Asian Regional Institutions and the Possibilities for Socializing the Behavior of States

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Abstract

Departing from the traditional yardsticks for measuring the performance and effectiveness of regional institutions, this paper proposes a new framework to investigate their effect in the socialization (i.e. internalization of group norms by newcomers) of new members. Called Type III internalization, it represents a middle ground between Type I (i.e. member states simply acting according to group expectations, even if they may not agree with them), and Type II (i.e. states transforming themselves by adopting the interests and identities of the group) internalization. In Type III internalization, states act both instrumentally and normatively. While their interests and values do not change permanently, there is enough change to induce substantially new kinds of cooperative behavior, in trade and security. Type III internalization is non-legalistic and consensual, moving at a pace in which everyone is comfortable, but there is no danger of backtracking. New members moderate their competitive instincts and pursue common objectives. The impact of institutional norms such as “open regionalism” and “cooperative security” transmitted through institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the ASEAN Regional Forum on Viet Nam, India, and the People’s Republic of China attests to the existence of a Type III internalization.

Keywords: Asia, regional institutions, Asian regional institutions, constructivism, socialization, institution-design, multilateralism

JEL Classification: F50, F55
1. Introduction

This essay examines the socializing effect of Asian regional institutions, using the theoretical and conceptual prism of constructivist approaches to international relations. It is divided into three parts. The first briefly outlines the main and distinctive arguments of constructivism as a theory (or at least a perspective) on the study of international relations. Since socialization as a concept is deeply embedded in the theoretical literature of constructivism, it is useful to begin the essay by looking at the core assumptions and arguments of constructivism. Such an exercise also helps to explore the role of institutions in constructivism, since international (including regional) institutions act as promoters and sites of socialization. The second section highlights the insights generated by constructivist scholarship on Asian regional institutions. The third section considers the contribution of Asian regional institutions to socialization, one of the most important conceptual tools of constructivism (Johnston 2007). This section addresses the specific question of whether regional institutions in Asia have created the possibility of socializing the behavior of states, and to what extent the motivations and conditions of socialization as specified by constructivist theory have played out in the region and shaped its regional institutions.

At the outset, let me note some limitations of this essay. I write this assessment of constructivist scholarship on Asian institutions from “within the camp,” hence subject to the presumptions and biases that come with this predicament. Second, my coverage of constructivist contributions to the study of Asian regionalism is not exhaustive. Although relatively new, the body of writings on Asian regionalism that is explicitly or implicitly constructivist is growing in number and diversity. I have drawn mainly upon those that are directly relevant to my investigation into the socializing effect of regional institutions. I do not include constructivist studies that are not concerned with institutions and socialization, such as those which focus primarily on domestic politics (e.g., Japan’s anti-militaristic norm, the emergence of a Taipei,China identity), bilateral relations (e.g., the alliance between the United States [US] and the Republic of Korea, or relations between the People’s Republic of China [PRC] and Taipei,China), or the foreign policy or strategic behavior of individual states (e.g., Johnston’s study [1998] of the PRC’s “cultural realism”). Next, with some exceptions (like its attention to epistemic communities), the essay is state-centric, even though it need not be so. Constructivist accounts can fully accommodate the role of both states and civil society actors (not just Track-II bodies) in regional cooperation. But consistent with the mandate given to this author, I have accepted here as a fair assumption that Asian regional institutions, reflecting the domestic politics of many states, are primarily inter-governmental organizations, even though their ideational (as opposed to material) resources derive from epistemic communities as much as states. It is in relation to state behavior that their impact must be primarily judged, even though regional institutions are increasingly subject to pressures from a transnational civil society.
2. Constructivism in International Relations Theory

Constructivism is a relatively new perspective on international relations. Although some trace its genesis to the work of the English School of international relations beginning in the 1950s, it emerged as a distinctive label in the late 1980s and acquired growing popularity in the 1990s (Hopf 1998; Checkel 1998a, 1998b). Today, some would see it as having acquired a status (and a dominance) comparable to realism and liberalism, although this would be stretching the truth, except perhaps in Europe. There are vigorous academic debates over what constructivism stands for and whether it's a full-fledged or substantive theory (like realism, liberalism, or institutionalism) or a meta-theory, a philosophical position and an ontology that does not offer causal arguments that are falsifiable and testable (Moravcsik 2001, Risse and Wiener 2001). In the latter view, constructivism, like rational choice, is more of a method than a theory *per se* (Checkel 1998a, 1998b). There are significant differences between American Wendtian constructivism, which tends to be social-scientific, or “softly rational,” as Ernst Haas (2001) put it, and a European variety which stresses argumentative rationality and leans more towards reflectivism (Christiansen, Jorgensen, and Wiener 2001). There may even be a possible Asian strand distinguished by claims of regional exceptionalism: the uniqueness of Asian culture and tradition as the basis of its international relations (Kang 2003) and constitutive localization of ideas and norms (Acharya 2004, 2009). Moreover, although its initial popularity was due to its claim to challenge rationalist (neo-realist and neo-liberal) theories, there is a growing consensus that these and the constructivist perspective are complimentary rather than antithetical. Hence, the growing talk about a rationalist–constructivist synthesis (Checkel 2005).

Notwithstanding these debates, it is fair to say that constructivism makes some fundamental claims about the nature of international relations which set it apart from other theories including realism and liberalism. Five are especially noteworthy.

The first is that agents (e.g., states) and structures (the international system) are mutually constitutive. This goes against structuralist theories, such as neo-realism, which hold that state behavior is determined by structure (i.e., anarchy, or the absence of a higher authority above the state) and the distribution of power (e.g., bipolarity, multipolarity). For structural perspectives, unit-level variables (domestic politics, democracy, and autocracy), human nature (good or bad leaders), and the action of agents (norm entrepreneurs, including civil society groups) are not decisive in shaping conflict and cooperation. Constructivists, on the other hand, believe that states, leaders, transnational moral agents, and civil society groups affect the international system and are shaped by it.

Second, constructivism argues that the interests and identities of actors (states) are not a given, or preordained, but are shaped by their interactions with other actors. To quote the title of Wendt's (1992) classic essay, “anarchy is what states make of it”. This challenges the rationalist logic of theories that hold that states already “know who they are and what they want” before they enter into international interactions.

A third claim of constructivism is that international relations is shaped not just by material forces, but also by ideational ones, including culture, ideas, and norms. Constructivism
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has been a major factor in the return of culture and identity to the study of international relations, after it became unfashionable in the West as a result the behavioral revolution. Constructivists have taken up the study of cultural determinants of foreign policy, security, and economics, with the best known examples being The Culture of National Security, a collection of essays linking culture and security issues edited by Peter Katzenstein (1996), and Iain Johnston’s Cultural Realism (1998), which examined the cultural determinants of the PRC’s strategic behavior. Few constructivists would claim exclusive causality for ideas, but many would argue, following Wendt (1999), that in explaining international relations, one should turn to ideas first and then turn to material forces to explain residual phenomena. It is fair to say that many followers of constructivism see it is an “ideas-first”, rather than “ideas-all-the-way-down” theory. Others give ideas at least equal space. Moreover, constructivists do not see ideas as mere hooks for strategic action or self-interested behavior aimed at achieving parochial goals, but as instruments of normative action that can transform international relations.

This leads to a fourth key argument of constructivism concerning the transformative effects of norms. Constructivists (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Checkel 1998a, 1998b; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999) believe that states are guided by a logic of appropriateness, rather than by a logic of consequences (or consequentialism). Norms play a crucial role in deciding what is legitimate and appropriate, and what is not. Norms matter; they can and do trump power- and interest-driven behavior. Norms can tame or constrain power politics by delegitimizing it (Acharya 2009). Once accepted, norms develop a sticky quality and tend to reproduce themselves. Norms help the socialization of new actors into a community.

Finally, constructivism takes a deeper view of the impact of international institutions. Institutions are central to the constructivist view of international relations. Realists often dismiss international institutions as marginal to the game of international politics, some consider them as adjuncts to power-balancing behavior. Institutions are as good as their great power patrons want them to be. Liberals see international institutions as having a more meaningful role. Classical liberalism stressed the collective security function of international institutions. A more recent strand of liberalism, neo-liberal institutionalism (Keohane 1989), while regarding the international system as anarchic (thus agreeing with neo-realism), nonetheless finds cooperation to be possible because institutions promote transparency (information flows), reduce transaction costs, and discourage cheating. Constructivists have significantly redefined and broadened the neo-liberal institutionalist perspective on how institutions work by moving away from its contractual view of cooperation based on reciprocity and rational calculation of cost and benefit. According to constructivist theory, international institutions, formal and informal, act as teachers of norms (Finnemore 1993) and provide an environment for socialization (Johnston 2001), in which “actors internalize the norms which then influence how they see themselves and what they perceive as their interests.” (Risse and Wiener 2001, 202). Instead of strategic calculation, the constructivist view of how institutions work focuses on the micro-processes of persuasion and social influence. Constructivists thus argue that international institutions not only regulate state behavior, they also have a constitutive effect on states, meaning institutions can change state interests and reconstitute their identities. Together with norms, institutions can transform anarchy and
push a group of states onto a path towards security communities in which war among states become unthinkable (Adler and Barnett 1998).

Recent non-Western, including Asian, contributions to the constructivist view of international institutions have moved it beyond its origins within a Western discourse and context. Two lines of advance can be discerned. The first is that international institutions may matter even if they are not fully backed by the great powers or when they are led by weak states in the face of great power indifference or opposition. Unlike realism, which is a theory of the weak in the world of the strong, constructivism offers a theory of the strong in the world of the weak. Weak states resorting to norm-based action and working through cooperative institutions can resist the material hegemony of great powers and influence power politics (Acharya 2009). Second, constructivism, even more so than regime theory, offers a way of understanding why states cooperate even in the absence of strong formalistic, legalistic institutions like the European Union (EU). Constructivism focuses on the transformative and constitutive role of ideas and norms, which can be diffused and shared with or without formal organizations with large, permanent bureaucracies (Acharya 1997, 2009).

Constructivism not only describes a worldview with conditions for peaceful change, it also has a prescriptive function that includes specifying strategies of change induced by socialization. As Johnston (2007, xvi) argues, “there is also a great deal of policy space for socialization arguments. After all, governmental and non-governmental diplomacy is often an effort to persuade, shame, cajole, and socially ‘pressure’ states to change their collective minds and behavior.” Some of the key documents of Asian regionalism reflect a constructivist logic of socialization (Severino 2006, East Asia Vision Group 2001, East Asia Study Group 2002). Strategies of socialization, constructivism’s signature contribution to international relations theory and practice, is an approach employed by states in opposition to realpolitik approaches of engagement such as balancing, bandwagoning, or buck-passing. Socialization is a way of generating counter-realpolitik behavior in states that are being socialized.

### 3. Constructivism and the Study of Asian Regionalism

It is useful to remind ourselves that Asian regionalism as a distinctive field of study is remarkably new, and that until recently, it had remained largely atheoretical. The study of Asian regionalism has in recent years become increasingly theoretical. This essay argues that constructivist approaches, or studies underpinned by constructivist assumptions as identified earlier, have made a number of important contributions to the study of Asian regional institutions.

The first concerns the question of regional definition. Challenging the traditional geographic and geopolitical view of regions, constructivists argue that the there can be no preordained, permanent or changeless regions. Regions are social constructs, whose boundaries are subject to negotiation and change. Such characterizations apply whether one is speaking of Southeast Asia, which has been likened to an “imagined community” (Acharya 2000), or the larger East Asia (Evans 1999) and Asia-Pacific regions. As Pempel (2005, 24–25) put it, while “East Asia today is a much more closely knit region
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than it was at the end of World War II or even a decade ago…no single map of East Asia is so inherently self-evident and logical as to preclude the consideration of equally plausible alternatives.” It should be noted that critical international relations scholars also challenge regional definitions as givens. Dirlik (1992) for example characterized the “Asia-Pacific idea” as a matter more of representation than reality: an artificial construct that rationalizes elite interests. Constructivists do not necessarily share such skepticism about regional construction and identity. Neither do they agree on the question of whether regions are constructed from within or from without. But unlike realists who often think of regions as extensions of great power geopolitics, constructivism makes greater allowance for the bottom-up construction of regions.

This leads to a second insight of constructivist analysis of Asian regional institutions: how they differ from the European variety. This debate has acquired a huge following thanks to European-funded projects and conferences. But the most insightful contribution to this debate comes from a constructivist scholar (admittedly with an eclectic perspective that combines power and interest variables with ideational ones): Peter Katzenstein. Katzenstein (2005) argues that regionalism in both Europe and Asia is shaped by US-led processes of globalization and internationalization, and are underpinned by regional production structures led by a “core state” serving US interests: Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia. But while Europe’s regionalism is much more institutionalized, legalized, and marked by supranational governance, Asia’s is late, sovereignty bound, informal, and non-legalistic. The reason for this has to do not only with differing domestic structures (Asia’s non-Weberian polities versus Europe’s Weberian ones), but also—and this is the constructivist element in his contribution—with international norms, such as Asia’s adherence to the norm of “open regionalism,” and variations in identification. While Katzenstein’s position on core states has not gone unchallenged (Aggarwal et al. 2007), especially from those who argue, among other things, that the characterization of Japanese dominance in Asian regional production structures is rapidly becoming anachronistic in the face of a rising PRC, he does address one of the key puzzles of Asian regional institutionalism: why did post-War Asia not develop a multilateral institution? While realists explain the puzzle by pointing to the “extreme hegemony” of the US in the early post-war period as a factor inhibiting multilateralism, and liberals do so by pointing to the region’s initial lack of economic interdependence, constructivists point to the role of identity and norms. For Katzenstein, US perceptions of a greater collective identity with its European partners as a community of equals led it to encourage North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-like multilateralism in Europe; the absence of such identification and the perception of Asia as an inferior community led it to shun multilateralism there (Katzenstein 2005, Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002). Another constructivist explanation looks beyond the US–Asia identity dissonance and argues that the late development of Asian multilateralism could be explained in terms of the normative beliefs and preferences of Asian actors against great-power-led security multilateralism (Acharya 2009).

Third, constructivism has done much to highlight the specific and unique design features of Asian institutions. The literature on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the so-called “ASEAN way,” which is authored largely by constructivist scholars, identifies the informal, non-legalistic, consensus-based, and process-driven approach to coordination and collaboration developed by ASEAN (Acharya 1997, Busse
These design features of ASEAN have also been grafted onto the wider Asia-Pacific institutions such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Aside from defining the latter's institutional characteristics, ASEAN's design features also underscore its role as the driver of these wider institutions. There has been much debate as to whether the ASEAN way has always been upheld in practice. But what is clear is that it has come under increasing strain in recent years as ASEAN and other institutions face new transnational challenges such as financial crises, pandemics, and terrorism. ASEAN is under growing pressure to legalize itself and has responded to these pressures by drafting and adopting an ASEAN Charter. Some of the institutional mechanisms of ASEAN, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area and Agreement on Transboundary Pollution, show increasing legalization. APEC's move towards legalization is also worth noting, although this has stalled as a result of the setbacks to its trade liberalization program. The ARF remains weakly institutionalized and severely under-legalized. Its confidence-building agenda is based on voluntary efforts, and its development of a preventive diplomacy and mediation role has stalled.

A fourth insight of constructivism into Asian regionalism concerns the role of ideas and epistemic communities (non-official or semiofficial transnational expert groups) in the development of regional institutions, especially APEC. It is true that the leading figures of the Pacific Cooperation movement were neoclassical economists and economic liberals (Woods 1993). But their role in first developing the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and subsequently APEC cannot be understood without applying a constructivist perspective on the role of knowledge or epistemic communities. Although not strictly a constructivist work, John Ravenhill's (2001) study of APEC takes a composite approach to examine both the material as well as the ideational sources of APEC. He puts the role of knowledge groups—especially the advocates of the Pacific Community idea in the 1970s and 80s, who were deeply involved in PECC as the precursor to APEC—and their ideas (open regionalism) alongside the distribution of power, interdependence, and domestic politics as the mix of forces that produced APEC. In this respect, his book differs from rationalist accounts of APEC's emergence (Drysdale 1988, Kahler 1994, Aggarwal 1993, Aggarwal and Morrison 1998). The role of the ASEAN Institutes of International and Strategic Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) in developing policy proposals and serving as a filter of ideas for ASEAN and the ARF are similar testimony to the role of epistemic communities in fostering cooperation and institution-building (Caballero-Anthony 2005; for a radical constructivist view of these epistemic communities, see Tan 2007).

The fifth contribution concerns the role of ASEAN, the first truly viable regional institution in Asia. Here, Acharya ([2001] 2009), Haacke (2003), Caballero-Anthony (2005), and Ba (2009) have each made well-known constructivist contributions to the understanding of ASEAN. Their relative focus differs, however. The author's book (Acharya 2001) uses the concept of a “security community,” or a group of states which rule out the use of force in resolving their conflicts, originally developed by Karl Deutsch and his associates, and reformulated by Adler and Barnett (1998) as an analytical tool to examine ASEAN's strengths as well as limitations. Despite its stated intention to stay away from the question of ASEAN's current status as a security community, the book has fuelled a
heated controversy precisely over the question of whether ASEAN should or should not be regarded as a pluralistic security community. And while the author’s work places strong emphasis on norms and local agency, others like Ba, give more play to the socialization involving external actors. Haacke’s idea of diplomatic and security culture is essentially constructivist, albeit influenced by Michael Leifer’s (Haacke’s doctoral supervisor) soft realism, while Ba avoids the security community debate and employs an ideational and “social negotiations” (e.g., dialogues, meetings) approach to trace the evolution of ASEAN’s norms and its extension to East Asian great powers (the PRC and Japan).

Despite these differences, they share a fit with constructivist assumptions in the following respects. First, they highlight the role of ideational forces—norms, identity, community, and strategic culture—in the origin and evolution of ASEAN. Ideational assets are key in explaining ASEAN’s emergence and effectiveness:

The role of norms and identity-building is especially important for the study of Southeast Asian regionalism because its material resources and bureaucratic organization are thin indeed. ASEAN regionalism has been primarily a normative regionalism. Hence, no serious investigation of ASEAN can be complete without consideration of the role of norms and the issue of identity-formation. For the same reason, the concept of community is an important analytic tool for investigating Southeast Asian regionalism and regional order. This is because the notion of security community allows the use of norms and identity as analytic tools to investigate international relations, while neo-realism or neo-liberalism would ignore such variables. (Acharya 2005)

Other shared threads among constructivist works on ASEAN are their investigations into ASEAN’s constraining impact on inter-state conflicts and great power behavior, and the strengths and limits of ASEAN’s informal regionalism, including the extension of the ASEAN model to East Asia and the Asia-Pacific. In these respects, these contributions dissent from Michael Leifer’s soft realist account of ASEAN (Leifer 1989), or Shaun Narine’s (2002) essentially realist account, although his subsequent work on ASEAN has embraced the English School’s international society perspective. Much of the above constructivist work concerns ASEAN’s political and security cooperation. There has not yet been a significant constructivist account of ASEAN economic cooperation to match Nesadurai’s (2003) domestic-politics-centered account of trade liberalization.

Sixth, constructivism has done much to explain the emergence, activities, and performance of wider Asia-Pacific and East Asian regional institutions. Initial work on this started as an extension of research on ASEAN, which is not surprising since ASEAN has been the institutional hub (and sometimes the driver) of Asia-Pacific and East Asian regionalism. Here, constructivists’ accounts (Acharya 1997, Ba 2009, Johnston 1999) have explored the benefits and pitfalls of extending the ASEAN process (or ASEAN way) to Asia-Pacific regionalism by asking whether a sub-regionally developed approach can work in such a larger and more complex setting involving so many great powers. Constructivists generally believe that it can.

Constructivists (Acharya 2003) believe that the major contribution of Asian institutions is normative. Asian institutions act as sites of normative contestation, creation (i.e., “norm
breweries” to use Katsumata’s [2006] term, and localization. While Asian regionalism is influenced by global norms, these norms are not imported wholesale, but are localized by regional actors to suit their own context and need, in accordance with their prior beliefs and practices. Thus, the usefulness and relevance of these normative discourses carried through regional institutions is enhanced by such “constitutive localization” (Acharya 2004). A related and subsequent line of investigation concerns the socializing effects of security institutions, particularly the ARF. Iain Johnston’s Social States (2007), not strictly a study of Asian regionalism, but of the PRC’s participation in international institutions during 1980–2000, cautiously argues in support of the ARF’s influence in inducing more cooperative behavior from the PRC. Katsumata (2009) is far more forthright in claiming that the ARF has had a substantial impact on the strategic preferences and behavior of the PRC, Japan, and the US, the three principal powers of the Asia-Pacific. This would certainly add to a particularly contentious ongoing debate over the ARF triggered by Leifer’s (1996) skeptical view, which pointed to what he terms the ARF’s “structural flaw”: the professed goal of a group of weak states (ASEAN) to manage the balance of power in a region which contains practically all the great powers of the international system. The ARF in his view can at best be an adjunct to the balance of power game played by the great powers; instead of influencing it, it will be influenced by it. Moreover, the success of ARF depends on a prior balance of power, by which he meant an equitable distribution of power. On the other side of the debate are constructivists who have turned the balance of power logic on its head by arguing that norm-guided socialization led by ASEAN’s weaker states can actually shape great power geopolitics and that the restraint induced by the ARF is key to maintaining a stable balance of power in the region. This theme is also captured by Ralf Emmers’ (2003) study of ARF which represents an attempt to reconcile realism and institutionalism.

4. Socialization and Asian Regional Institutions

This leads us to a discussion of the socializing role of Asian regional institutions, the principal theme of this essay. What evidence is there that Asian institutions have had a role in socialization and how effective have they been in socializing their member states? To consider this meaningfully, we must first have an understanding of what socialization means, what are its causal mechanisms, how to we measure the success or failure of socialization, and what are the conditions that determine the success or failure of socialization mechanisms.

In a broad and simple sense, socialization means getting new actors to adopt the rules and norms of a community on a long-term basis without the use of force or coercion. There are four key aspects to this definition. First and foremost, socialization’s key ingredient is norms. Socialization implies norm transmission by socializers resulting in pro-norm behavior by the socializee. Risse (1997, 16) emphasizes processes “resulting in the internalization of norms so that they assume their ’taken-for-granted’ nature” as the core aspect of socialization; while Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990, 289–90) define socialization as a process of learning in which the norms and ideals are transmitted by one party to another. Second, for constructivists, such norm transmission that underlies socialization is pacific and non-coercive. There is no socialization through force or conquest, the key mechanism of socialization is persuasion. Third, socialization is
directed at newcomers, or novices. Fourth, socialization leads to long-term and stable changes in behavior, rather than short-term adaptation. Checkel’s definition of socialization which draws upon previous writings on the subject, including sociological perspectives, is useful to borrow. Socialization is:

defined as a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the norms and rules of a given community. In adopting community rules, socialization implies that an agent switches from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness; this adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions. (Checkel 2005, 804)

To clarify, this essay views socialization itself as a dependent variable, i.e., getting new actors to follow the rules of the group, rather than attainment of peace and prosperity. Judging socialization is different from judging the instrumental efficacy of institutions.

The insights of the constructivist literature on socialization can be summarized as follows:

(i) Whereas previous works on socialization focused more on the motivations and role of “socializers,” more recent works (especially Johnston 2007; Acharya 2004, 2009), investigate it from the perspective of the “socializee” or the norm-taker. In other words, in understanding socialization, it is more important to understand the domestic and external conditions of the socializee/persuadee/ norm-taker than that of the socializer/persuader/norm-giver.

(ii) International institutions play a vital role in socialization, whether as promoters of socialization from outside or as sites of socialization in cases when the socializee is a member of the institution.

(iii) There is no one pathway to socialization. Mechanisms of socialization can include strategic calculation (whereby the target actor calculates that the benefits of socialization exceed its costs) and bargaining, as well as persuasion, teaching, mimicking, social influence, argumentation, role playing, or normative suasion. The shift to a logic of appropriateness is not necessarily a shift to what is morally appropriate, but to what is socially appropriate, from a calculation of what is instrumentally beneficial to the socializee (logic of consequences).

(iv) The dependent variable of socialization (when socialization has taken place) is internalization of “the values, roles, and understandings held by a group that constitutes the society of which the actor becomes a member. Internalization implies, further, that these values, roles, and understandings take on the character of ‘taken-for-grantedness’” (Johnston 2007, 21). The degree of internalization may vary, however. Socialization may or may not involve a fundamental redefinition of the
interests and identities of the target, sometimes, the target may agree to play by the rules of the group it is being inducted without developing a “we feeling.” Checkel distinguishes between Type I socialization, where the socializee has accepted new roles out of instrumental calculations (incentive-based) in order to conform to the expectations of a community it seeks to belong to without necessarily liking or agreeing with it, and Type II socialization, where genuine and long-term (taken for granted) changes to the interests and values of the socializee have occurred, and where new roles and behavioral changes reflect a new normative conception that “it’s the right thing to do” (Checkel 2005, 808 and 813).

Socialization depends on a number of conditions. Zurn and Checkel’s (2005, 1055) list of scope conditions of socialization includes properties of the international institutions that trigger socialization, properties of the political systems and agents that become socialized, properties of the issues or norms regarding which type of socialization takes place, and properties of the interaction between socializing and socialized agents (e.g., intensity of contact, style of discourse). A more selective and specific set of hypotheses about socialization may be derived from the literature on persuasion, an important mechanism or “micro process” of socialization (Checkel and Moravcsik 2001, Checkel 2005). According to this literature, persuasion is more likely to succeed if the (a) target actors are in a new and uncertain environment, (b) prior and ingrained beliefs of the persuadee do not clash with the beliefs and messages of the persuader, (c) persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the persuadee wishes to belong, (d) persuader itself sets the example and acts out the principles of deliberative argument and, (e) interaction occurs in a setting that is relatively less politicized or more insulated from public opinion and pressure (i.e., “in-camera setting”). For a more extensive list of the scope conditions, albeit generalized out of European cases, see Checkel 2005, 813; Zurn and Checkel 2005. Other determinants of socialization include group size, intensity, and frequency of contact, and shared identity among the persuader and the persuadee.

How do these conditions apply to Asian regionalism? This essay focuses on three main cases of socialization through regional institutions in Asia: Viet Nam, the PRC, and India.¹ These three cases are discussed below in terms of the insights of the socialization literature outlined above.

¹ One might plausibly include the US here, but I have kept the US out on grounds of regional belonging and identity.
Table 1: Key Norms of Asian Regional Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>ASEAN</th>
<th>APEC</th>
<th>ARF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norms (Substantive)</td>
<td>Non-interference; Pacific settlement of disputes; Primacy of regional solutions; Avoidance of multilateral military pacts reflecting great power rivalry; One Southeast Asia concept</td>
<td>Open regionalism; market-driven regionalization</td>
<td>Common/cooperative security, inclusiveness; non-interference, avoidance of NATO-style military cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norms (Procedural)</td>
<td>Consensus; Informalism; Voluntary compliance</td>
<td>Flexible consensus; Concerted unilateralism; Soft institutionalism</td>
<td>Consensus; ASEAN leadership; Voluntary Compliance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APEC = Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, ARF = ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Source: Authors’ compilation.

The first area to look at concerns the socializee’s imperative. In each of these cases, the changing domestic conditions (including regime legitimacy and survival) of the target have been critical. Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the PRC (inspired by domestic economic pressure, ideological shift, regime insecurity, and a desire to restore the PRC’s standing in the world) beginning in the late 1970s; Viet Nam’s withdrawal from Cambodia (induced by domestic economic failure earlier in the 1980s created by the burden of its occupation of Cambodia); and India’s crisis-induced (a severe balance of payments crisis and near default on foreign debt) liberalization in the early 1990s paved the way for critical foreign policy shifts leading to their eventual membership in regional institutions. External conditions, especially the end of the Cold War have also been a critical factor, but not sufficient by themselves to explain why these countries chose to be socialized, since the end of the Cold War did not generate similar responses from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Moreover, the socialization of the three states did not begin simultaneously; Viet Nam’s was first and perhaps the most advanced, the PRC’s was second in sequence, followed by India. And the socializations of the PRC and India have not progressed to the same extent. Hence, domestic conditions and the preferences of the socializee, is the more important variable here, rather than the singular external event (i.e., end of the Cold War).

The second area is the role of institutions, especially regional ones. There is little doubt that regional institutions have been critical in the socialization process, both before and after the target states became formal members. While ASEAN has been the most important institution for Viet Nam, the ARF has been especially important for the PRC. For India, the prospect of becoming an ASEAN dialogue partner and a member of the ARF and East Asian Summit (EAS) has been similarly important. Once the target states became members, regional institutions became sites of dialogues, rule-making, and creation of new mechanisms of cooperation.

The third area, which concerns the issue of strategic calculation versus persuasion/argumentation/social influence, is especially important. No one can exclude
strategic calculation on the part of the three states in engaging and being engaged by these institutions. For Viet Nam, membership in ASEAN offered an opportunity to attract foreign investment, even before the ASEAN Free Trade Area and ASEAN Investment Area, and a platform to cushion its reentry into the international system after a decade of isolation due to its occupation of Cambodia. It also meant diplomatic support (albeit implicit and limited) for its territorial claim (Spratlys and Paracels) against the PRC in the sense that its bilateral dispute with the PRC now became a PRC–ASEAN issue. For the PRC, the strategic calculation in joining the ARF, despite substantial misgivings, would have been the opportunity afforded by the ARF as a platform to launch a charm offensive and reduce perceptions of the “[People’s Republic of] China threat.” Neutralizing Taipei, China’s influence-seeking in Southeast Asia through trade and investment was also important. For India, improving its then-dismal economic conditions, having ASEAN as a bridge with its prosperous East Asian neighbors, and engaging in strategic competition with the PRC were important motivations that a rationalist framework would easily recognize.

But as noted, constructivists accept that norm compliance and socialization is not inconsistent with self-interested behavior. The key is whether what we are witnessing is pacific, long-term, and transformative (in the sense that they involve a redefinition of interests and identities, and not simply short-term adaptation and reluctant role-playing). The jury is still out on this question. But certain important indicators of internalization are visible in each case in which regional institutions have played an important role, whether as external promoters or sites of socialization.

Turning to Viet Nam first, there is considerable evidence that Viet Nam has accepted and internalized ASEAN’s non-intervention norm, in contrast to its past disregard and violation of the norm, evident in its support for communist movements in neighboring Southeast Asian states, its grand scheme of an Indochinese federation dominated by itself, and its invasion and occupation of Cambodia. In the case of the PRC, the key change has been the shift from an exclusively bilateral approach to conflict management to a multilateral approach. This is evident in its acceptance of multilateral talks with ASEAN on the South China Sea dispute leading to a Declaration on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (not yet a full-fledged legal instrument or code, but an important step towards it; further progress towards such a code will be a key test of its internalization of multilateralism norm). The PRC’s growing support for the ARF despite earlier misgivings about it is also important. The author’s research offers a graphic account of the conceptual shift in Chinese thinking on multilateralism in the 1990s. Johnston (2007) provides considerable evidence of changes to Chinese bureaucratic and decision-making structures that support the internalization of new norms of multilateralism. As for India, the key change is in the economic arena as evident in India’s gradual shift from economic nationalism and protectionism to trade liberalization, openness, and foreign direct investment. Again, this shift is occurring (albeit haltingly) not just because of regional institutions, but regional institutions have provided key sites for the change, including negotiations over the ASEAN–India Free Trade Agreement and India’s own interest in developing an Asian Free Trade Area (as well as prospective membership in APEC, as yet unrealized but an incentive for accepting free trade liberalization norms). What is striking about India’s membership in ASEAN, ARF, and EAS is that unlike the 1940s and 1950s, when India was the leading provider of Asian
Asian Regional Institutions and the Possibilities for Socializing the Behavior of States

Regionalist ideas and a key force behind Asian multilateral conferences—such as the Asian Relations Conference of 1947 and 1949, and the Asia-Africa Conference of 1955—it is now following someone else’s (ASEAN) lead in regionalism.

These instances of internalization (as indicator of socialization) have their limits. The PRC does not accept a preventive diplomacy role (signifying deeper multilateralism) for the ARF, or resorting to multilateralism in addressing the Taipei, China issue, and India is not yet a full convert to free trading with East Asian countries, or to multilateralism in resolving the Kashmir conflict. But while not comprehensive, their normative and behavioral shifts are irreversible. There is no going back to the Indochinese federation for Viet Nam, exclusive bilateralism for the PRC, or Nehruvian socialism for India. And it is fair to say that these shifts were induced by socialization through regional institutions, although not exclusively by them. Regional institutions have helped to create and reinforce the convergence between domestic interests, strategic calculation, and international behavior.

The evidence seen thus far suggests the possibility of a Type III internalization, in addition to Checkel’s Type I (states acting in accordance with group expectations “irrespective of whether they like the role or agree with it”), and Type II in which there is real value and interest change leading agents to “adopt the interests, or even possibly the identity, of the community of which they are a part” (Checkel 2005, 804). In either case, instrumental calculation, which may be initially present as a mechanism of socialization, has been replaced by a logic of appropriateness. Although Checkel calls for a “double interpretation” of every instance of socialization, once from the perspective of constructivism and once from the perspective of rational choice, he is quite clear on what socialization entails: in order to be socialized, whether into a Type I or a Type II outcome, states must discard instrumental calculation (logic of consequences) in favor of logic of appropriateness (Checkel 2005, 804). By contrast, this author suggests a Type III internalization to refer to a condition in which agents act both instrumentally and normatively, concurrently, and on a more or less permanent basis. Moreover, in Type III internalization a key factor in determining the outcome may be the logic of expediency. Creating a room for states to determine their own pace within regional institutions and agreements is an important enabler for Type III internalization, in which states act both instrumentally and normatively, concurrently, and to support regional cooperation and integration. In this situation, states tend to pursue new initiatives or new directions at a pace comfortable to all stakeholders. Yet this is no short-term shift from purely instrumental calculation and behavior, the shift is irreversible, even though it may or may not lead to Type II internalization, in which values and interests change permanently.

Type III internalization is what best describes the socializing effects of Asian regional institutions today on newcomers. While the socializee (the PRC, India, Viet Nam) are not in danger of backtracking, they need more time and convincing before fully committing to the new norms and roles to an extent where interest and identity transformation becomes discernable. And they may never get to that stage. In other words, Type III internalization may or may not be an intermediary stage or the tipping point between Type I and Type II. Moreover, Type III internalization may not be comprehensive in terms of issue areas. Viet Nam, the PRC, and India have all irrevocably committed to non-interference, multilateralism, and trade regionalism, respectively, but they have not...
embraced all three areas, at least to the same degree. Uneven socialization and internalization is thus a feature of Type III socialization.

Finally, the conditions of socialization are important in answering the question of why internalization, even if to such limited degree, has taken place in Asia. Of the five conditions outlined above, the new and uncertain strategic and economic environment of the post-Cold War era has certainly been an important factor; Khong (2004) has argued that the principal mission of Asian regional institutions has been to reduce and manage uncertainty. Uncertainty—about the US military posture, the rise of the PRC and its strategic intent and behavior, competition between the PRC and Japan, the appearance of regional trade blocs due to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the EU’s Single Market—was the key element of the security discourse of the post-Cold War period. It certainly helped to focus the purpose and direction of Asia’s regional institutions. The second condition is consistent with this essay’s norm localization argument, which suggests that norm diffusion is more likely to be successful if it is congruent with the prior beliefs and practices of the norm-taker. Since norms are important to socialization, it is important to recognize that certain norms promoted by external players (e.g., Australia, Canada, Gorbachev’s former Soviet Union), such as open regionalism in the economic arena and cooperative security in the security arena, have been accepted in Asia (by ASEAN states and the PRC) because they were congruent (or made to appear as such by norm entrepreneurs from Canada and Australia) with the prior beliefs and practices of the local actors, which included ASEAN’s prior multilateralism and its openness to foreign direct investment. By contrast, norms of humanitarian intervention and EU-style free trade failed to diffuse in East Asia because of their clash with prior local norms of non-intervention and developmental regionalism (Acharya 2004, 2009).

### Table 2: Types of Socialization (Internalization)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Type I</th>
<th>Type II</th>
<th>Type III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agent’s (Socializee) motivation</strong></td>
<td>To be socially accepted by satisfying group expectations</td>
<td>Because “it’s the right thing to do”</td>
<td>To be socially accepted by finding the best fit between self-interest and group purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator of internalization</strong></td>
<td>Learning and playing new roles even when the agent may not like it or agree with it</td>
<td>Changes in interests and identities that can be “taken for granted”</td>
<td>Learning new roles that it agrees with, with some redefinition of its interests and identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logic of action</strong></td>
<td>Logic of appropriateness</td>
<td>Logic of appropriateness</td>
<td>Logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The third condition is also relevant in Asia; ASEAN, as the chief forum for socialization, had an aura of authoritativeness (at least before the 1997/98 financial crisis), which made it attractive for the PRC, India, and Viet Nam to participate in ASEAN-led regional institutions. This authoritativeness had to do with ASEAN’s relative longevity (the oldest viable regional political grouping in Asia), its role in the Cambodia peace process, its own intra-mural peace, and its system of dialogue relationships with the major powers. ASEAN had also shown both willingness and ability to act out its own norms of non-intervention and non-use of force (notwithstanding the fact that the meaning of non-intervention remains contested here, as ASEAN has supported fellow regimes facing internal threats and this particular norm is now subject to increasing challenge). Its authority as a socializer is also the result of the fact that no other country or group of countries in Asia are in a similar position to provide leadership due to their past failures (India), mutual rivalry (PRC–Japan), smallness and security preoccupations (Republic of Korea), or outsider-ness (US, Australia, Canada, and Russian Federation).

The centrality of ASEAN in Asian regionalism also raises the question of the content of norms as a condition for socialization. In the European context, the examples of such norms which are often cited as conditions of socialization are minority rights or democratic procedures (Zurn and Checkel 2005, 1055). In Asia, the norms that most influence socialization are not those of human rights or democracy, but domestic non-interference and regional autonomy. Without the centrality of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states espoused by ASEAN, it is unlikely that the PRC or Viet Nam (or Myanmar) would have been drawn into APEC, ARF, and EAS. Its sister norm is non-intervention by outside powers in regional affairs, or regional autonomy, and the intent to explore indigenous solutions to regional problems. This, coupled with the related tendency to localize foreign norms to suit regional context and need in accordance with prior beliefs and practices, has not been that crucial in Europe, but is of considerable salience in Asia’s post-colonial context, even though it does not imply the exclusion of outside powers from the region.

Last but not the least, is the final condition of socialization: the importance of having an “in-camera” setting. This condition suggests that socialization is more likely to succeed in an authoritarian setting than in a pluralistic one, where the impact of public scrutiny and pressure group influence is more likely to occur and be felt. If this is true, and there is no reason why it should not be—the success of authoritarian ASEAN governments in forming and developing the association is one example—then it challenges those who argue that democracies are more likely to build lasting and more effective institutions, including security communities. And herein lies a possible challenge to the socializing role of Asian regional institutions. As many governments in ASEAN and Asia increasingly confront the forces of democratization, could their regional institutions keep up with the task of fostering and deepening socialization? Unlike European institutions, Asian regional groups have not made democracy a condition of membership or rewards. In fact, they have been illiberal and have attracted new members and support by holding up the prospect of non-intervention as a reward. There is a chance that democratization may disrupt this apparent authoritarian bent of Asian regional institutions. But on the positive side, there is no evidence that democratization has induced inter-state war in East Asia and disrupted regionalization or regionalism. On the contrary, it may foster a
cooperative security dynamic as evident under recently democratizing regimes in the Republic of Korea and Indonesia (Acharya manuscript).

**Table 3: Socialization of Viet Nam, the People’s Republic of China, and India**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions/ Members</th>
<th>ASEAN</th>
<th>APEC</th>
<th>ARF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>Ended occupation of Cambodia in 1989; Signed the Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia in 1991; Observer status in ASEAN in 1992; Full ASEAN membership in 1995; Chair (rotational) of ASEAN in 2001 and 2010; Leading role in drafting the Hanoi Plan of Action for ASEAN. Abandoned Indochinese federation concept (non-interference); Adheres to One Southeast Asia concept; Seeks peaceful settlement of South China Sea dispute but wants coverage of the South China Sea Code of Conduct to extend to the Paracels; Conservative and staunch champion of non-interference principle</td>
<td>Joined APEC in 1998; Hosted APEC Summit in 2006</td>
<td>Founding member in 1994; Chair of ARF 2001 and 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Growing domestic economic liberalization consistent with open regionalism and market-driven regionalization</td>
<td>Inclusiveness: supported the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s admission to ARF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperative security: regular participation in the ARF’s confidence-building measures and capacity-building initiatives; Abandoned military alliance with the former Soviet Union; Seeks to balance but not contain the PRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
<td>Agreed to multilateral talks with ASEAN on the South China Sea dispute in 1995; Full Dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1996; Signatory to Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003; Willing to be the first nuclear weapon state to sign the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty; Proposed Free Trade Area with ASEAN in 2002, agreement to be signed in 2010</td>
<td>Joined in 1991 along with Taipei, China</td>
<td>Founding member in 1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Accepts open regionalism, but supports development-oriented agenda for APEC in preference to trade liberalization</td>
<td>Inclusiveness: supported India’s membership in ARF; Cooperative security: regular participation in confidence-building measures and capacity-building initiatives; Leadership: initiated ARF’s Security Policy Conference meeting of defense ministry senior officials in 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Excludes Taipei, China issue; Opposes full preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution role for ARF; Opposes raising South China Sea dispute in ARF; Wants ARF to remain consultative, rather than become a problem-solving forum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of course, socialization in Asia has not been uniformly successful, as the cases of the DPRK and Myanmar demonstrate. But these failures can be explained to some extent by the absence of the scope conditions of socialization, especially frequency and intensity of contact and clash with the prior beliefs of the regimes. In both cases, the prior isolation of the regimes (and hence the low intensity and frequency of contact) is important. ASEAN’s policy of constructive engagement of Myanmar in the 1990s did not involve direct talks with the regime. The Six-Party Talks with the DPRK did provide a forum for contact, but it was clearly limited in scope, failing to address Pyongyang’s regime insecurity, and paling in comparison with the frequency of dialogues among other participants, e.g., between the Republic of Korea and the US, the US and Japan, and even the US and the PRC. Also important in both cases is the prior beliefs of the socializee, which is closely related to regime type. To the extent that socialization involves overcoming isolationist and autarchic domestic political ideology of the target regimes, the deep-seated paranoia of the regimes in the DPRK and Myanmar underpinned by their ideologies of national self-reliance—Juche and the “Burmese Way to Socialism,” respectively—have conflicted with the call for openness (economic and political liberalization, rather than democratization) from the regional institutions. Finally, and this applies only to the DPRK, ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions like the ARF have been somewhat distant and indifferent interlocutors in Northeast Asian security affairs. The Six-Party Talks have been an ad hoc process in line with the US preference for a la carte multilateralism. A pre-established Northeast Asian subregional institution like ASEAN in Southeast Asia was not around to cushion the dialogue with the DPRK. Instead of providing the forum for the socialization of the DPRK, such a mechanism is envisaged as a possible outcome of the Six-Party Talks. While the cases of the DPRK
and Myanmar attest to the failure of socialization by Asian regional institutions, they do suggest the applicability of the conditions of socialization identified by socialization theory.

**Table 4: Mechanisms of Socialization: Three Cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal Mechanisms</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type I: Strategic Calculation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type II: Normative Suasion/Teaching/Social Influence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type III: Bargaining/Role Playing/Mimicking/Social Influence</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Not all mechanisms may be present in every case of socialization. There may be overlap among the mechanisms, but the first one (in bold) in the above typology is the mechanisms that is most active under different types of internalization. Because Type III internalization is a hybrid, mechanisms from Type I and Type III may overlap with those in Type III. This is particularly true of mimicking and social influence; although Johnston considers them mainly as non-rationalist mechanisms, hence theoretically part of Type II, this essay includes them in both Type I and Type II.

I. ARF’s Security Agenda: Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy

**Socializer (ASEAN/Canada/Australia):**

**Strategic Calculation:** Tame rising Chinese power

**Bargaining/Role Playing/Mimicking:** Ensure ASEAN is in the driver’s seat (status), Australia and Canada live up to their image as mid-level powers in diplomacy and influence; Use collective pressure from the PRC’s neighbors to induce peaceful behavior

**Normative Suasion/Teaching/Social Influence:** ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation; Familiarize the PRC with multilateral negotiations and consensus building in the “ASEAN Way”; Seek pacific settlement of disputes in the South China Sea

**Socializee (PRC):**

**Strategic Calculation:** Diffuse “[People’s Republic of] China threat” perception; Ensure peaceful regional environment conducive to its own economic development; Enhance the PRC’s international status and demonstrate the PRC’s peaceful rise; Use ASEAN’s support to influence US position towards the PRC, especially any US approach towards containing the PRC

**Bargaining/Role Playing/Social Influence:** Adopt declaratory confidence-building measures (CBMs) but prevent intrusive measures and binding agreements in the CBM and preventive diplomacy (PD) negotiations by adopting a limited definition of these concepts; Reject conflict resolution role for ARF

**Normative Suasion/Teaching:** Offer the PRC’s own five principles of peaceful co-existence as a basis for engaging and reassuring neighbors “mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, noninterference, equality and mutual benefit”

**Outcome:** Consistent with Type III internalization; Scope conditions: reputation of the socialize (ASEAN), sustained and intense contact, consistency with socializee’s prior norms, and in-camera setting
II. APEC’s Trade Liberalization (circa 1993–97)

Socializer (US):

Strategic Calculation: Use ASEAN and APEC as a counter to the EU single market
Bargaining/Role playing: introduce reciprocity into trade arrangements
Normative suasion: spread Washington Consensus principles

Socializee (ASEAN):

Strategic Calculation: Use the US as a counter to the EU’s single market; Keep the US engaged as a regional balancer against rising powers
Bargaining/Role Playing/Mimicking: Prevent ASEAN’s marginalization in APEC; Location of the APEC Secretariat in Southeast Asia; Dilute strict reciprocity in trade agreements
Normative Suasion/Teaching: promote ASEAN way-like norms, such as developmental regionalism, flexible consensus, and concerted unilateralism in APEC

Outcome: Consistent with Type I internalization; Scope conditions: persuader’s lack of reputation as a socialiser, insufficient intensity and duration of contact, clash with the prior norms of socializee

III. ASEAN–India Free Trade Agreement (2004–09)

Socializer (ASEAN):

Strategic Calculation: To use India as a balancer against the PRC in Southeast Asia; To exploit trade and investment opportunities in India
Bargaining/Role Playing: To gain access to India’s large domestic market without granting it too many exceptions; To enhance ASEAN’s reputation and status as a regional integrator and driver of wider Asian regionalism
Normative Suasion/Teaching: Use ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and open regionalism norms as basis for engaging India

Socializee (India):

Strategic Calculation: to use ASEAN as a stepping stone to regional influence in East Asia and to balance the PRC
Bargaining: To protect elements of India’s domestic sector from competition while gaining access to ASEAN’s markets
Normative Suasion: India’s historic cultural and normative links with Southeast Asia

Outcome: Consistent with Type II internalization; Scope conditions: reputation of socializee, length and intensity of socialization, in-camera setting

5. Socialization and Institutional Design in Asia

As noted, institutions are central to the constructivist view of international relations, and socialization is the core function of institutions. But how do the design features of institutions (institutional design) shape socialization? What types of design features are most conducive to socialization? And conversely, how does having socialization as an objective shape institutional design? Socialization is different from coercion, sanctions, or other types of negative incentives. Hence, different types of institutional designs may offer different potential for the success of socialization. Constructivist theory holds that the best chance for success in socialization lies with institutions which do not coerce or (materially) constrain, but persuade and (socially) pressure. These institutions are more likely to promote behavior on the basis of a logic of appropriateness rather than of consequences.

The literature is not uniform when it comes to identifying the elements of institutional design, but the following five are important (Acharya and Johnston 2007):

(i) membership (inclusive or exclusive),
(ii) Scope (range of issue areas, multipurpose or issue-specific),
(iii) Decision-making rules (e.g., consensus as opposed to majority voting)
(iv) Ideology (including ideological flexibility), and
(v) Mandate (brainstorming as opposed to problem solving, distributive versus deliberative, process over the product).

To this list, one might add institutional foundation and linkages. “These two elements are most important particularly when an institution is at the stage of being proposed or is evolving. Knowing right on which existing regional institutions/agreements a new one should be founded, built on, branch out, and link up to could increase the possibility of its acceptability and success.”

The elements of institutional design can affect the socialization capacity of institutions. In general, inclusive membership, mutipurpose, decision-making by consensus, and a deliberative mandate are more conducive to socialization, as they facilitate persuasion. In terms of ideology, ideological flexibility rather than substance is more conducive to socialization. In Asian institutions, the link between socialization and institution design has been a two-way process. Prior norms developed through interactions and informal institutions (e.g., Bandung Conference, 1955, Association of Southeast Asia) have influenced the design of formal institutions (e.g., ASEAN). At the same time, institutions have rendered these designs stable if not permanent. The ASEAN way thus became the basis for the “Asia-Pacific way” and Asia-Pacific institutions like the ARF, APEC, and the East Asian community blueprint. The element of path dependency in the design of Asian regional institutions is especially striking.

It is clear that decision-making rules and mandates have been crucial to the socializing potential of Asian institutions, including ASEAN, APEC, and ARF. All operate by

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2 I am grateful to a reviewer for the ADB for suggesting this variable, and the quote is from the review.
consensus and have a deliberative rather than distributive mandate. The effect of scope and membership is less clear. ASEAN expansion has been important to its continued relevance in the post-Cold War era, while the ARF’s principle of inclusiveness is what has sustained it so far and resulted in the engagement of the PRC and the US. But it is unclear whether APEC’s expansion to include Latin American nations has been as fruitful, as it raises the question not only of dilution of regional identity, but it also lowers the frequency and intensity of contacts, which are crucial to socialization. Ideological flexibility has been common to all Asian groups, which have accommodated different degrees of openness to market economics, political democracy, and state sovereignty. There is no NATO- or EU-style ideology binding Asian institutions. And despite growing legalization (Kahler 2000) and formalization (e.g. ASEAN Charter), there is no prospect of major and sudden changes to this situation.

6. Conclusion

Constructivists still account for only a small, if growing, number of scholars working on Asia’s international relations and regionalism; other perspectives, especially realist perspectives, are plentiful and influential. (Constructivists do, however, seem to outnumber institutionalist and domestic politics approaches to Asian regionalism.) Moreover, as noted, constructivist writings do not constitute a homogeneous category. “While all take ideational factors and socialization seriously, they differ on the degree of transformation to the existing regional order that they argue is possible. Indeed, constructivists are not uniformly optimistic about [Asia’s] regional order; aspects of their critical perspective on aspects of regional order borders on realism” (Acharya and Stubbs 2006).

Despite these differences, the constructivist turn in international relations theory has influenced and advanced the study of Asian regionalism and regional institutions in important ways. It broadens the understanding of the sources and determinants of Asian regional institutions by giving due play to the role of ideational forces, such as culture, norms, and identity, as opposed to material determinants. By stressing the role of culture and identity, it has helped to link the insights of the traditional area studies approach to Asia or Asian states to the larger domain of international relations theory. Constructivism has also introduced a less static conception of Asia’s regional order. By giving greater play to the possibility of peaceful change through socialization, constructivism has challenged the hitherto centrality of the balance of power perspective. At the very least, it has infused greater theoretical diversity and opened the space for debate, thereby moving the study of Asia’s regional relations significantly beyond the traditionally dominant realist perspective.

Conversely, constructivist writings on Asian regional institutions have contributed to constructivist international relations theory. Like other major theories of international relations, constructivism emerged and initially reflected predominantly Western intellectual concerns and debates. But it has found a solid foothold in Asia. Constructivist writings on Asian regionalism have made some distinctive contributions, as highlighted in this essay. One contribution is that ideas and norms that are borrowed from outside go through a localization process, rather than being adopted wholesale, before they trigger institutional change. This is seen in the ideas of open regionalism and
cooperative security in APEC and the ARF, respectively. Second, institutions can emerge and achieve success despite great power indifference or opposition. A corollary is that institutions created and led by weaker actors can engage and socialize stronger states (e.g., ASEAN and the ARF in relation to the US and PRC). Third, institutions need not be formal or legalistic in order to play a meaningful role in redefining actor interests and identities (e.g., ASEAN way). Finally, the effects of socialization through international institutions need not be confined to a Type I (tentative and transitional) or a Type II (taken for granted and transformative) outcome, but could also encompass a Type III outcome in which actors continue to be motivated by both a logic of consequences and a logic of appropriateness on a long-term basis. These insights are not just applicable to the Asian context, but have a wider relevance to the study of regional and international institutions in general.

But the work is far from complete. Socialization as a tool of analyzing Asian regionalism is new and relatively untested. But as Asian institutions proliferate and age, like Europe, Asia will provide a vibrant arena for testing socialization theory. In the meantime, constructivism’s potential to contribute to a thorough understanding of Asian regional institutions remains unfulfilled. Much more empirical research needs to be done before one can get answers to some of the basic questions posed by constructivists regarding the socializing effects of Asian institutions. For example, it would require investigations (through analysis of official records, interviews, and surveys and content analysis) into the presence of different mechanisms of socialization including strategic calculation, role playing and micro-processes of mimicking, persuasion, norm localization, and social influence. This would need to be accompanied by compiling and analyzing indicators of the three types of internalization and differences in the behavior of new member states of Asian institutions before and after socialization. The work has just begun.
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Asian Regional Institutions and the Possibilities for Socializing the Behavior of States

Are Asian regional institutions merely talk shops or do they have meaningful effects on the economic and security behavior of their members? Using the insights of constructivist international relations theory, this paper argues that institutions such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and ASEAN Regional Forum might have led newcomers such as Viet Nam, the People’s Republic of China and India, to accept the principles of open regionalism and cooperative security. These effects are important to bear in mind in analyzing the debate over whether Asian institutions matter to regional security and prosperity.

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