Can Asia lead?

Power ambitions and global governance in the twenty-first century

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‘Has Asia been doing enough in leading world opinion on how to manage, and in particular not to mismanage, the global challenges we face today, including that of terrorism, violence, and global injustice?’ asked Indian Nobel laureate Amartya Sen at a forum in Bangkok in 2007.¹ Much has been said and written about the ‘rise’ of Asia; very little about Asia’s contribution to global governance.² To be sure, many Asian nations, not just the major Asian powers of China, Japan and India, but also South Korea, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, are demanding a greater voice in international affairs, both for themselves and for the region. Asian views of international order are changing in keeping with the region’s economic and political ascendancy. The founding leaders of modern Asian states were preoccupied with bringing down colonial rule, protesting against western dominance, asserting their sovereignty and equality, and in many cases demanding concessions and economic aid from the West. Hence their ideas about international order were imbued with what might be called ‘defensive sovereignty’. But if one takes the shift in world power to Asia as an incontrovertible fact or an irreversible trend,³ should one not expect Asian ideas about and approaches to international relations to change as well? One might hope, for example, that instead of pursuing defensive sovereignty, Asia would harness its substantial economic achievements over recent decades to seeking out a share of global leadership in addressing the world’s problems. Yet, as this article finds, the leading Asian powers—China, India and Japan—while seeking global leadership, seem to be more concerned with developing and legitimizing their national power aspirations (using the traditional notions and means of international relations) than with contributing to global governance.⁴

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¹ 'Eastern influence badly needed', Bangkok Post, 1 April 2007, p. 3.
² Kishore Mahbubani, in The new Asian hemisphere: the irresistible shift of global power to the East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008) and in his other writings, addresses the implications of Asia’s rise for global governance.
³ For a sceptical note on Asia’s rise, see Minxin Pei, ‘Bamboozled: don’t believe the Asia hype’, Foreign Policy, July–Aug. 2009, pp. 32–36.
⁴ I use the term ‘global governance’ to refer to ‘collective efforts to identify, understand or address worldwide problems that respect no national or regional boundaries and go beyond the capacity of individual States to solve’ (emphasis added). This builds upon a definition offered by Thomas Weiss and Ramesh Thakur and found in Definition of basic concepts and terminologies in governance and public administration (New York: United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2006), p. 4.
A central challenge facing global order today is the seeming contradiction between the desire of Asia’s leading states to be recognized and treated as global powers on the one hand, and their limited and hesitant contribution to global governance on the other. The problem is compounded by an emerging element of realpolitik in the international behaviour of China, Japan and India; resource constraints on the part of India and, to a lesser extent, China; the legacies of India’s and China’s historical self-identification and involvement with the so-called ‘Third World’; political constraints on Japan’s international role; and a certain legitimacy deficit attaching to each of these powers in its own regional neighbourhood.

Asia is hugely diverse and there is no consensus over where its boundaries lie. There is really no single conception, voice or identity of Asia.\(^5\) To speak of an Asian conception of, or Asian contribution to, international order and global governance would be a gross overgeneralization. What one tends to find instead are national conceptions, put forward by the ruling elites in various Asian states. Moreover, conceptual thinking within Asia about its role in international relations is hardly plentiful. A desire to increase Asian leadership of global institutions is growing within these countries; but there is no coherent Asian thinking on global governance. While Europe’s intelligentsia and policy community speak of its role as a ‘global normative power’, in Asia a collective regional idea about world order is yet to develop.

National or regional ideas or role conceptions about international order are not given or constant. They are shaped and reshaped continually by domestic and external developments, such as economic growth and crisis, war and peace. While this holds true anywhere, in a rapidly transforming region like Asia, where the most dramatic shifts in the global distribution of economic and military power are taking place, change is even more difficult to predict and account for. For example, Chinese, Indian and even Japanese role conceptions of international relations and world order have changed in significant ways since the early years after the Second World War, reflecting changes in their domestic politics and in their economic capacity and policy, and the impact of external developments such as the end of the Cold War. India has abandoned its traditional concept of non-alignment, and further, some would argue, has moved significantly away from the entire Nehruvian approach. China has moved well beyond the tenets of Maoist socialist internationalism to embrace a world-view best described as neo-Westphalian. An equally significant shift is occurring in Japan as it pursues the idea of a ‘normal state’, with significant implications for its foreign policy and security framework.

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The historical backdrop: conformist Japan, revisionist China, adaptive India

The shifting self-images and ‘national role conceptions’ of Asia’s three major players—China, Japan and India—are a good starting point for an analysis of Asia’s role in global governance. International Relations scholars usually speak of ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ (which incorporates elements of liberalism) as the two alternative ways of describing the world-views of states and leaders. Realists take international relations as a highly competitive game driven by considerations of national interest, in which war remains a constant possibility and genuine international cooperation highly improbable. Idealists/liberals are optimistic, believing that conflict can be mitigated through the pacific effects of economic interdependence, international institutions and shared democratic governance. But these concepts, which derive from western theory and experience, do not do justice to the ‘maverick’ or eclectic outlooks and approaches of Asian leaders. For example, India’s Jawaharlal Nehru was foremost among those nationalist leaders whose ideas about world order were eminently compatible with Wilsonian liberal internationalism. Burma’s leader Aung San was a self-professed internationalist who championed economic interdependence and regional integration in Asia. But Nehru’s critics in Asia, such as Carlos Romulo, former foreign secretary of the Philippines, who once accused him of being a ‘starry-eyed idealist’, were not necessarily people who, as a realist might expect, dismissed regional and international cooperation. Romulo was actually an active champion of regional multilateral institutions. Realism, as some academic analysts argue, may well be the dominant mode of thinking among Asia’s policy-making elite; but this has not prevented Asian states from engaging in multilateral cooperation at the global and, increasingly, regional levels, as the case of Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew, foremost among Asia’s realist statesmen, attests.

Perhaps a better way to look at postwar Asian thinking on international relations is to assess how Asian states related to an international order which was practically an extension of the ‘European international society’ and was overwhelmingly dominated by the West. Here, despite some early rhetoric on Asian unity, there

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6 The term ‘national role conception’ was coined by Kal Holsti to refer to ‘the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their “image” of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment.” See Kal J. Holsti, ‘National role conceptions in the study of foreign policy’, International Studies Quarterly 14: 3, Sept. 1970, pp. 245–6. Significantly for the purpose of this article, Holsti starts with interstate relations in China during the Chou dynasty, and in India during the Maurya period, to illustrate the concept, and considers non-alignment, balancer, satiated and unsatiated (status quo and revisionist) powers as some of the examples.

7 I leave out of this analysis the role conceptions of Russia, Australia and the United States. They do influence Asian security, but have less influence on Asia’s approach to global and regional governance.

8 ‘I am an internationalist, but an internationalist who does not all[ow] himself to be swept off the firm Earth … The one fact from which no nation, big or small, can escape is the increasing universal interdependence of nations’: Aung San, Burma’s challenge (South Okklapa, Burma: U Aung Gyi, 1974), pp. 192–3. These remarks by Aung San are a far cry from the self-imposed autarchy and isolationism of the military junta which came to rule the country.
remained significantly different stances within the region, which I would label as conformist, revisionist and adaptive.

The classic conformist nation was postwar Japan, the first Asian nation to modernize by imitating the West. Because of its economic accomplishments and military power, Meiji Japan was granted limited entry into the European international society as a ‘civilized’ nation, a status that was denied to the European colonies in Asia, such as India. To be sure, Japan did turn against the western powers when its effort to dominate its own Asian neighbourhood was challenged. But postwar Japan, despite its distinct cultural–political style and a plurality of voices within its academic institutions, retained a largely conformist posture in the international system, accepting western ideas, rules and institutions and indeed becoming a significant financial stakeholder in them. Japan might not have been the ‘yes-man’ of Asia, but it was certainly not, and still is not, a ‘Japan that can say no’.

This position was in stark contrast to that of communist China, which occupied the other end of the spectrum as Asia’s leading revisionist power. China under the nationalist regime started out as a conformist nation, but communist China was a different story. ‘From its birth date,’ writes Chinese historian Chen Jian, ‘Mao’s China challenged the Western powers in general and the United States in particular by questioning and, consequently, negating the legitimacy of the “norms of international relations”.’

India remained somewhere in between, occupying what may be best described as an adaptive position. Jawaharlal Nehru rejected European-style power politics and was especially scathing about the realist prescriptions for international order which, as put forward in the 1940s by Nicholas Spykman, Winston Churchill and Walter Lippmann, would have divided the world into a series of regional blocs, each under the leadership of a Great Power (including one under India itself). Instead, Nehru would propose what he called a ‘world association’ of states that recognized their essential equality. But Nehru never went too far in his critique of western dominance or in pushing for the creation of an anti-western bloc in Asia, a fact recognized and appreciated by Britain—though not the United States. He kept the tone of the Asian Relations Conference of 1947 (of which he was the chief organizer) and the Asia–Africa Conference of 1955 in Bandung (of which he was a co-sponsor) remarkably moderate. Nehru defended the United Nations and, for all his early championing of Asian unity and shepherding of communist China, disagreed with Chou En-lai at Bandung when the latter proposed a permanent regional association of Asian and African countries to serve China’s need at a time when it was not recognized by the UN. Nehru’s concept of ‘non-involvement’ (which later became incorporated into the broader doctrine of ‘non-alignment’) was in essence an adaptive extension of the western principle of non-intervention at a time when the two superpowers were violating the doctrine with impunity.

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The predicament and position of South-East Asian nations were closer to India’s than to China’s or Japan’s. They were willing to live within the existing system of international governance which preserved their independence. With the exception of a brief spell of revisionism in Indonesia under Sukarno in the 1960s, when he withdrew the country from the UN and flirted with his own ideas about ‘old established forces’ (OLDEFOS) and ‘new emerging forces’ (NEFOS), and that of communist Vietnam in the 1970s and 1980s, South-East Asian states have generally accepted the rules and norms of the international system, especially those of non-interference, diplomatic interdependence and the sovereignty and equality of states. Burma’s Aung San and U Nu exemplified this thinking in the early period, and later the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) spearheaded the emergence of a regional international society based on adaptations of these rules.

The divergent attitudes and responses of Asia’s key nations towards the existing international order meant significant intraregional differences over how to organize the region and the world at large. Japan’s sense of cultural and political supremacy as Asia’s first modernizing nation had underpinned its quest for an East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. But while Japan’s initial military victories over western powers inspired Asian nationalists, the Japanese idea of an exclusionary regional economic and political bloc did not. Thus, Aung San, after flirting for a while with Japan’s ideas, declared that ‘a new Asian order … will not and must not be one like the Co-Prosperity Sphere of militarist Japan, nor should it be another Asiatic Monroe doctrine, nor imperial preference or currency bloc’.11

In post-Second World War Asia, wide differences emerged over the philosophy of international economic relations, especially between China and Japan (the undisputed leader of East Asia’s market economies). Ironically, India’s approach to economic development had more in common with that of socialist China than with that of democratic Japan. One offshoot of the divergent positions of Asia’s three major powers was that none would be able to lead an Asian regional organization. After the Second World War doomed Japan’s effort to create an East Asian bloc, Nationalist China and Nehruvian India (in a competitive way) and India and communist China (in a more cooperative manner) were the central actors in the period from 1947 to 1955 during which Asia tried to develop a regional multilateral grouping. But neither would succeed, and eventually the ground was conceded to a group of South-East Asian countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore—which, suspicious of the bigger Asian powers attempting to lead the region, formed ASEAN in 1967. ASEAN survived precisely because it was not led by any of the three great Asian powers. The failure of the latter to provide leadership in building viable regional institutions—and the resulting regionalist leadership of the ASEAN members—has since become a defining feature of Asian regional governance.

Have matters changed? The end of the Cold War, a common adherence to state-supported capitalist economic development, and the emergence of Asia-

wide multilateral regional groupings like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asian Summit have effectively put an end to the conformist–revisionist–adaptive divisions. Today, the differences between Japan, China, India and ASEAN countries over concepts and approaches to economic development are hardly fundamental. In foreign policy terms, India (by abandoning Nehruvian non-alignment) and China (by similarly ditching Maoism) have both moved closer to Japan’s conformist position. In this sense, all three Asian powers, China included, are best described as status quo powers. All have embraced ASEAN-led multilateralism in the region. Ironically, it was the United States under the administration of George W. Bush that seemed to be the least conformist power in relation to a world order and governance structure that under earlier administrations it had played a central role in creating.

This apparent convergence of world-views and approaches does not, however, mean that Asian powers share a common view of global governance and how to reform global institutions. Some argue that the simultaneous rise of India and China and their respective moves beyond non-aligned and socialist ideologies may actually mean greater competition, rather than cooperation, between them. In this view, India and China have become essentially similar players in the international system: both are aspiring Great Powers, equally willing to assert their national interest, increase their power and influence in the world at large, and resort to the use of force in international relations. Realists see distinct prospects for an intensified security dilemma in twenty-first-century Asia not unlike what Europe experienced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Moreover, there remain important areas of diversity in contemporary Asian thinking on the relationships between democracy, regional stability and international order. While Asian leaders have generally accepted the liberal view that economic interdependence is a force for peace and that international (including regional) institutions are useful if not powerful instruments for managing regional order, sharp divisions remain over the role of democracy, on questions such as whether democracy promotes development or stagnation (the Lee Kuan Yew versus Fidel Ramos debate in the 1990s), whether democracy is at all a suitable political arrangement for Asia, and whether democracy is a force for national and regional stability or a prescription for violence and disorder.

National aspirations versus global governance

It is in China, rather than in Japan or India, and in official as well as academic circles, that a good deal of Asia’s conceptual thinking about the future of international

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order is taking place. This is partly in response to the international community’s doubts and misgivings about China’s global role following its spectacular economic, military and political ascent, doubts that are less pronounced in relation to the role of Japan or India. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Chinese thinking on international relations today is to a large extent an attempt to legitimize the rise of China as a fundamentally positive force in international relations.

China’s initial conceptualization of the post-Cold War order was presented under the rubric of ‘multipolarization’. Consider the following statement, posted on the Chinese foreign ministry’s website in 2000:

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has moved towards multi-polarity, and the international situation on the whole has become more relaxed. This is an objective tendency independent of people’s will, reflecting the trend of the development of the present era. Multi-polarization on the whole helps weaken and curb hegemonism and power politics, serves to bring about a just and equitable new international political and economic order and contributes to world peace and development.

But the concept of multipolarization was dampened by the US victory over Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1991 and the advent of the so-called ‘unipolar moment’. This led some Chinese to modify their position by recognizing what they called ‘uni-multipolarity’. At the same time, Chinese policy and academic discourse (the two are often inseparable) developed its thesis about China’s ‘peaceful rise’, thereby rejecting the view that China’s rise would trigger a power transition dynamic that would lead to war with the United States and other ‘status quo’ powers.

**Figure 1: GDP growth rates 2001–2010: China, India, Japan and the United States (per cent)**

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Figure 2: Growth rates of defence expenditure, 2000–2009: China, India, Japan and the United States (per cent)

Table 1: National GDP as a percentage of global GDP, 2000–2010: China, India, Japan and United States

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China’s attitude towards and involvement in global and Asian multilateralism have changed considerably since 1991—changes for which its South-East Asian neighbours, working through ASEAN, can justifiably take some credit. To borrow Iain Johnston’s words, China today is not only a ‘status quo power’ but also a ‘social state’.15 In Chinese academia there are moves under way to develop a ‘Chinese school of international relations’ based partly on the historical (and benign) frameworks of the ‘all under heaven’ (Tianxia) concept, the tributary system and the ‘Chinese world order’.16 The Tianxia concept, which stresses harmony (as opposed to ‘sameness’—possibly to send a signal that China can be politically different from other nations and still pursue friendship with them), is increasingly invoked by the Chinese leadership; indeed, President Hu Jintao has defined the objective of China’s foreign policy as to ‘jointly construct a harmonious world’.18

But while China has increased its participation in multilateralism and global governance, it has not offered leadership. This is explained in part by inexperience, fear of provoking a backlash from other powers and the lingering impact of Deng Xiaoping’s caution about Chinese leadership of the developing world.19 Chen Dongxiao of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies points to a perception gap between how the world views China (as an emerging global power) and how China views itself (as a low-income developing country). Also at play are a desire not to sacrifice its sovereignty and independence for the sake of multilateralism and global governance, and the impact of domestic factors such as increasingly diverse interest groups, lack of sufficient institutional coordination for implementing international agreements, and limited integration between domestic and international considerations in decision-making within China about

15 Johnston, ‘Is China a status quo power?’
19 Deng’s words, often misquoted and misinterpreted, did not rule out Chinese leadership, but took a very cautious position. On 24 Dec. 1990 he stated: ‘Some developing countries would like China to become the leader of the Third World. But we absolutely cannot do that—this is one of our basic state policies. We can’t afford to do it and besides, we aren’t strong enough. There is nothing to be gained by playing that role; we would only lose most of our initiative. China will always side with the Third World countries, but we shall never seek hegemony over them or serve as their leader. Nevertheless, we cannot simply do nothing in international affairs; we have to make our contribution. In what respect? I think we should help promote the establishment of a new international political and economic order’. See ‘Seize the opportunity to develop the economy’, 24 Dec. 1990, http://chairmanmaozedong.org/article/744.html, accessed 6 June 2011. Deng’s dictum derived from his assessment of China’s limited capacity to lead and a fear of overreaching. See Wang Zhibang, ‘The architecture and efficiency of global governance’, in Alan S. Alexandroff, David Shorr and Wang Zhibang, eds, Leadership and the global governance agenda: three voices, June 2010, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/report/3_Voices_o.pdf, accessed 6 June 2011, pp. 16–17.
issues of global governance. Together these factors, Chen argues, mean that ‘China would, at its best, be capable of playing “part time leader” in [a] selected way.’

This ambivalence was demonstrated in China’s recent reluctance to take the lead in allowing its ample financial resources play a direct role in alleviating the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008. At the time, President Hu Jintao argued that ‘the Chinese economy is increasingly interconnected with the global economy … China’s sound economic growth is in itself a major contribution to global financial stability and economic growth. This is why we must first and foremost run our own affairs well.’

China has been less reticent in assuming a position of regional leadership, as exemplified in its promotion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the idea of an East Asian Community. But even here China has been a cautious exponent, backtracking in the face of resistance to any real or perceived effort on its part to drive the membership and agenda of the East Asian institutions.

While China continues to grapple with the issue of its leadership in world affairs, Japan’s national role conception, and its foreign policy and security approach, are being redefined by the idea of a ‘normal state’. In his 1993 book, *Blueprint for a new Japan*, the leader of the Democratic Party of Japan, Ichiro Ozawa, used the term ‘normal state’ as a way of reclaiming Japan’s right to use force, albeit only in support of UN-sanctioned operations. But under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006), Japan’s aspiration to ‘normal statehood’ came to reflect some stark strategic motivations: to hedge against any drawdown of US forces in the region, to counter the rise of China and the growing threat from North Korea, and to increase Japan’s participation in collective military operations in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf regions. It was also a response to growing domestic pressures on the Japanese government to address its perceived inability to respond to foreign security threats. The concept could also be used to counter and dilute some of the constitutional limits on Japanese diplomacy and power projection at a time when Japan was under pressure to do more for the US–Japan alliance.

Some have viewed Japan’s aspiration to be a ‘normal state’ as a welcome step towards a more proactive approach to global governance. If Japan as a normal state were free to deploy its forces internationally, as Ozawa had envisaged, it could make a bigger contribution to international peacekeeping, anti-terrorism and anti-piracy operations, hence to key aspects of global security governance. In the economic arena, as Takashi Inoguchi puts it, ‘The globalization of governance
entails more integrated markets, the global diffusion of military weapons, and the
global permeation of public elite culture ... Astute, articulate and agile leaders
must always be mindful of domestic audiences and yet must act globally—and
decisively.24 To act accordingly with this imperative, Japan must move beyond its
postwar constitutional constraints. Importantly, Inoguchi cites the Japanese naval
deployment to the Indian Ocean to support US operations in West Asia as one
example of normal statehood, alongside its support for negotiations to advance
free trade in Asia.

In 2005 Japan’s foreign minister (and later, briefly, prime minister), Taro
Aso, spoke of Japan as a ‘thought leader’ of Asia.25 Japan has been a pioneer of
regional cooperation in Asia and the Pacific. In 1993 it helped broker a pathway
to multilateral security cooperation by suggesting that the ASEAN Post-Minis-
terial Conferences be used as the platform for regional security dialogues that
resulted in the ARF (although here Japan was drawing on ideas already circulating
in Asia–Pacific second-track dialogues rather than espousing an entirely original
formula). The Japanese contribution to concepts of regional economic governance
has been more substantive. Japanese officials and scholars were at the forefront of
the Pacific Community movement in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, which stressed
‘open regionalism’ as East Asia (defined here as a subset of the Pacific Rim or
Asia–Pacific region) went through its ‘economic miracle’ riding on the wave of
Japanese investment and aid that also created de facto regional integration. The
1997 Japanese proposal to develop an Asian Monetary Fund (which some saw as
a challenge to the authority of the IMF) further attested to Japan’s interest in
regional economic cooperation, but the Japanese initiative faded quickly in the
face of strong US opposition. Japan has actively sought a permanent seat in the
UN Security Council, and is willing to collaborate with India (which it has in
the past defeated in a bid for a temporary seat), but it is not clear whether this
move reflects any genuine desire to change the basic rules of the global multilat-
eral system or rather a desire simply to win itself due recognition for its abundant
financial and other contributions to the UN system.

Inoguchi argues that Japan has ‘become one of the major rule makers relin-
quishing the role of a rule taker in global governance in a number of policy areas’.
Among the niche areas he identifies are attempts to reconcile different concep-
tions of human rights, developing ‘rules and norms of transnational business
transactions’ and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.26 But these rules and norms do
not necessarily represent a fundamental rethinking of the contemporary global

24 Takashi Inoguchi, ‘Japan’s ambition for normal statehood’, http://www.glocom.org/opinions/essays/200302_
25 ‘Asian strategy as I see it: Japan as the “thought leader” of Asia’, speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro
perceive it, a thought leader is one who through fate is forced to face up against some sort of very difficult issue
earlier than others. And because the issue is so challenging, it is difficult to solve. But as the person struggles
to somehow resolve the issue, he/she becomes something for others to emulate.’
26 Takashi Inoguchi, ‘Why are there no non-western theories of international relations? The case
of ‘Japan’, International Relations of the Asia–Pacific 7: 3, 2007 (special issue on ‘Why is there no non-western
international relations theory?’, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan), pp. 369–90.
governance structure. Japan continues to be a conformist status quo power. Hence, when the current global financial turmoil erupted in 2008, Japan’s main response was to offer to strengthen the IMF’s coffers rather than to put all its resources into developing the fledgling regional financial reserve under the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). And Japan, like China, indicated that ‘Japan’s primary responsibility lies in invigorating its own economy … this would be the most immediately effective contribution that Japan can deliver.’

Speaking to an annual assembly of overseas Indians in 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh asserted that ‘the 21st Century will be an Indian Century’. His prognosis was defined in economic and political terms: ‘The world will once again look at us with regard and respect, not just for the economic progress we make but for the democratic values we cherish and uphold and the principles of pluralism and inclusiveness we have come to represent which is India’s heritage as a centuries old culture and civilization.’

Although Singh refrained from trumpeting India as an emerging global power, Barack Obama, like George W. Bush before him, did so more explicitly when he pledged America’s support for India in realizing this goal during a visit to Delhi in November 2010. Indian commentators and media have not been reticent either, although they may be happy to quote western policy-makers and analysts to make the same point. Arguably, there is more, and louder, media and policy talk about India as a global power in Delhi than there is similar talk about China as a global power in Beijing.

India’s policy of non-alignment has not been replaced by any alternative broad organizing framework. In fact, neither non-alignment nor Nehru has been formally and officially disavowed by India’s post-Cold War governments. Nevertheless, in his 2003 book Crossing the Rubicon, Indian analyst C. Raja Mohan made a powerful case that India was reverting to a Curzonian geopolitics, replacing both the Gandhian world-view that first made its appearance roughly a century ago and the Nehruvian idealism that defined the country’s foreign policy in the twentieth century. The Curzonian approach assumed Indian centrality in the Asian heartland, and envisaged a proactive and expansive Indian diplomatic and military role in stabilizing Asia as a whole. The end of the Bharatiya Janata Party government in 2004 might have slowed if not ended that transition, but Indian power projection in both western and eastern Indian Ocean waters is growing, reflecting a Mahanian rather than Nehruvian bent. It is partly driven by a desire, encouraged...

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31 C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: the shaping of India’s new foreign policy (New Delhi: Viking, 2003).
32 Mahanian refers to the perspective of Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), who stressed dominance of the sea as key to Great Power status.
by the US and the South-East Asian countries, to assume the role of a ‘regional balancer’ vis-à-vis China (whereas Nehru pioneered Asia’s engagement of communist China), although India avoids both any outright containment of China and any offer of unconditional support to the US strategic framework vis-à-vis China.

Indian interest in advancing global governance is limited by its concern to advance its national power position in the international system through high growth rates, expertise in information and communications technologies, nuclear weapons capability and space dreams (now a partial reality). Commenting on its stance on global issues ranging from nuclear non-proliferation, climate change and human rights to corruption, veteran journalist Barbara Crosette calls India the country that gives ‘global governance the biggest headache’. India has grounds for feeling that its contribution to global governance is being stymied by other powers—for example, through the continuing resistance from the West (and China) to its desire to be recognized as a nuclear weapon state, entitling it to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on that basis. Like Japan, India has sought a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, a dream that seems destined to remain unfulfilled for some time, despite the Obama administration’s recent backing. It has done better in the G20 forum, but even in that context there do not seem to be any obvious Indian ideas or blueprints to inspire the reform and restructuring of the global multilateral order. Within Asia itself, India has returned to the fold of Asian regionalism, but—in stark contrast to the Nehru era—as a follower rather than as a leader. And its regional involvement is much stronger in its economic dimension than in its political and security one, even though it remains excluded from the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC).

Asia’s role in global governance cannot be delinked from the question: who leads Asia? Historically, aside from the mutual rivalry of the region’s main powers, three factors have determined the issue of Asian leadership: political will, resource capacity and regional legitimacy. In the years immediately following the Second World War, India had high legitimacy in Asia and was more than willing to lead, but was unable to do so due to a lack of resources. Japan’s case was exactly the opposite: it had the resources (from the mid-1960s onwards) to be Asia’s leader, but not the legitimacy—thanks to memories of its imperialism, for which it was deemed by its neighbours to have been insufficiently apologetic. Japan’s involvement in regional leadership was deliberately low-key, cautious and exercised mostly through development aid and promotion of ideas about regional economic cooperation, leaving the political–security domain aside altogether. China, for its part, at that time had neither the resources, nor the legitimacy (since the communist takeover), nor the political will (at the onset of the reform era) to be Asia’s leader.

In Asia today, although Japan, China increasingly and India to a lesser extent all have the resources to lead, all still suffer from a deficit of regional legitimacy

deriving from past histories (the Japanese wartime role, Chinese subversion and Indian diplomatic arrogance, dating back to the Bandung conference). Moreover, their mutual rivalry prevents the Asian powers from assuming regional leadership singly or collectively. Hence, regional leadership rests with a group of the region’s weaker states. ASEAN is not entirely without merit or contribution, but while it is a useful and influential voice in regional affairs, some doubt its ability to manage Asia—home to three of the world’s four largest economies, four (excluding Russia) of its eight nuclear weapon states and its fastest-growing military forces.

**Asia and the G20: an uncertain trumpet**

Since 2008 the global economic crisis has provided new opportunities for Asia to assume a greater role in global economic governance, especially through participation in the G20. The G20 was by no means an Asian idea; Canada’s former prime minister Paul Martin is credited for it, even though its composition—the crucial issue of whom to invite—might have been decided by US Treasury officials and those of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Nevertheless, the G20 does have an Asian lineage. Four Asian countries that were later to become members of the G20—China, Japan, India and Indonesia—attended the Bandung Conference in 1955, and the number increases to six if Saudi Arabia and Turkey are included. The Bandung Conference had several major and long-term implications for international order, chief among them the genesis of the Non-Aligned Movement. It provided a powerful impetus for pan-African and pan-Arab movements led respectively by Nkrumah (who was prevented by the British from attending) and Nasser (who was a star of the meeting, but whose country today is conspicuously not a G20 member). It advanced decolonization and symbolized the appeal of economic self-reliance in the Third World, thereby delaying the march of market-driven globalization which has since underpinned the G20’s rise to prominence.

But there are key differences. Bandung was exclusively an intra-South event, whereas the G20 is a North–South forum. Bandung’s focus was political, whereas the G20’s is primarily economic, at least to date. Some of the key country participants in Bandung that are now in the G20 have in the meantime changed dramatically and irreversibly. For Japan, Bandung was the first foray into international diplomacy after defeat in the Second World War. The country has since emerged as a key player in Asia and the world. Bandung was communist China’s debut on the world diplomatic stage. A poor and fledgling communist country, China

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36 ‘Asian’ is not the preferred identity of either Saudi Arabia or Turkey today; certainly doubts are in order in Turkey’s case, given its fervent if unrequited wish to join Europe. The only Asian G20 member that did not take part in Bandung was South Korea (neither Korean state was invited). Australia, which shares with Turkey the problem of ambivalent regional identity, did not even want to be invited to Bandung. For more on attitudes to the Bandung Conference, including the hostile attitudes of the UK and US, see Amitav Acharya, ‘Lessons of Bandung, then and now’, *Financial Times*, 22 April 2005.
then easily invited mistrust; Nehru did his very best (at the cost of his own image and India’s influence) to project China as a constructive Asian neighbour rather than as a communist mischief-maker and an integral member of the Sino-Soviet communist monolith, as the Eisenhower administration was doing its best to project it. China is now the world’s emerging superpower, and a valuable and vital member of the global governance architecture. India, as noted, no longer professes Nehruvian non-alignment, and is no longer the leader of Asian unity, having long since ceded that role to ASEAN. Indonesia at Bandung was on the verge of sliding into authoritarianism; as a G20 member, it is held up as a shining example of Asian democracy. The global South is no longer led by the likes of Nehru, Nasser or Nkrumah, but headed today by technocrats like Manmohan Singh and Hu Jintao—a transition that within Asia is further embodied by transition from firebrand ideologues such as Mao and Sukarno to the introverted Singh and Susilo Bambang Yudhnowono.

Despite these changes, India, China and Indonesia continue to identify themselves as developing nations and are subject to the lingering normative legacy of their involvement in the Third World coalition. For example, India and China stake out positions on the global economy and ecology that are still framed in their predicament and perspective as developing nations. For them, the pursuit of national development goals takes priority over compliance with the West’s demands for greener standards.

Whether the G20 will develop concrete institutional capacity or even emerge as a viable and permanent global institution sharing decision-making and agenda-setting powers with the G7 and the Bretton Woods institutions is far from clear. As Chen Dongxiao notes, the G20 is not a group of like-minded nations, but one in which cooperation among the emerging powers is ‘issue-based and interest-oriented’. The establishment of cooperation and coordination among these powers is hindered by ‘the fact that the economies and trade interests among these emerging powers are more competitive than complementary’. Moreover, the G20 is something of an exclusive club, plagued by questions about its representativeness and legitimacy. According to two Indonesian analysts, although the G20’s emergence as ‘the premier forum for international economic cooperation’ is ‘historic … from the perspective of global governance as well as the role of Asia in the global economy’, there are many challenges that have to be dealt with first. Countries in the region have to showcase their abilities in sustaining high economic growth, maintaining political stability and working towards closer regional integration. An approach that relies on a politicised and formal structure will not suit the dynamics in a region which is economic growth-oriented and market-driven.

Asia does not speak as one voice within the G20. On the issue of reforming global financial regulation, a key concern of the G20, the ‘lack of a unified Asian

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37 Chen, ‘China’s perspective on global governance and G20’.
voice’ has made it easier for America and Europe to set the terms, sometimes to the
detriment of Asia’s interests. For example, Lee Jang Yung, senior deputy governor
of South Korea’s Financial Supervisory Service, complains that Asian countries ‘are facing significant challenges in meeting’ the liquidity standards set under the
Basel III framework.39

Nations represented at Bandung, including Nehru’s India, Mao’s China and
Nasser’s Egypt, harboured no illusions about achieving global Great Power status,
whether individually or collectively. Asia’s G20 members all aspire to be leaders
not just of their region but of the world. Indeed, they (even in the case of middle
powers like Indonesia and South Korea) may be using the G20 to leapfrog Asia.

Asian approaches to the other major issue on the global governance agenda,
climate change, are by no means shared or suggestive of an act of global leadership.
China and India are leading the resistance to the demand for deeper cuts to carbon
emissions. Both use the argument that, as developing nations, they need more
time before accepting the slower growth rates (in both economic development and
carbon emissions) that the western nations are prepared to accept now. At the 2010
Boao Forum held in China’s Hainan Island, India’s Environment Minister Jairam
Ramesh described cooperation between India and China on climate change and
environment as ‘one of the outstanding success stories of this bilateral relation-
ship’—but he also conceded that the two countries ‘might not be on the same page
as far as emissions are concerned’.40 At the Copenhagen meeting in 2009, India
agreed to accept a non-binding target of cutting CO₂ emissions per unit of GDP
by 20–25 per cent from 2005 levels by 2020, whereas China ‘set a “binding goal” to
cut CO₂ per unit of GDP by 40–45% from 2005 levels by 2020’.41 But China, like
India, refuses to accept the proposed global target of cutting emissions by at least
50 per cent relative to 1990 levels by 2050.42 Moreover, in what Ramesh described
as a ‘paradigm shift’ in both India and China, the two countries have adopted a
posture of concerted unilateralism (‘we have to do these things on our own’),
rather than outright multilateralism, in approaching the carbon emissions issue.
This means, as Ramesh put it, that the two countries pursue carbon emission cuts
through their own domestic policy processes and have thus ‘delinked emissions
control actions from the international negotiations’.43 Their defensive position
hardly meets Amartya Sen’s desire, noted above, to see Asia ‘leading the world
opinion on how to manage, and in particular not to mismanage, the global
challenges we face today’.

Relations among the Asian G20 members remain competitive. China has not
been supportive of the bids by India and Japan to acquire permanent seats in

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40 Anantha Krishnan, ‘Climate cooperation changing India–China ties, says Jairam Ramesh’, The Hindu
43 ‘India–China climate cooperation thrives with the “spirit of Copenhagen”’, http://www.chinafaqs.org/blog-
the UN Security Council, even though such a development would be consistent with China’s own ‘multi-polarization’ concept. This apparent contradiction has prompted some analysts to accuse China of seeking global multipolarity but regional unipolarity. At Bandung in 1955 there was the perception, exaggerated by the western media, of a Sino-Indian competition. Today, there is similar talk of rivalry between China and India, as well as competition between China and Japan, which was in no position to compete at Bandung. There is the danger that competition among the Asian G20 members could spill over into other parts of Asia, including South-East Asia, just as China and India competed over African resources and markets, or Russia, China and Brazil over arms sales to African countries. In the meantime, countries left out of the G20 (for example, Singapore and Malaysia) are resentful of those (Indonesia) who are savouring their new status in global affairs.

**Conclusion**

‘China, Japan can help by helping themselves’, ran the headline of a *Japan Times* commentary by journalist Frank Ching on Chinese and Japanese responses to the global financial crisis that broke out in 2008. Admittedly, they have—or at least China has—already done so. But the headline is remarkably revealing. What it tells us is that Asian countries approach global governance largely in terms of self-help. While Asian conceptions of international relations are no longer a defensive or confrontational reaction to western dominance, there remains a perceptible gap between Asia’s rise in terms of the traditional power indices of international relations and the requirements for global governance. The gap may be explained partly by resentment against western resistance to the desire of Asian countries to increase their influence over global institutions commensurately with their rise in the global power structure. But it is not unreasonable to doubt whether a larger say over global institutions will yield a greater willingness on the part of Asian powers to go beyond their ‘helping others by helping themselves’ mindset. There is also little question that intra-Asian differences and rivalries will hinder any bid by Asia to assume a greater share of the leadership in global governance.

I started this article by referring to the ‘seeming contradiction’ between the national power aspirations of leading Asian nations and their role as contributors to global governance. The two goals need not compete with each other. But as the analysis above suggests, changing national role conceptions, such as China’s ideas about ‘multi-polarization’ and ‘peaceful rise’, Japan’s quest for ‘normal’ statehood, and India’s seeming embrace of Curzon and Mahan at the expense of Gandhi and Nehru, do not translate into support for global governance. The obvious answer to Amartya Sen’s question posed at the outset of this article is that Asia is doing more than before, but this is still far from doing enough.

If one looks for Asian ideas about and approaches to multilateralism and governance, some of these might well be found at the regional level, and for these the
credit might belong to the region’s weaker nations, ASEAN’s members, rather than Asia’s larger powers. Asia offers a type of regionalism which is both homegrown and distinct from the European type. Asian regionalism offers three key ideas. First, regionalism does not require hegemonic leadership, whether coercive or benign. Second, regionalism does not have to rely on formal, legalistic or politically unifying platforms—regionalism in markets can be equally, if not more, important. Third, regionalism should be open and inclusive, in both its economic and its political–strategic dimensions. Indeed, despite their limitations, the experience of groupings like ASEAN is perhaps more relevant to other parts of the developing world than the much-vaunted European experience, which is far too committed to an ideology of unification (now under serious stress) to serve as a model for the developing world.45

The story of Asian regionalism to date is far from perfect. There are valid doubts about the ability of Asian regional institutions—led as they are by the relatively resource-poor ASEAN—to address the region’s most serious conflicts (in the Korean peninsula, between India and Pakistan, and across the Taiwan Strait) or cope with transnational challenges without a significant shift away from the region’s prevailing neo-Westphalian mindset. Asia lags behind other regions in developing mechanisms for promoting human rights and democracy, and institutionalizing new global norms such as the ‘responsibility to protect’. But a ‘non-indifference’ mindset and a ‘responsibility to assist’ principle may be emerging out of Asia’s recent brush with a series of transnational threats, including the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Bali terrorist attacks in 2001 and 2002, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) pandemic in 2003, the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, and Cyclone Nargis in Burma in 2008. This is an important, if as yet modest, shift from defensive sovereignty to responsible sovereignty. At the same time, Asian regional groups have contributed to regional and global stability in engaging with all the major powers of the world, including China (where they have arguably done a better job than the EU and NATO in engaging with Russia).

Although regionalism and globalism are sometimes seen as opposing forces, and despite the danger that the global power aspirations of key Asian nations might tempt them to neglect regional cooperation, Asian regionalism has the potential to pave the way for a more concerted and consequential Asian globalism and governance. These are not mutually incompatible directions. Asian regional institutions may not resolve all of the region’s vexing security and economic challenges, but they may be useful as a potential means of tempering the hitherto singular and nationalistic efforts by the individual Asian powers to claim their seats at the table of global decision-making bodies. Indeed, while pursuing its engagement with global institutions and processes, Asia could do well by beginning its response to global problems at home, a strategy all the more justified given that so many of the major global problems today—climate change, energy supply,

Can Asia lead?

pandemics, illegal migration, etc.—have local roots in Asia just as they do in other regions of the world. Asian regional institutions, formal and informal, are already responding to global issues, including climate change (ASEAN, APEC), financial volatility (CMI) and terrorism (ASEAN, ARF and a web of cross-cutting bilateral and subregional agreements). Much depends on whether Asian regional institutions can strengthen themselves with more robust financial stability and conflict management mechanisms, and move towards a more flexible view of state sovereignty through which to deal with transnational challenges. But by engaging with common issues of global governance at the regional level, Asian powers can limit their intramural conflicts. By gaining experience in dealing with complex transnational issues, securing legitimacy from peaceful interaction with neighbours, and sharing leadership with the region’s weaker states in managing its security and economic conflicts, Asia’s emerging powers can derive from their regional interactions useful experience and expertise that could facilitate a substantive contribution to global governance from a position of leadership and strength. The time is ripe for them to make a serious start now.