Security: Common, Cooperative and Comprehensive

Asia-Pacific Security Concepts in the Post-Cold War Era
For much of the post-Second World War era, international relations scholars had accepted and used a concept of security defined largely in terms of the ability of states to defend against external military threats.\textsuperscript{i} The notion dates back to the Westphalian origins of the contemporary international system, but its most influential formulation in the post-World War II era is Walter Lippmann's. According to Lippman: "a nation is secure to the extent that it is not in the danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war".\textsuperscript{ii} A clear and powerful echo of this view of security is to be found in a 1988 definition of security studies by Nye and Lynn-Jones as "the study of the threat, use and control of military force."\textsuperscript{iii}

Abstract security conceptions in academic and policy-making arena have provided the basis for security strategies in the realm of policy and practice. Thus, the Realist conception of security is the basis of East-West security structures during the Cold War. This was marked not only by an emphasis on military force, but also the strategy of deterrence involving nuclear weapons.

Since the superpower rivalry and alliance strategies in Europe assumed a central position in defining the scope of security discourse during the Cold War years, the Realist paradigm was adapted in literature in most parts of the world. But outside Europe, such concepts have not been deemed adequate. A broader notion of security has been preferred. In Asia, the notion of comprehensive security developed by Japan and the ASEAN states is a good example.

Moreover, even in the European traditional East-West context, the classical
The notion of security has been judged deficient in addressing security concerns of states. Several alternative conceptions have been proposed. The danger of war in the nuclear age and the growing interdependence among nations imposing constraints on the use of force led to exploration of alternative concepts. This process acquired momentum as the Cold War drew to a close and the CSCE process became more and more credible. The notion of common security developed originally in a European context as a counter to deterrence. The success of CSCE led to calls for similar measures based on similar conceptions of security. In Asia-Pacific, following unsuccessful calls for a CSCE-type process, indigenous concept incorporating some features of common security and comprehensive security were adapted. The notion of cooperative security developed by NPCSD in an Asia-Pacific context is broadly similar to the notion of common security in the European context, but for reasons to be explored later, promises to be more appropriate for the Asia-Pacific. There is considerable overlap in the meaning and scope of these concepts. Thus, all three notions, i.e. common security, cooperative security and comprehensive security share many common features. Thus any attempt to differentiate them runs the risk of drawing artificial boundaries.

**COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY**

The term comprehensive or "overall" security was coined in Japan during the 1970s. But it has also found adherence in other Asian countries, especially Southeast Asia.
Before 1945, national security in Japan was closely "identified with military domination of decision-making and with the disastrous 'quest for autonomy'." (J.W.M. Chapman, R. Drifte and I.T.M. Gow: Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), p.xiv). The notion of Comprehensive Security was put forward as an alternative to the concept of national security, reflecting a quest to move beyond Japan's wartime role and rationalise its post-War international role. The development of the notion of Comprehensive Security was meant to give a new and wider basis for Japan's international role and to rationalise its defence effort. The term also reflected Japan's pragmatic response to the problems of maintaining its renewed prosperity in an increasingly difficult international environment.

In Japan, the term gained currency as the result of a study group established by Prime Minister Ohira Masaharu in 1978. Ohira defined a policy of comprehensive security as "a chain of tautly balanced national power, including various factors such as economy, diplomacy and politics..." (Chapman, et al., p.xvi). The report of the study group, submitted to Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki in July 1980 and entitled Report on Comprehensive National Security, identified six objectives (Chapman et al, p.xvii):

1. Closer military and general cooperation with the US
2. Increasing Japan's own capacity to defend its own territory
3. Improvement in relations with China and the USSR
4. attainment of energy security
5. Achievement of food security
6. Measures for coping with major earthquakes

Comprehensive security was not just a statement of goals, but also of policy framework. "since security itself was a comprehensive concept, the means to achieve that, too had to be comprehensive." (S. Javed Maswood, *Japanese Defence: The Search for Political Power* (Singapore, ISEAS, 1990), p.39). Thus, according to the Japanese Diplomatic Blue Book (1981 edition, p.30): comprehensive national security is a policy to:

secure our national survival or protect our social order from various kinds of external threats which will or may have serious effects on the foundations of our nations existence, by preventing the arising of such threats, or by properly coping with them in the case of their emergence, through the combination of diplomacy, national defence, economic and other policy measures".

The doctrine of comprehensive security not only embraced different functional areas of security, e.g. economic, military and political, but also defined security policy in terms of its various levels, e.g. domestic, bilateral, regional and global. As Yukio Satoh put it, the concept "is a reflection of the Japanese understanding that security requirements for Japan range broadly from the East-West military balance to regional stability in Asia and to international energy and food." (Yukio Satoh, *The Evolution of Japan's Security Policy*, Adelphi Paper No.178 (London: IISS, 1982), p.7) According to the report:
"Security means protecting the people's life from various forms of threat...Efforts required for security consist of three levels: efforts to turn the overall international environment into a favourable one; self-reliance to cope with threats; and, as intermediary efforts, efforts to create a favourable international environment within a limited scope while protecting security in solidarity with countries sharing the same ideals and interests". (Cited in Yukio Satoh, The Evolution of Japan's Security Policy, p.40)

The economic component of comprehensive security has been salient than other, especially ecological concerns. The Comprehensive National Security Council established in 1980 was dominated by representatives of economic ministries. This emphasis is evident from the following definition of comprehensive security in the early 1980s:

Comprehensive security policy for Japanese decision makers...appears to include not only overt threats from an increasingly menacing Soviet military machine or from major geophysical catastrophies, but also to include major threats to economic livelihood and standard of living of the Japanese people from the denial of access to markets for Japanese goods, the expropriation of Japanese property and exclusion of Japanese investment projects abroad, and from a withholding of vital supplies of goods, materials and services to Japanese enterprises home and abroad." (Chapman, et. al., p.149)

This leads to questions regarding Japan's commitment to sustainable development, especially in regions in which it has been active in extracting resources. It appears
that protection of access to resources is more important as an objective of comprehensive security than concern for the damaging effect of economic development on the environment.

Because of endorsements by two successive prime ministers, comprehensive security became more than a slogan, it had a direct and strong influence in the realm of policy. It also found broad and widespread support with the Japanese society. But like the notion of security itself, the term "comprehensive security" lacks precise definition. It is also marked by certain degree of ambiguity which is reflected in radically differing interpretations of the concept within Japanese society. On the one hand, it was seen as "a smoke-screen behind which the hawks can expand defence spending", while another group viewed it as a policy toward lower defence expenditures and greater emphasis on diplomatic and economic instruments (Chapman, et al., p. xvi) Within the Japanese decision-making system, however, it found broad acceptance. It was seen by various government agencies as "a welcome way to promote their goals of budgetary gains." The term also proved useful to the Japanese government in its efforts to raise the defence budget in the 1980s as public opinion became less hostile to the need for defence and the US-Japanese alliance. "Only within the comprehensive national security concept can the government proceed with this policy of raising the level of the defence pillar." (Chapman et al, p.94)

As Arnold Wolfers once out it, the term national security is an ambiguous symbol. Although comprehensive security sought to move beyond the traditional military emphasis of national security, it was afflicted with the same kind of
ambiguity that Wolfers had wrote about. In the words of one writer:

...Comprehensive Security has represented a phase in the postwar development of Japanese security thinking in which the Japanese have come to embrace the basic idea of alliance burden-sharing with Western nations. Burden-sharing naturally includes contributions to the collective defense, and its acceptance has brought forth a gradual removal of the various self-imposed constraints on military undertakings that have long constituted the unique feature of Japanese defense posture. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, a concept which in the abstract implies a reduction of the relative weight of military efforts on behalf of national security has in fact served as a vehicle for promoting such efforts. (Umemoto Tetsuya, "Comprehensive Security and the Evolution of the Japanese Security Posture", in Robert A. Scalapino, et al., eds., Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1988), p.28

Comprehensive Security in ASEAN

While the Japanese conception of comprehensive security was a limited in scope (the emphasis being on economic elements) and riddled with ambiguities, in ASEAN, the notion of comprehensive security found a broader and less ambiguous meaning. At least three ASEAN members, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, have developed distinctive notion of security which go beyond military objectives and instruments, while the Philippines has also recent developed a similar doctrine to guide its approach to security. Particular attention to Malaysian and Indonesian notions.
In general, the concept of comprehensive security held by various ASEAN countries is more inward-looking than the Japanese notion, which focusses largely, if not exclusively, on external threats to Japanese security. The linkage between policy and doctrine is also different in the ASEAN context. Unlike in Japan, a broader notion of security incorporating domestic and essentially nonmilitary threats have been used by ASEAN governments to negate the possibility of alliances with both regional and extra-regional states on the ground that such an alliance will be irrelevant against internal threats and to limit the scope for external intervention in the region (as reflected in ZOPFAN). Unlike Japan, ASEAN states have not used comprehensive security doctrines to justify higher defence spending.

Indonesia's notion of national resilience emerged in the 1960s when Suharto assumed power, although it was officially proclaimed in 1973. According to the Indonesian constitution,

National resilience is a dynamic condition of will power, determination and firmness with the ability to develop national strength to face and overcome all manner of threats internal and external, direct or indirect, that may endanger the Indonesian national identity and the total way of life of the nation and its people, and to achieve the objectives of the national struggle. (cited in Muthiah Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries", in Robert A. Scalapino, et al., eds., Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1988), pp.57-58
According to one formulation, "National resilience is an inward-looking concept, based on the proposition that national security lies not in military alliances or under the military umbrella of a great power, but in self-reliance deriving from domestic factors such as economic and social development, political stability and a sense of nationalism". The political significance of such an inward-looking notion lies in the fact that it signalled the Suharto regime's intention to focus on domestic problems, and on economic development, in contrast to its predecessor, President Sukarno's internationalist and interventionist outlook which had undermined Indonesia's economic health.

Nonetheless, the centrality of domestic stability in Indonesia's security thinking leads to a closely-related emphasis on non-military measures, especially economic development and social justice, to achieve overall national and regional security.

Muthiah Alagappa (p. 58) has pointed to several factors behind the origin and development of the doctrine of national resilience with its focus on internal threats:

(1) Indonesia's long national liberation struggle against Dutch colonialism and its difficult experience in nation-building in the immediate aftermath of independence

(2) the weakness of the Indonesian state as a conglomeration of a multitude of ethnic groups separated by geography, culture, and ethnicity.
(3) Indonesia's weak military power and potential which sets serious limits to security posture based on military self-reliance alone

(4) The military-dominated Indonesian regime's quest for legitimacy and survival in the face of domestic competition for political power, especially from the communist insurgency

(5) A fear that domestic political and ethnic strife would pave the way for external intervention; hence domestic tranquility must be ensured as a precondition for security against external threats

National resilience is a multi-dimensional concept consisting of ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural and security-cum-defence aspects. It is "promoted through political, economic, military and socio-cultural policies with the highest priority being accorded to economic development..." (Alagappa, p.62)

Although the doctrine of national resilience limits itself substantially to the domestic level of security, it has indirect and serious implications for the external/international strategic environment. At origin, the doctrine of national resilience was reassuring to Indonesia's regional neighbours who saw in Indonesia's commitment to internal stability and prosperity a signal of its intent of good
neighbourliness and support for regional cooperation through ASEAN. Indeed, the Indonesian notion of resilience pays explicit attention to the link between national and regional security in the form of the doctrine of "regional resilience". In this view, "if each member nation [of ASEAN] can accomplish an overall national development and overcome internal threats, regional resilience can result much in the same way as a chain derives its overall strength from the strength of its constituent parts". To be sure, the attainment of regional resilience on the basis of domestic consolidation of every regional actor cannot be automatically assumed, apart from such national efforts it required a commitment to regional conflict-avoidance and cooperation through the ASEAN framework. But given the prevalent fear of Indonesia's regional ambitions spurred by the Sukarno presidency, its smaller neighbours were relieved by the shift towards an introverted security posture. Also, by paying attention to long-term conditions for stability at home peaceful inter-state relations within the region, Indonesia and its neighbours could minimise the risk of external intervention and Great Power rivalry.

Malaysia's concept of comprehensive security places a similar emphasis on non-military threats and policy instruments. In the words of Mahathir:

National security is inseparable from political stability, economic success and social harmony. Without these all the guns in the world cannot prevent a country from being overcome by its enemies, whose ambitions can be fulfilled sometimes without firing a single shot. (cited in Alagappa, p.63)
Malaysian leaders and analysts have identified a wide range of factors as constituting threats to national security. These include: communist insurgency, and subversion, armed separatism, economic slowdown or recession, religious extremism and racial strife in a multiethnic society, drug addiction, illegal immigration. In the words of former Prime Minister Hussein Onn, "These problems traverse political, socio-cultural, psychological and economic dimensions – thus emphasizing the total or comprehensive nature of Malaysia’s national security." (Alagappa, pp.67-68). Although Malaysia has acknowledged some external security concerns as well, including Great Power rivalry and the Cambodia conflict, in general these are considered to be less immediate and urgent.

It is interesting to note that Malaysian leaders have linked the realisation of comprehensive security to stability in the region. In 1992, the defence minister of Malaysia, Najib Tun Rajak, argued:

Certainly, today, the term security is seen in a very broad manner, which encompasses, both military and non-military elements. Comprehensive security covers political, economic and defence dimensions. Therefore, to us, to achieve security, it has to be comprehensive, i.e. it has to be politically stable, economically strong and resilient, its population, united and strong-willed, and last, but not the least, it has to be militarily sufficient...Therefore, in terms of the region, its members must, first and foremost, achieve all these factors at home. Only then can this region be truly secured. In the mean time, the regional environment must be conducive for these
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to take place. It has to be a stable and trouble-free region. (Address to the Chief of Staff Conference, Darwin Australia April 1992)

COMMON SECURITY

The concept of common security originated in Europe. A response to the East-West rivalry in general and nuclear deterrence in particular.

The first major exposition of common security can be found in the report of the Palme Commission entitled: Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). The report defined common security in the following terms:

The avoidance of war, particularly nuclear war, is a common responsibility. The security - even the existence - of the nations of the world is interdependent. For both East and West, the avoidance of nuclear catastrophe depends on mutual recognition of the need for peaceful relations, national restraint, and amelioration of the armaments competition. ...For stability based on armaments cannot be sustained indefinitely. There is always the danger that the fragile stability of an international system based on armaments will suddenly crumble...A more effective way to ensure security is to create
positive processes that can lead to peace and disarmament... Acceptance of common security as the organizing principle for efforts to reduce the risk of war, limit arms, and move towards disarmament means, in principle, that cooperation will replace confrontation in resolving conflicts of interest. (pp.7-8)

The Palme Commission report laid six principles of common security:

1. All nations have a legitimate right to security.
2. Military force is not a legitimate instrument for resolving disputes between nations.
3. Restraint is necessary in expression of national policy.
4. Security cannot be attained through military superiority.
5. Reduction and qualitative limitations of armaments are necessary for common security.
6. 'Linkages' between arms negotiations and political events should be avoided. (pp.8-11)

The idea of common security also shares with the notion of comprehensive security a concern with both military and non-military threats, although in the immediate European context, its chief aim was to manage the East-West nuclear rivalry. Thus, the essence of common security as outlined by the report is the notion of "security with" as opposed to "security against" the adversary. As such, the notion of common security militates against the principle and mind-set of deterrence. Strategic doctrines and alliance systems which are based on the idea of deterrence may engender greater insecurity by trigerring the security dilemma.
The idea of common security evolved steadily and gained further legitimacy with the success of the CSCE in bridging the East-West gap. The CSCE represented the operationalisation of the core principles of common security. The key objective was to significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the likelihood of war by securing adherence to a set of norms and rules that constrain the conflictual behaviour of the regional actors in relation to one another. The CSCE aimed at achieving security cooperation among actors in the absence of a common external enemy; it instituted an European security regime in which the interests of the national actors "are neither wholly compatible nor wholly competitive"\textsuperscript{vi}, and where it was possible to secure compliance with "principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate"\textsuperscript{vii}.

The success of the CSCE has led to the call for similar approaches in Asia-Pacific. The ball was set rolling by the then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987 which called for a "Pacific Ocean conference along the Helsinki [CSCE] conference" in his famous speech at Vladivostok in 1987. The Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, followed up in July 1990 by proposing a Conference on Security Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) - "a future Asian security architecture involving a wholly new institutional process that might be capable of evolving, in Asia just as in Europe, as a framework for addressing and resolving security problems". Although initially, these proposals seemed to envisage an Asia-Pacific version of the CSCE, the analogy was dropped latter on grounds of acknowledged differences in the regional milieu between Europe and Asia. But the essence of the CSCE process
could nonetheless be applied to Asia-Pacific region in the form of confidence-and security-building measures that had been so successful in reducing Cold War tensions in Europe. viii

Within ASEAN, these proposals were initially greeted with considerable skepticism and ambivalence. While Malaysia appeared to endorse some of the Soviet proposals for regional confidence-building measures in the superpower strategic context, in general ASEAN leaders echoed the response of the Bush administration which had dubbed the Asian version of the CSCE as a "solution in search of a problem". ix Washington viewed any such institution as a threat to its existing alliance system which had proved their worth during the Cold War period. In the words of a Bush administration official: "While the United States would adjust the form of its security role in the region [in the post-Cold War era], it intends to retain the substance of its role and the bilateral defence relationships which give it structure." x

Echoing the US view, ASEAN leaders argued that the Asia-Pacific was too complex and diverse a region for CSCE-type arrangements. Moreover, if regional and external players were to direct their attention and resources to creating an Asia-Pacific security forum, it might lead ASEAN to "lose its identity". xi A related concern of ASEAN was that a CSCE-type grouping could be used by Western members to press ASEAN on the contentious issue of human rights, which had been a central theme of the CSCE process. ASEAN would clearly and strongly reject any pressure from its Western dialogue partners on human rights or environmental issues as part of their existing consultative agenda. xii

Thus, caution should be expressed in evaluating the prospects for duplicating
European-based models of common security in the Asia-Pacific region. Important differences in theatre conditions as well as the historical and cultural roots of conflict would complicate the creation of Helsinki-type arrangements in other region.\textsuperscript{xiii}

Nonetheless, the idea of CSBMs inherent to the CSCE process provides a potentially effective way of dealing with the challenge of regional reconciliation that has become urgent in several regional theatres with the end or prospective end to several regional conflicts shaped by Cold War dynamics. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN has decided to accept into its fold the Indochinese countries and Burma; in the Gulf, the GCC's narrow subregional membership has in practice been compromised by strong security links with other Arab nations such as Egypt and Syria. The CSCE experience is clearly relevant to fostering these regional processes in the Third World.

While rejecting a formal CSCE-type institution, ASEAN members were more receptive to the use of looser and more consultative mechanisms for promoting an exchange of views within the region on security issues.\textsuperscript{xiv} ASEAN could already boast of such fora: the annual meetings between ASEAN foreign ministers and their counterparts from countries which were given the status of official "dialogue partners" (The ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences, or ASEAN-PMC). The ASEAN-PMC, held since 1978, follows the annual meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers (AMM), hosted by each ASEAN member in rotation and which itself would be the forum for security consultations among the ASEAN members.

As such, the ASEAN-PMC framework offered several advantages as forum for a dialogue on security within the Asia-Pacific region. First, ASEAN would have a controlling influence over the agenda of discussions, and would not risk being sidelined as might
be the case with any new institution. As the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, put it: "In too big and amorphous a club, we will lose our sense of unity and our sense of purpose. But we can do it without losing our separate identity in ASEAN by dialogue with, say, the North Pacific countries and in the South Pacific countries, and then both north and south."\textsuperscript{xv} Second, the ASEAN-PMC would enable ASEAN to pursue a more "inclusive" approach to security in the context of the growing security interdependence between Southeast Asia and the wider Pacific theatre. Despite earlier concerns that its regional identity might be diluted by integration into a larger regional process, ASEAN as a grouping could no longer ignore the growing linkages between sub-regional (i.e. Southeast Asian) security concerns and the developments affecting the role of major Asia-Pacific powers such as the US, Russia, China and Japan. As a Thai scholar argued: ASEAN's "efforts to establish region-wide order in Southeast Asia must be related to the larger Asia-Pacific framework of conflict-reduction and cooperation, not only because one needs to recognise the geographical and economic interdependence that exist in this area, but also because one needs to find ways and means of ensuring that extra-regional, that is non-Southeast Asian powers' involvement in this region continue to be `constructive engagements.'"\textsuperscript{xvi}

Indeed, a more flexible variant of common security seems to be broadly acceptable to ASEAN states. The defence minister of Malaysia, Najib Tun Rajak, speaking on the subject of Asia-Pacific security at a conference in Darwin, Australia in April 1992, invoked the principles of common security enunciated by the Palme Commission i.e. the legitimate rights of all nations to security, the inadmissibility of military
force as an instrument of problem solving, the need for restraint in pursuit of national interests, and the futility of trying to achieve security through military superiority. He argued that: "Although the Palme Commision's major preoccupation was with nuclear confrontation, I am of the opinion that these principles are equally valid in the non-nuclear context."

In defining the elements of a new approach to security in Asia-Pacific, he interestingly used the notion "cooperative security" (used interchangeably with the term common security as defined by the Palme Commision)

The end of the Cold War has certainly provided us with a golden opportunity to find new approach to security...This golden opportunity must be seized by all of us. We must be guided by the notion of cooperative security. "One man's security should lead to another's assurance", should be our motto.
**Proposed Asia-Pacific Security Systems**

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<td>&quot;Common Security&quot;; CSCE model</td>
<td>Comprehensive; focus on CSBMs and nuclear arms control</td>
<td>New; Asia Pacific-wide; Broad-brush govt.-led</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>Multiteralism</td>
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<td>Existing; Limited to PMC&lt;sup&gt;xx&lt;/sup&gt; members and special invitee; ad hoc inter-govt.</td>
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<td>No new standing inst. envisaged; maintain existing alliances; case-by-case Clinton(?) approach inter-govt.</td>
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Since Gorbachev's Vladivostock speech in 1986, there has been a proliferation of proposals to restructure Asia-Pacific security. While many of these are in the nature of "trial balloons" or aimed at gaining propaganda mileage (as some of the early Soviet proposals, which were noticeably lacking in specifics), a few were seriously conceived. These proposals differ widely as to the type of security structure desired, the scope of security threats to be addressed, the nature of institutions to be developed and the process of transition envisaged. Indeed, a notable aspect of the current thinking about Asia-Pacific security is the sheer diversity of approaches to multilateralism that have been proposed so far, which range from a mere talk-shop with an informal and ad hoc agenda (ASEAN-PMC), to a transitional mechanism of CSCAP (as a security equivalent of PECC), to a CSCA with formal, standing institutions and summitry, or a concert system with the leading role in conflict-management assumed by the principal regional powers. There is also the notion of "flexible multilateralism" and the "building bloc" approach which may be viewed as attempts to seek a compromise between the extremes of maintaining the status quo (doing nothing) and jumping into an all new, one step and comprehensive security system (doing everything at once).

But a common objective runs through most of these proposals: to replace the Cold War security structure (an essentially bipolar balance of power framework underpinned by bilateral military alliances with the primary aim of nuclear deterrence) with a multilateral framework with the following attributes:

a. it must be geared toward reassurance, rather than deterrence,

b. it must at best replace or at least co-exist with bilateral alliances,

c. it must promote both military and non-military security.
These elements of an alternative security framework is well-encapsulated in the notion of "Cooperative Security" which in turn lies at the heart of the NPCSD initiative launched by the former Canadian External Affairs Minister, Joe Clark. At a first glance, cooperative security and common security appear to be almost identical notions. Both are inclusive in their approach by seeking to engage adversaries and non-likeminded actors. Both emphasise the need to move beyond the deterrence mind-set. Both doctrines emphasise security as a broad concept incorporating a range of non-military elements. ut cooperative security envisages a more gradual approach to developing multilateral institutions. It also a more flexible notion as it recognises the value of existing balance-of-power type arrangements in contributing to regional security and for retaining them until the conditions for multilateralism become more favourable. Thus it has potential to be developed into a broadly-accepted "homegrown" security doctrine for the Asia-Pacific region, reflecting the unique features and problems of the regional security environment. It is noteworthy that the notion "cooperative" indicates a greater diversity of security policies and predicament than the notion "common".

In sum, future attempts to create a new security architecture for the Asia-Pacific region involves a set of organising principles:

a. Broad-brush versus building block approach
b. Comprehensive versus selective security
c. Great Power concert versus General Assembly-type approach
These principles also highlight the potential for contradictions between various approaches to security. A broad-brush approach is more focussed and specific as a guide of policy, but necessarily less flexible and evolutionary than a building bloc approach. Comprehensive security is a desirable and in some respect unavoidable goal, but expanding the agenda of security cooperation also expands the scope for disagreement. A security framework which recognises the equality of actors is ideal and more acceptable to regional states who resent Great Power dominance, but it also ignores the reality of power disparity in the region.

As noted earlier, the notion of common security does incorporate the need to address non-military threats. In this sense, common security is comprehensive security plus security cooperation or inclusive security framework. Sukhumbhand Paribatra has stressed this linkage in the context of Southeast Asia by identifying the following dimensions of a common security framework: (1) military, (2) political, (3) economic, (4) environmental, (5) human. All these are familiar aspects of comprehensive security, but the emphasis here is the need for regional/international cooperation in addressing these problems. This is akin to the notion of cooperative security as used in the NPCSD context, which also stresses the need for cooperative/common approaches to both military and non-military problems.
NOTES

i. Subsequent generations of American strategic thinkers have more or less retained this definition. According to Wolfers, the "common usage" of the term "national security" "implies that security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack" (Wolfers, 1962:150). In the 1970s, some scholars moved away from the war-centric view of security and allowed for the consideration of some categories of non-military (especially economic) threats. Thus, according to Klaus Knorr, "national security concerns arise when vital or core values are threatened by external actions or events (Knorr and Trager, 1977:8).


vi. Stein, "Detection and Defection", p.600


viii. The problems of applying European-style CSBMs to the Asia-Pacific region are discussed in Trevor Findlay, "Confidence-building Measures for the Asia-Pacific: The Relevance of the European Experience", in M. Alagappa ed., Building Confidence-Resolving Conflicts (Kuala Lumpur: Institute for International and Strategic Studies, 1989), pp. 55-74; For a survey of regional attitudes towards CSBMs at this time, see Findlay, Asia-Pacific CSBMs: A Prospectus (Canberra: Australian National University, Peace Research Centre, 1990)

Affairs, at the University of San Diego, 30 October 1990, excerpts published US Department of State Dispatch, 5 November 1990. Solomon argued that "East Asia is a region so vastly different from Europe in terms of its history, cultural diversity, levels of economic development and geopolitical architecture that imposing the logic of European security is simply inappropriate. The Cold War did not weld the region into two opposing blocs and there is no single threat commonly perceived across the region. Instead, there is a multiplicity of security concerns that vary from one sub-region to another...."

x. The Straits Times, 7 August 1991

xi. Excerpts from Lee Kuan Yew's interview with The Australian, published in The Straits Times, 16 September 1988. See also Michael Vatikiotis, "Yankee Please Stay", Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 December 1990, p. 32 It is also noteworthy that ASEAN states opposed a security role for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) framework. APEC was proposed by the then Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke in January 1989 as a formal intergovernmental vehicle for co-operation which could allow the region as a whole to co-ordinate an approach to GATT and increase the liberalisation of trade in the area. ASEAN's initial attitude towards APEC was marked by extreme caution, bordering on rejection. Like the idea of a CSCA, APEC was viewed as a competitor to ASEAN's own role as a vehicle for regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas wanted to have APEC meetings focus on the annual ASEAN-PMC sessions. It would not endorse the idea until four conditions were met: (1) APEC should not deal with political and security issues; (2) APEC should not lead to the formation of a trade bloc; (3) APEC's institutional arrangements should not reduce the importance and role of existing Asia-Pacific institutions for cooperation and; (4) ASEAN's machinery should be the centre of APEC process.

xii. The Straits Times, 22 July 1991


xiv. The Straits Times, 10 July 1991

xv. Excerpts from Lee Kuan Yew's interview with The Australian, published in The Straits Times, 16 September 1988

xvii. Similar to the notion of "common security" except that it envisages a more gradual as opposed to broad-brush process.

xviii. Includes economic underdevelopment, trade disputes, overpopulation, irregular migration, and refugee movements, environmental degradation, political oppression, human rights abuses, terrorism and the illicit trade in drugs.

xix. Environment, Human Rights and Democracy

xx. ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences

xxi. Especially the Korean Peninsula