Democracy or death? Will democratisation bring greater regional instability to East Asia?

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PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Democracy or death? Will democratisation bring greater regional instability to East Asia?

Amitav Acharya

Abstract The article challenges the view that democratisation is a recipe for regional disorder in East Asia. This view is not supported by evidence. Critics of democratisation fail to consider a number of mitigating factors that may check the destabilising consequences of democratisation while accentuating its peace-causing effects. These factors are not necessarily other liberal forces, like economic interdependence, or regional institutions, although these do matter. Certain dynamics associated with democratisation, such as focus on economic rebuilding for regime legitimation, positive nationalism ('democratic pride'), involvement of civil society, etc., may lessen the potential for inter-state conflict. These mitigating factors do not necessarily correspond with the normative and institutionalist logic underpinning the democratic peace theory, and they have been largely overlooked by the critics of that theory. After identifying them, this paper shows that the East Asian experience does not show that democratisation leads to greater conflict between states. On the contrary, democratisation might create better prospects for cooperative peace in the region.

Keyword Asian democracy; Asian security; Asian regionalism; democratic peace; cooperative security.
The nexus between democracy and stability of Asia remains one of the least examined subjects, especially when compared with other drivers of Asia’s regional order, such as the balance of power, economic interdependence or regional institutions. Comparative politics scholars studying democratisation in Asia, despite their immensely valuable contribution, have paid far more attention to exploring the domestic context and factors (such as the role of the middle class, the impact of economic growth, and the role of (a largely national) civil society) behind democratic transitions than to its external underpinnings and consequences (see, for example, Hewison et al. 1993; for a critique, see Amitav Acharya (1990)).Disciplinary international relations scholars, especially those debating the ‘democratic peace’ thesis, have given the Asian regional context a miss in developing their arguments about whether democracy is a force for peace or prescription for disorder. Preoccupied with large N statistical studies, debates about democratic peace have produced little insight into regional dynamics, especially outside Europe. There is little available work examining democracy and regional order with a specific focus on East Asia (exceptions are Goldsmith 2007; on China see Friedman, 2000; on Southeast Asia, see Author 2003; Emmerson 2009).\(^1\)

In the policy-making world, some of the region’s elite argued that authoritarianism could be credited with economic growth, political stability, and security order. It could even explain the success of its early regional institutions like ASEAN. In particular, the nexus between democracy and economic performance aroused a great deal of controversy in the 1990s. Remember the Lee Kuan Yew–Fidel Ramos debate over whether democracy breeds indiscipline and poor economic performance (Author 1999)?\(^2\) The 1997 financial crisis put paid to this debate by highlighting the existence of ‘bad Asian values’, such as corruption, nepotism and lack of transparency, which were widely blamed for the crisis. But it was replaced by concerns about, if not a debate over, the relationship between democracy and stability and security, especially with the downfall of the Suharto regime in Indonesia as a direct consequence of the crisis, which set in motion the democratisation of Southeast Asia’s largest and Asia’s third most populous nation. In the immediate aftermath of the Indonesian crisis, the outbreak of tensions between Jakarta and its neighbours Singapore and Malaysia fed perceptions that democratisation in the region could be a prescription not just for internal disorder, but also inter-state conflicts. It was feared that Jakarta might at best abandon its support for ASEAN, and at worst, might revert to a Sukarno-like belligerent nationalist posture towards its neighbours. Such concerns also emerged about Taiwan’s democratic transition which some viewed as having enhanced the prospect for conflict with China by creating an alternative political model of growth and prosperity which makes Beijing nervous and insecure. The issue of democratic change in Burma, and more generally, human rights and democratisation in Southeast Asia, has polarised the once cohesive regional grouping and strained its relations with an otherwise sympathetic West.
The link between democratisation and regional order in East Asia has significant wider theoretical and policy implications. At a broader theoretical level, it raises the crucial question whether economic interdependence and regional institutions are sufficient by themselves to underpin stable peace in the region. Can there be a community (a stated goal of East Asian nations), in the absence of shared democratic values and politics? In the policy arena, fear of disorder has been partly responsible for the international community’s lukewarm support for Asian democratisation. Yet, these fears do not seem to be based on a thorough empirical examination of the actual effect of democratic transitions on regional stability. Another policy question concerns the role of regional institutions in the promotion of democracy. If democracy is blamed for disorder, regional institutions may shy away from democracy-promotion and hold dearly to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of their member states, as has been the case in Asia. But is this policy really justified?

In this article, I make two arguments. First, empirical evidence does not support the pessimism found in either academic or policy literature concerning the effects of democratisation on regional order in East Asia. Second, pessimists fail to consider a number of mitigating factors that may check the destabilising consequences of democratisation while accentuating its peace-causing effects. These are not necessarily other liberal forces, like economic interdependence (Wan 2002; Lind 2005; Goldsmith 2007), or regional institutions (Author 2002) although these other forces do matter. But what is more important are the effects of democratisation itself, which may mitigate any potential for conflict that is inherent in the democratisation process. These mitigating factors do not necessarily correspond with the normative and institutionalist logic underpinning the democratic peace theory, and they have been largely overlooked by the critics of the theory.

Some initial caveats and clarifications are necessary here. First, I am concerned with East Asia, which does not include South Asian states. (It has been argued that India and Pakistan and India and Sri Lanka have been embroiled in military conflict even when their regimes were democratic, most notable example being the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. See Friedman 2000). Second, I am concerned primarily with dyadic inter-state conflict (which is the main focus of both the supporters and critics of democratic peace theory, although the latter cannot be entirely separated from domestic violence. I am less concerned with the general issue of regional instability, such as strategic relations with outside major powers, which may be affected by democratisation and undermine regional security. Hence, I do not examine arguments about rising anti-Americanism caused by democratisation in South Korea and Philippines, which may affect their alliances with the US, an outcome which some would view as detrimental to regional stability. This is an important subject but perhaps worthy of a separate exercise. Third, I offer a qualitative analysis, focusing on, and generalising from, individual cases of democratic
transition in Asia and their impact on peace and stability. My approach in this respect is different from the quantitative studies that are commonplace in the literature on democratic peace and its critics. Moreover, the factors linking democratisation and order that I highlight are sensitive to the East Asian regional context and broader than the standard democratic peace literature, which has dominated the debate over democracy and peace at the global level. As such, this article not only challenges the critics of democratic peace theory, but also encourages us to move beyond the narrowly focused and quantitative research of democratic peace scholars and their critics and focus on regional cases and dynamics.

**Conceptual linkages**

Much of the recent debate in the Western academic and policymaking circles over democracy and international order revolves around the claims of democratic peace theory (See, for example, Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller 1996; Lee Ray 1995; Weart 1998). Although the exact formulation of this theory is in itself contested, simply put, this theory argues that democracies tend not to fight other democracies (as opposed to the broader claim that democracies tend to be more pacific than autocracies, a proposition that is much more controversial and harder to defend). Academic writings on democratic peace offer two reasons for the pacific tendency of democracies: normative and institutional (Maoz and Russett 1993). The normative argument holds that democracies tend to externalise the domestic values and practices such as tolerance of diversity, competition, peaceful settlement of disputes, and respect for liberty. This explains why they seek and maintain peaceful relations with other democratic states who possess similar values. The institutional argument focuses on constraints on the leaders of democratic states in going to war, such as parliamentary scrutiny, media criticism, and pressure of public opinion that might see war as a waste of public resources. If states in a dyadic relationship are both democracies, then the normative and institutional constraints on war are magnified, especially as such governments would be tied to common values and practices that engender trust and a sense of community. This explains the extreme scarcity of war between democracies.

The democratic peace thesis has its fair share of critics. Much of the criticism focuses on key terminology, such as how does one define democracy, and what counts as a war. Believers in democratic peace have often been accused of tautology, i.e. defining these terms in ways so as to support and safeguard the democratic peace proposition. This is not the place for revisiting these debates. Suffice is it to say that although it is a useful starting point, the democratic peace theory does not serve as an adequate framework for analysing the international consequences of democratisation in East Asia for several reasons.
For a long time, the relative paucity of durable liberal democracies in East Asia meant there was a very small sample with which to test the causal arguments of democratic peace. Whether there has been any instance of an outright war between two democratic states in East Asia does not prove the pacific conduct of democracies towards each other, because there have been so few democracies in the region. Friedman (2000: 228) argues that in Asia as elsewhere, since democracies are isolated by maritime distances, and since wars usually take place between neighbours, the democratic peace logic based on relationship among democracies may be ‘circular or not significant’. Moreover, East Asian democracies, despite having allowed regular elections, have been less ‘liberal’ in terms of multi-party competition and civil liberties than their Western counterparts, which begs the question whether the logic of democratic peace can really be applied here. After all, in some versions of the democratic peace argument the pacific impulse of democracies towards each other is produced by liberalism, i.e. democracies which guarantee political and civil liberties, especially open criticism of governments and where ‘citizens have leverage over war decisions’, rather than simply hold regular controlled elections.

Other reasons can be added to support the above argument that the normative and institutionalist logic underpinning the democratic peace theory does not fit easily within the East Asian context. In so far as the normative argument goes, the internalisation of norms, any norms, takes time, and the relative newness of democratic regimes in East Asia makes it difficult to speak of such internalisation in Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia. Democratic norms may have a more significant impact on the foreign policy of older democracies like Japan and India, but India’s behaviour towards its immediate South Asian neighbours does not support such expectations. The institutional argument, on the other hand, is undercut by the fact that legislative scrutiny of foreign policy conduct is less institutionalised and binding in Asia than in Western democracies (although this may be changing in some cases like Indonesia). Moreover, and this is a general criticism of democratic peace theory, the very institutions that are supposed to rein in a democratic regime’s war-making policies, whether the parliament, media and public opinion, can be manipulated and act as a spur to conflict.

Against this backdrop, one aspect of the academic debate over democracy and order which would seem to have more resonance in East Asia is not the theory of democratic peace itself, but its criticisms from those who believe that democratisation, if not mature democracy, is a prescription for disorder. The most well-known of the academic perspectives, by Mansfield and Snyder jointly, and Snyder separately, blame heightened nationalism for instability and war during democratic transitions. In their view, to put it simply, democratisation increases the danger of war (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002; Snyder 2000). Mansfield and Snyder claimed that
'countries do not become mature democracies overnight. More typically, they go through a rocky transitional period, where democratic control over foreign policy is partial, where mass politics mixes in a volatile way with authoritarian elite politics, and where democratisation suffers reversals. In this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states' (Mansfield and Snyder 1995: 5). In their 2002 article, Mansfield and Snyder (2002: 297) reiterate their argument: citing the cases of the former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus and Indonesia, they argue ‘transitions from dictatorship to more pluralistic political systems coincided with the rise of international independence movements, spurring separatist warfare that often spilled across international borders’. (For a robust challenge to the Mansfield and Snyder thesis, see Narang and Nelson 2009)

Yet, such perspectives linking democratisation and violence do not take into account a number of possible mitigating factors of democratisation. Nor is nationalism the only or the most decisive factor in causing tensions and conflict among newly democratic nations. In an earlier article, going well beyond the literature on democratic peace theory and its critics, I had identified a number of possible consequences, both negative and positive, of democratisation for regionalism and regional order in Southeast Asia (Author 2003). Expanding on the framework, I present a list of possible consequences of democratisation for regional conflict and stability.

The conflict causing consequences involve both revived or freshly created inter-state tensions as well as effects of democratic transitions on regional cooperation and mechanisms that ensure peaceful settlement of disputes. Newly democratic states have a tendency to export their ‘revolutions’, either actively or passively (they may show sympathy for pro-democracy struggles in their neighbourhood), which make their authoritarian neighbours fearful and hostile. Heightened nationalism, as Snyder and Mansfield have pointed out, often a feature of newly democratic states, could fuel inter-state tensions. The advent of a new and legitimate regime may revive tensions over issues ‘settled’ by an unpopular ousted regime. As far as regional cooperation and cooperative institutions are concerned, preoccupation with democratisation may divert the attention and resources of leaders from regional cooperation. Regional institutions led or promoted by an authoritarian regime may be opposed by a new democratic regime and its civil society allies and newly empowered civil society groups. Regional cooperation founded upon close inter-personal ties and informal contacts among leaders and elites will face disruption if the key regime anchoring them is removed from office. In a related vein, regional institutions established and maintained by authoritarian states could lose legitimacy and support from within the population of those of their member states that have experienced greater domestic political openness.

Democratisation may call into question the sanctity of existing regional norms and the relevance of existing institutional mechanisms. Leaders of
separatist movements who become democratically-chosen leaders of new states created by the collapse of an authoritarian polity are likely to be hostile towards a regional grouping which had previously not supported their cause or even acquiesced with their suppression out of deference to regional norms. Uneven democratisation within a regional grouping could polarise members over key political issues, including promotion of human rights and democracy through regional means. A final factor is the trans-boundary spill-over effect of domestic strife accompanying the democratisation process. The cross-border outflow of political or ethnic refugees can become a source of interstate tensions.

While these dangers always lurk in any democratisation process, they may be offset by a number of mitigating forces, which are generated by democratisation. The rulers of a newly democratising state are likely to focus on internal consolidation and economic reconstruction (especially if it has been under long and ruinous authoritarian rule) to fulfil promises made during the struggle for democracy. Hence war would be regarded as wasteful. Democratisation creates more domestic transparency in ways beneficial to regional understanding and trust. Transition to democratic rule brings in its wake availability of greater information about a state’s national security and financial policies and assets. This could reduce suspicions among neighbours and expand regional security and economic cooperation. Rule of law in the domestic context often leads to rule-based interactions in the regional arena. This can be more conducive to regional collective problem-solving. Democratisation creates a deeper basis for regional socialisation by according space to the civil society and accommodating its concerns. The ruling elite in democratising states is likely to co-opt the civil society and accept its transnational links, and thereby increase their chances for more effective responses to transnational issues. The ruling elite in democratising states is likely to give a higher priority to maintaining and enhancing its international legitimacy than to regain territory from neighbours or to seek unilateral gain. Opposition leaders during the struggle for democratic change accept and use international liberal norms, such as pacific settlement of disputes, and interdependence. This may offset the impact of nationalism produced by democratisation.

Furthermore, the nationalism that accompanies democratisation may turn out to be a positive nationalism, or ‘democratic pride’ (i.e. pride in having achieved an open polity; being able to say we are a ‘democratic nation’, win respect from the international community, avoid the derogatory labels of authoritarian regime or ‘dictator’), than a negative nationalism. Democratising states are more likely to subject themselves to international mediation and arbitration. And democratising states are as much if not more likely to adopt cooperative security and regional integration strategies towards their neighbours. The last factor, called the ‘cooperative security’ effect of democratisation, has been a significant trend in three recent cases of democratic transitions in East Asia.
### Box 1 Democritisation in East Asia: key dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>February 1986: Corazon Aquino replaces Fidel Marcos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>June 1987: Direct presidential elections under Roh Tae Woo, 29 June 1987.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>July 1987: President Chiang Ching-Kuo, on 30 October 1986, announced that KMT state would lift the martial law in July 1987. First elections in which parties other than Kuomintang were allowed to compete were held in 1989.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### East Asian cases

Comparing and co-relating democratic transitions (for key transitions in East Asia, see Box 1) and incidence of inter-state war (with at least 1000 battle deaths, the yardstick used by Snyder and Mansfield) involving South Korea, Taiwan, in Northeast Asia, Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia and Indonesia in Southeast Asia, one thing stands out. There is no single case in East Asia where a newly democratic regime has gone to an outright war with its neighbour. Neither is there much evidence (with the possible exception of Taiwan) of significant increased tensions with neighbours caused by, as Snyder and Mansfield argue, growing nationalism in the democratising country.

Let us now turn to the Northeast Asia, and compare the cases of South Korea and Taiwan. Both the Northeast Asian cases are special in the sense that they involve reunification, rather than conventional inter-state relations, and hence may not be directly relevant to considering how democratisation will affect foreign policy behaviour elsewhere in Asia. One has to be careful in generalising from them about the link between democratisation, national identity and regional conflict in other parts of Asia. But with this caveat, at first glance, it appears that democratisation of these two policies has had a significantly different effect on the prospects for regional conflict (Chung 2002, 2003). Arguably, Taiwanese democratisation
**Table 1** Destabilizing and conflict-causing consequences of democratisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did the newly democratic country:</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fight a war with its neighbor/s within the first 10 years of transition?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No(^1)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No(^2)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempt to destabilise the region by exporting its 'revolution'?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No(^3)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revive territorial claims thought to have been 'settled' by authoritarian predecessor?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Find itself distracted from or express lack of interest in, regional cooperation?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No(^4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce its adherence to existing regional norms and institutional mechanisms for regional cooperation?</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes(^5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience opposition from its civil society towards existing regional institutions?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Yes (to ASEAN and APEC over East Timor and Burma)</td>
<td>Yes (to ASEAN over Burma)</td>
<td>Yes (to ASEAN over Burma)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

1. A military crisis with China occurred in 1996 over President Lee Teng-hui’s revision of one China policy, and subsequently due to tensions over DPP’s plans for independence.
2. Limited border conflicts with Laos in 1987–88, and with Burma in 2001, neither could be attributed to democratisation.
3. Thailand did seek to promote democracy in the region and this caused tensions with Burma.
4. This appeared to be the case initially under Abdurrahman Wahid government.
5. Especially the non-interference norm and the ASEAN Way, but this might have spurred ASEAN to undertake greater institutionalisation.
Table 2 Stabilising and cooperative consequences of democratisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sign a peace or reconciliation treaty (bilateral or multilateral) with a hostile neighbour or a domestic insurgent group within its first 10 years?</td>
<td>Yes (with MNLF)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, Paris Peace Agreement (1991)</td>
<td>Yes, Bali Concord II (2004)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adopt cooperative security strategies towards a neighbouring state?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create greater domestic transparency and oversight of foreign and defence policy?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Push for more rule-based interactions in regional institutions?</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject itself to international mediation and peacemaking efforts?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, Aceh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accord space to the civil society and accept at least some of its transnational links and demands?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MNLF: Moro National Liberation Front.
MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
led to greater Taiwanese nationalism, with stronger assertions of Taiwanese identity, thereby aggravating tensions with China. By contrast, South Korean democratisation eventually brought into power a regime (Kim Dae Jung) which sought peace with its North Korean adversary.

But the hitherto popular view that Taiwanese democratisation created greater regional instability while that of South Korea had the opposite effect should be viewed with caution. It is not without merit, but the reality is rather more complex. Taiwan’s case is probably the most problematic one if one argues against a co-relation between democratisation and disorder. Yuan-Kang Wang (2004: 293) argues that ‘democratisation in Taiwan led it to increasingly demand more international recognition of state sovereignty. These two contradictory forces – Chinese nationalism and Taiwan democratization – made for a rocky period in cross-Strait relations, culminating in the test-firing of missiles by China in the waters near Taiwan during 1995–96.’ Other analysts link changing conceptions of national identity in Taiwan brought about by democratisation with greater cross-Straits antagonism (Horowitz et al. 2007). These authors make similar arguments about China, where identity change is brought about by liberalisation, not democratisation per se.

But such views ignore the fact that Taiwanese democratisation also has had some important pacific effects. As Hughes (1999: 134) noted, one of the early effects of democratisation (evident by 1994) was that the KMT (then under Lee Teng-hui) came to be ‘constrained by public opinion against taking undue risks and limiting cross-straits transactions’, while the opposition DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) ‘appeared to be constrained in its advocacy of Taiwan independence by its rejection at the polls.’ This was of course before the DPP won the presidency, and embarked on a campaign for Taiwanese identity, but even thereafter, the constraining effects of public opinion on its risk-taking propensity remained important, despite the growing evidence of Taiwanese identity. As Tsang and Tien (1999) argue, while democratic politics led to the identification of political parties along ethnic lines and thus caused domestic polarisation (although not violent conflict) and provoke mainland China, this is offset by the development of a ‘national identity’ which mitigates conflict. This might have pulled the DPP government under Chen Sui-Bien from the brink of conflict with the mainland which would have resulted from a unilateral declaration of independence. A related point here is to recognise the ‘constructed’ nature of Taiwanese identity. To the extent that Taiwanese identity has been identified as a conflict-causing variable induced by democratisation, and to the extent that it was deliberately promoted by the DPP to secure its electoral prospects, electoral defeat would mean a roll back on the DPP’s strategy. In other words, the fact that the building of Taiwanese identity had partly to do with top-down regime manipulation (rather than an entirely spontaneous occurrence) implies at the very least that it is not irreversible. This might have already happened as the outcome of Taiwan’s latest elections.
Turning to South Korea, the Korean reunification project is different from cross-strait relations because the driving force behind in the former is the more prosperous and democratic South Korea, very different from the cross-strait relations where the driving force behind reunification is less prosperous (at least until now) and authoritarian China. While the progress of democratisation in Taiwan is caught up with the issue of competing identities, in the Korean Peninsula’s case it is not. In South Korea, one finds a clearer case where democratisation appeared to have led to improved prospects for conflict resolution. Democratisation initially made the government more dovish, rather than hawkish (Horowitz et al. 2007), thereby showing that democratisation does not necessarily make regimes nationalistic and aggressive towards their neighbours. The South Korean case shows that national identity building under conditions of democratisation can be inclusive, not divisive, as in the case initially with Taiwan. In other words, democratisation can engender positive nationalism, (as opposed the negative nationalism stressed by Mansfield and Snyder): a project of common identity-forging in divided societies involving ideologically different neighbours.

The main reason for this positive nationalism in the case of South Korea is the opening up of the security discourses and the decision-making system, a direct outcome of democratisation. But this did not happen immediately with democratisation. Although Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam allowed free elections, the security discourse in the country remained more or less as under authoritarian rule. It continued with the narrowly-based, military-dominated decision-making apparatus. It really changed under Kim Dae-jung. It was under the Kim Dae-jung government that South Korean society witnessed the first true change in security discourse previously monopolised by a small elite or national security establishment. At least it can be said that the effect of democratisation which led to peaceful overtures toward North Korea was the greater diversity and openness in South Korea’s national security establishment, a process which did not take place overnight, but which can be legitimately regarded as a byproduct of democratisation. Hence, it would be defensible to link democratisation with improved relations between the North and the South. Democratisation opened the space for alternative views and approaches to make their impact felt. Kim Dae-jung’s ‘sunshine policy’ towards North Korea was not a direct product of democratisation, but a product of these alternative discourses and ideas which were made possible by democratisation. And while tensions between the North and the South have remained, North Korea’s covert action and assassinations against the South have declined after South Korea became democratic.

South Korea’s case is particularly important because it shows a cooperative security effect of democratisation, which leads newly democratic regimes to sue their neighbours for peace and cooperation. It is a relevant question whether and to what extent the ‘sunshine policy’, pursued
despite US resistance, owed also to the ‘transnational moral debt’ of the leaders of regimes presiding over transition to democracy. This applies not just to leaders like Kim Dae-jung who were persecuted under authoritarian rule and sheltered by the West, but also more generally to leaders who receive significant international goodwill and support from Western and other Asian governments and civil society groups, after the collapse of authoritarian rule, and even those who seek to cultivate a new foreign policy image consistent with their democratic credentials. They have a moral obligation not to disappoint the international community by engaging in domestic or external violence. While one might question its motivations and debate its implications, this adds ammunition to the arguments of those who believe that democratisation can cause peace, rather than conflict.

This leads us to a consideration of the international effects of democratisation in Southeast Asia. While there have been signs of heightened nationalism accompanying democratisation in Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia, there is no evidence that this nationalism, which owes to elite and societal pride in the overthrow of authoritarian rule, and the gaining of international respectability that goes with democratisation, has spilled over into anger and conflict against neighbours. I discuss below the case of Thailand, Cambodia and Indonesia. The Philippines is left out because there is no dyadic tension between Philippines with its ASEAN neighbours since the Sabah dispute with Malaysia in the later 1960s and 1970s. (Tensions between Philippines and Singapore over the hanging of a Filipina maid by the latter could not fit as a case of democratisation-induced conflict since it occurred long after the transition). Sino-Philippine tensions over the Spratlys had also little to do with democratisation. The Philippines case is more germane to the implications of democratisation for foreign military alliances and bases, which is not discussed in this article, although it may just be pointed out that while initially democratic transitions in Philippines caused anti-bases sentiment, 9/11 has engendered positive public sentiments towards US–Philippines security cooperation against terrorism and separatism in the South.

Thailand’s case is a good starting point. Democratisation in Thailand has never been linear or terminal. But it was the elected government of Chatichai Choonhavan (which was the first elected government since 1976) which pursued the ‘battlefields to marketplaces’ approach which broke the diplomatic deadlock in the Cambodia conflict and provided an opening for ASEAN’s reconciliation with Vietnam: the most peace-causing development in the recent history of Southeast Asia. Here, it may be difficult to separate the effects of democratisation from national economic and even geopolitical motives. Critics claimed that Chatichai was reviving a historic strategy of Thai economic and strategic dominance of mainland Southeast Asia, consistent with a Suwonophum – golden land – concept. In the end, however, any such design that Thailand might have had failed to materialise. But the point of this example is to counter the view that
democratisation is a natural or automatic catalyst of nationalism which spills over into conflict with neighbours.

Another relevant case in Thailand would be the Chuan Leekpai government which came into office in 1997, following the outbreak of the Asian economic crisis. Here is a clear example of a newly elected regime pursuing a foreign policy agenda that self-consciously reflects and promotes its democratic credentials. Asada Jayanama, a top Thai diplomat, stated that ‘We want to encourage Indonesia to move towards democratisation because then we’ll have three important democratic countries in Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. That will change the picture’ (Acharya 2001: 5). Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan hoped that Thailand’s democratic system ‘will be an inspiration to freedom and democracy-loving peoples in other countries, without interfering in their internal affairs.’ Despite affirming the non-interference principle, Surin explained his foreign policy stance as a reflection of Thailand’s ‘commitment to freedom and democracy’ (Pitsuwan 1998: 5). In so far as regional cooperation was concerned, Pitsuwan became famous for proposing a new approach, called ‘flexible engagement’ to reform the working of the regional institution: ASEAN. This was partly (but not entirely) directed at Burma, in an apparent repudiation of ASEAN’s existing policy of ‘constructive engagement’ (favoured by preceding Thai governments) towards the Burmese regime.

While these policies caused some apprehension and concern in Burma and discomfort among the ASEAN neighbours, they did not lead to conflict. Thailand was restrained in pursuing them. Faced with criticism and rejection from Singapore and Indonesian, Surin toned down his ‘flexible engagement’ concept. Thailand’s brief military conflict with Burma in 2001, the last days of the Chuan government, was a limited border skirmish (less than 10 people died) and had little to do with the democratisation ideology of the government, which was rarely heard of by this time. And although Chuan pursued a less than friendly attitude towards Burma, and his successor Thaksin Shinawatra pursued a more favourable approach towards the junta there.

Turning to international effects of democratisation in Cambodia, one has to start by noting the special circumstances under which the country was brought under democratic rule. Democratisation here was a necessary component of the overall restoration of the country, to normalise its politics and restore its fully sovereign status following the Vietnamese invasion and occupation since December 1978. And democratisation was brought about under the direct auspices of an international institution, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), backed by ASEAN which had played a significant role in the peace process leading to the UNTAC. While the UNTAC supervised the first elections in Cambodia and the democratic system proved fragile for a long time until Cambodia settled into a historic Southeast Asian pattern of rule by strongmen (in this case Hun Sen), there was little sign of the even the very unstable governments
(including the coalition government between Hun Sen and Ranarridh and by Hun Sen himself) pursued nationalist policies designed to cause tension and conflict with neighbours, including such historic rivals as Vietnam and Thailand. On the contrary, relations with Vietnam proved to be stable and free of violence, which is no small measure due to the UN-mandated peace and Cambodia’s membership in ASEAN, which had also accepted Vietnam not long after the democratic transition in Cambodia took place. This may well suggest that international and regional institutions are more relevant than democratisation in inducing restraint and peaceful conduct in a newly democratising country. Indeed, it’s hard to identify a direct link between democratisation and peaceful relations in the case of Cambodia beyond the fact that the new regime focused on economic issues to secure its domestic legitimacy and had to be careful not to provoke conflict with its neighbours which would have alienated the international community which was providing so much assistance to the country and the regime. But it also refutes any necessary correlation between democratisation and conflict, which is the main aim of this article. This is not to say that electoral politics has not led to heightened nationalism in Cambodia directed against its neighbours. The recent conflict with Thailand over the contested Preah Vihear temple complex on their common border which led to limited military engagement between the two countries was partly induced by Hun Sen’s desire to exploit public sentiment in his favour at a time of approaching national elections. Domestic politics was also a factor on Thailand’s side, as the government loyal to the ousted Prime Minister Thaksin bowed to public pressure created by the royalist opposition against its decision to support Cambodia’s application for UNESCO recognition of the temple as a heritage site, forcing it to reverse its stance and send troops to the border. But here, ASEAN membership seems to be a factor in restraining the two sides from escalating the issue further. And the domestic pressures in Thailand behind the conflict has little to do with democratisation per se, since neither the royalists nor Thaksin supporters were acting out of democratic impulse.

Post-Suharto Indonesia belied the fears not the least of neighbouring Singapore bemoaning the loss of its long-time friend and ‘father of ASEAN’, Suharto, about a return to Sukarno-era nationalism. Sure enough, Indonesia’s relations with Singapore deteriorated sharply after the ouster of Suharto, with Habibie (who was but an unelected president) calling the country a ‘little red dot’. The first elected (indirectly) post-Suharto President, Abdurrahman Wahid, also took a poor view of Singapore. The issues here were not Indonesia’s democracy promotion agenda, or democratisation-induced nationalist pride, both of which were muted, if not non-existent, but bilateral issues like extradition of Indonesians who kept their money in Singapore out of the reach of Indonesian authorities, and sand imports by Singapore from Indonesia, etc. Contrary to fears that Indonesia might step back from regional cooperation, Jakarta actually played a major role in strengthening ASEAN through a cooperative
security approach. Indonesia’s democratic government has not reneged on any of the commitments of its predecessor to ASEAN, and has become more active in regional diplomacy by proposing the idea of an ASEAN Security Community. Interestingly, this concept, despite much dilution due to opposition from authoritarian neighbours, made a strong pitch for enshrining democracy and human rights as part of ASEAN’s normative framework, and hence a new basis for deepening Southeast Asian regionalism. In other words, instead of defecting, Indonesia became a renewed promoter of ASEAN, albeit with a more liberal purpose for what has been a distinctively illiberal regional grouping. Indonesian nationalists might have been heartened by ASEAN refusal to endorse the East Timorese self-determination campaign even at the height of the bloodshed during the referendum period in August 1999, and its formal declaration of support for Indonesia’s territorial integrity in 2000. But Indonesia also shows evidence that democratisation may increase a country’s tolerance for foreign criticism and involvement in domestic affairs, as evident in its allowance of outside mediation and monitoring of a long-standing internal conflict, Aceh.

Although not the focus of this essay, the case of domestic violence of Indonesia’s democratisation is pertinent here because some observers point to the collapse of the Suharto regime as proof that democratisation is a recipe for violence. They credit Suharto as having been a force for both domestic and external stability (in ASEAN). According to one conservative estimate, Indonesia’s transition to democracy in 1998 claimed roughly 19,000 victims, about half of which were due to communal conflict and much of the rest due to secessionist violence, although the latter is most likely an underestimation. Considering the horrific killings of May 1998 alone, one might implicate democratic change as a trigger of severe domestic violence. But as a carefully crafted study on collective violence in Indonesia argues, Suharto’s late New Order regime (1990–2003) was hardly peaceful. Moreover, a good deal of the violence in 1998 occurred when Suharto was still in office (he did not formally resign until 22 May 1998, whereas severe anti-Chinese violence broke out on 13 May). Hence, the seeds of violence during the transition and in the post-1998 period could be traced back to the legacy of the Suharto’s regime: ‘the violence of the New Order did not end with its formal demise in May 1998. Its terrible effects continued even after its death’ (Varshney et al. 2008: 378–9).

**Beyond the mitigating factors**

The foregoing analysis has indicated where the mitigating factors have worked to reduce the danger of democratisation for conflict. Beyond these, a few other factors bear close examination because they may shape whether democratisation is stabilising or destabilising. The first is the relative economic prosperity of some of the states making democratic transitions: South Korea and Taiwan. But this does not explain the relative lack of violence or
war in the case of relatively poorer countries like Philippines and Indonesia. Realists may point to US military presence as a relevant factor, which might have checked any instability caused by democratisation. But the evidence to support this is limited. The US military presence did not prevent violence in the Philippines, South Korea or Thailand during authoritarian rule. And there is no reason to believe that US military assets would have been deployed to deter and suppress the domestic instability or inter-state war due to democratisation. This would have been unthinkable.

Second, democratisation through the self-liberalisation of authoritarian rule may be less destabilising than democratisation through its forcible or involuntary replacement by domestic and external pressures. In addition, the length and severity of authoritarian rule may also be important. Transition to authoritarian rule might prove particularly destabilising if the authoritarian ruler had a long run in power and less so if the period of authoritarian rule was short. This perhaps explains why Thailand, whose recent stints with authoritarian rule have been relatively brief, witnessed relatively more peaceful transitions to democracy in the 1990s compared to Indonesia. It is also plausible to argue from the Indonesian case that the more severely repressive and close-minded the authoritarian ruler, and the more violent its eventual collapse, but the experience of Indonesia since the early post-Suharto period suggests distinct limits to this hypothesis. What may seem more plausible is that authoritarian rulers which promoted economic development and co-opted a wider section of the elite need not plunge the country to instability when they give way to more democratic rulers. This is evident from the case of relatively bloodless transitions in South Korea and Taiwan.

Third, one needs to take note of another alleged danger of democratisation for regional order, one that is especially likely to be highlighted by realists, which holds that democratic transitions will undermine the US alliance-system in the region that has been the lynchpin of regional stability. According to this view, anti-Americanism in Philippines and South Korea has grown in keeping with democratisation. But this view can be questioned. Even if one accepts that the US alliances have been a force for peace, and this is debatable, and that their weakening would cause serious regional instability, there is no reason to believe that democracy is incompatible with the politics of alliances. Moreover, one cannot ignore the fact that anti-Americanism has always been present in South Korea from the very outset of the post-war period, albeit suppressed by the authoritarian regimes backed by the US, the very fact which was one major reason for anti-American and anti-alliance sentiments. Democratisation might have brought these latent sentiments to the fore. And in the Philippines, while the initial phase of democratisation was accompanied by anti-US alliance sentiments in the public, closer relations with the US could be forged during a subsequent phase of democratic rule.

The role of economic interdependence is also important. This has been stressed by the ‘liberal peace’ school. Lind (2005) suggests that ‘economic
interdependence stabilizes democratic transitions.’ Goldsmith (2007) finds considerable evidence for this linkage as well. At the international level, there appears to be a correlation between economic interdependence and peace. Yet, economic interdependence is by itself not a sufficient condition for regional stability. The initial absence of war among ASEAN members since 1967 was possible without significant economic interdependence.

A more important factor, at least in Southeast Asia, is the impact of regionalism and regional institutions. A key factor in Southeast Asian cases discussed in this article seems to be role of international and regional institutions. This is also an important aspect of liberal peace, and suggests that the regional context matters. Democratisation has led to a growing criticism and rejection, both within and outside the region, of the time-honoured ASEAN Way, which has been credited with conflict prevention and dispute settlement in ASEAN. While this may be seen as a weakening of traditional ASEAN solidarity, this has been offset by ideas for reforming ASEAN, such as Surin Pitsuwan’s call for ‘flexible engagement’. The debate over non-interference in ASEAN has highlighted an interesting trend: the strongest supporters of a more relaxed sovereignty are those who have undergone democratic transitions. Thus, Thailand and Philippines and now Indonesia have been the supporters of a more open and flexible ASEAN approach to sovereignty and non-interference. Moreover, these controversies have been limited and not led to the breakdown of regional cooperation. Indeed, they might have had the opposite effect. While the debate over non-interference divides ASEAN, over the long-term, it could prove to be a blessing in disguise. The criticism of the ASEAN Way has entailed a call for more transparency within ASEAN, and the development of a new culture of peer criticism and review. Thanks to the debate, ASEAN is developing mechanisms which could permit more effective tools of transparency, crisis prevention and conflict management. The ASEAN experience also suggests that democratisation need not cause too much ideological polarisation and conflict within Asian regional institutions and frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the evolving East Asian Community.

**Conclusion**

My goal has not been to establish whether democratisation leads to peace, but to suggest that the danger of conflict accompanying democratisation may be mitigated by other factors generated by democratisation, and to investigate whether the alleged destabilising effects of democratisation for regional order are actually borne out in reality in East Asia. Contrary to the claims of those who believe that democratisation causes greater inter-state conflict and regional disorder, it may actually have had pacific effects. To be sure, I do not offer any firm conclusions or predictions about the impact of democratisation on regional stability. This would require much more extensive research into long-term trends than what is undertaken here. But
this article hopes to start a discussion and debate by identifying a range of possible factors that might shape the nexus between democratisation and regional order, including especially *those factors that may contribute toward a positive co-relationship*, which have not been adequately highlighted in the academic literature or policy debates on East Asian security.

In terms of theoretical framework, I have argued that the propositions of democratic peace theory are not especially helpful in investigating the consequences of democratisation for regional order in East Asia, although they cannot be entirely disregarded. But one has to look outside of standard democratic peace literature to understand why democratic transitions have not been as violent as some might have led us to expect.

In South Korea, Indonesia, and to a lesser extent Thailand, there are clear signs that democratisation has been accompanied by more cooperative strategy towards problem neighbours. The reasons for this vary, but generally include a desire to discredit and distance from the authoritarian predecessor’s foreign policies, the pressure to build domestic legitimacy through economic performance which would be undermined by war, and the transnational moral debt of the new regime to refrain from war with neighbours and thereby sending a positive signal to the international community, including governments, donors, and civil society groups which backed it during authoritarian rule. To be sure, foreign adventures sometime help to divert attention from domestic problems and help the legitimacy of new regimes, but this comes only after the new regime fails to achieve legitimacy through peaceful means. Peace with neighbours may be a good way to create the regional climate for domestic economic performance.

Will a democratising China pose a threat to regional order? The answer depends very much on the nature and manner of this transition, which this article cannot predict. But historical record provides no reason why democratic transition in China, especially if takes place after the country achieves a level of prosperity and is realised through the South Korea and Taiwan pathway, rather than the people’s power models in Philippines and Thailand, will generate a virulent nationalism in China directed against its neighbours. Nationalism is rising even before democratic transition takes place. This nationalism is partly the product of regime manipulation, but is also generated by economic development and increase in national power. There is a possibility that nationalism generated by democratic transition may create pressure for taking Taiwan by force, but there is also reason to hope that a democratic China will exude a positive nationalism, which will be a more attractive home for the Taiwanese to reunite with.

An important policy implication of this article may be that the international community should not fear democratisation in East Asia. During the Cold War, US policy towards democratisation in countries formally allied with it, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and the Philippines was ambiguous at best. In South Korea, the US not only ignored repression by
the Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan regimes. But it might have legitimised the harsh military rule. In the Philippines, the US role in the toppling of the Marcos regime was minimal, and came very late in the people’s power uprising. The same can be said about the US role in the demise of the authoritarian regime, of Suharto in Indonesia. On balance, the US (and its chief Asian ally, Japan) has been an indifferent supporter of democratic transitions, and in many cases has directly or indirectly contributed to prolonged authoritarian rule.

Asian regional institutions have also played a marginal role, and might have even discouraged democratisation. No Asian regional organisation has helped democracy promotion in member countries, in sharp contrast to the European Union, OSCE, and the Organization of American States. ASEAN has in the past shielded the repressive regime in Burma. The mention of democracy as a common goal of the organisation in the ASEAN Charter is symbolic, but the organisation is doing little to promote democracy in the region, partially because of the fear held by the members governments (many of whom are non-democratic) of the destabilising consequences of democratic change.

Yet, these fears are unfounded. The East Asian experience does not show that democratisation leads to greater conflict between states. On the contrary, democratisation might create better prospects for cooperative peace in the region. Although further research is needed to establish clearly and unambiguously the relationship between democratisation and regional order, the article should at least cast serious doubt on claims that instinctively democratic transitions in East Asia with regional disorder.

Acknowledgements

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Notes

1 Benjamin Goldsmith’s quantitative analysis concludes that while the liberal peace argument is not irrelevant to Asia, there is only limited evidence that democracy (or international institutions) have pacific effects, especially when compared to trade (commercial liberalism). But the democratic peace argument is more pertinent to analysing the relationship between Asian countries and outside world. My qualitative analysis suggests that there is a strong correlation between democratisation and regional order, implying a stronger impact of democracy and peaceful inter-state relations. Note that Goldsmith is referring to liberal peace, rather than democratic peace.

2 Lee Kuan Yew stated that ‘I do not believe that democracy necessarily leads to development. I believe that what a country needs to develop is discipline more than democracy’ (cited in ‘Asia’s Different Drum’, Time, 14 June 1993, p. 18).
Friedman’s general argument is that there can be no correlation between democracy and peace in general, certainly not in East Asia, because democratic peace theory as formulated by Western scholars may not apply to Asia. Western democratic peace theory is in his view based on a misreading of Kant. In identifying why republics may not pursue belligerent policy, Kant stressed caution and mutual interaction between states than democracy per se. The costs of war would be a more important factor restraining governments from fighting than democracy. Applying this logic to East Asia, Friedman holds up ASEAN as a model of this logic and dynamic. If we accept this view, multilateralism may be a more important factor in East Asian stability than democracy; the costs of war: a more important factor restraining governments from fighting than democracy. Yet at the same time and going somewhat against his own critique of democratic peace, Friedman believes that a democratic China and democratic Japan could build ‘a structure of peace’ (Friedman 2000: 224–55).

4 John Owen (1994: 127–8) makes the point that illiberal democracies (e.g. the ancient Greek city states, who valued heroism and warrior ethic, or the contemporary Balkan countries who define themselves according to religious categories’), are unlikely to enjoy democratic peace. By this logic, democratic peace is less likely to hold for societies imbued in a predominantly communitarian ethic.

5 This argument is supported by an extensive historical analysis by Betts and Huntington (1985–1986: 142), who found that the longer authoritarian rulers ‘stayed in power, (and hence the more ‘stable’, in that sense, their regimes apparently were), the more likely the death of the leaders was to be followed by instability.’

References


Appendix

Democracy and death in East Asia: 1945–2008 (estimates)

Although this article has not dealt with the impact of democratisation for domestic conflicts and deaths, the result of a preliminary and ongoing research effort undertaken by the author shows that political violence under authoritarian regimes in East Asia claimed far more lives than democratic ones. Note that there is no consolidated comparative data on these killings and data is extremely hard to gather. The numbers below are indicative but not exact. But the author stands by the overall trend.
Table A1  Democracy and death in East Asia: 1945–2008 (estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Authoritarian Rule (Includes occupation)</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>(1950–52) 9,000; (Marcos Regime 1966–87): 35,000 + 40,000 = 75,000</td>
<td>1989 onward: 38,600&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Sukarno (1945–67) 5,000 + 5000 + 1000 + 30,000 = 41,000&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Starting from Habibie 1999–2006: 2,017&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Suharto (1965–66) 500,000&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suharto (1967–98) 150,000&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975–78 Pol Pot Famine and Massacre: 1,000,000&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1978–89: 65,000&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1947:21,000&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1954–55: 5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1,000&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1973–80 Junta rule: 1,577&lt;sup&gt;12&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2003–08: 936&lt;sup&gt;13&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
<sup>2</sup>Including the ‘9.30’ Movement in 1965, which committed at least half a million deaths.  
<sup>3</sup>Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/) has only collected detailed information on battle-deaths for the time period after fighting resumed in 1999. That is the basis for the total battle-death estimate given. Also, in the province of Aceh, it was estimated that over 4300 people had been killed in 1998–2002. Most of these victims were civilians and not victims of battle-related incidents but rather one-sided violence or rioting.  
<sup>4</sup>These killings followed the abortive coup in the night of 30 September–1 October 1965. ‘In the course of little more than five months from late 1965 to early 1966, anti-communist Indonesians killed about half a million of their fellow citizens’ (Cribb and Ford 2010).  
<sup>5</sup>This number includes the deaths of Annex Timor; famine and massacre through 1975 invasion to 1982.  
<sup>6</sup>North Vietnam and US intervention in civil war period.  
<sup>7</sup>Some estimates put the figures of death under Pol Pot rule, including deaths from disease and starvation, at over 2 million. See for example, http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/pol-pot.htm (accessed 10 February 2010).  
<sup>8</sup>Vietnam vs. Cambodia war period.  
<sup>9</sup>UCDP data.  
<sup>10</sup>Including the ‘2.28 incident’ of 1947 when Taiwan was under KMT martial law, which committed approximately 20,000 deaths.  
<sup>11</sup>Including the death toll of Gwangju massacre of 18 May 1980.  
<sup>12</sup>1973 Democracy Movement, 14 October Incident (Data source: Wyatt 2004).  
<sup>13</sup>UCDP data estimate given above is not counting deliberate targeting of civilians, or one-sided violence, which has occurred throughout the conflict. At the same time, due to the difficulty of identifying a specific organisation to the attacks, it is possible that some violence by non-insurgent related actors may be included in the estimate above.  

Source: Data source unless otherwise stated is Sivard (1996: 19).