Structural Change and Regional Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era
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In recent literature on international relations, there has been considerable debate on the consequences of the end of the Cold War for international order. Echoing structural realist assumptions that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar ones, some security analysts have predicted increased international and regional disorder in the post-Cold War era. For example, John Mearsheimer has argued that "a Europe without the superpowers...would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years."¹ Similar predictions have been made about stability in the Third World. Thus, Jose Cintra argues that the Cold War had suppressed "many potential third-world conflicts"; their geopolitical retrenchment will ensure that "other conflicts will very probably arise from decompression and from a loosening of the controls and self-controls" exercised by the superpowers.² Stanley Hoffmann similarly envisages a New World Disorder in the Third World, "a situation far more chaotic than the world of the Cold War, when the superpowers, knowing that they could blow themselves up, restrained themselves and their allies."³ In a more cautious vein, Robert Jervis argues that while the Cold War might have had a mixed impact on Third World conflicts, "In the net, however, it generally dampened conflict and we can therefore expect more rather than less of it in future".⁴

A more sophisticated view of the future has been offered by Goldgeiger and McFaul, who use two different theoretical lenses to analyse and predict the future of what they call the "core" and the "periphery". Structural realist predictions that multipolarity will heighten anarchy, competition, and balancing behaviour will not, in their view, apply to security relations among the Great Powers who constitute the core. Instead, "political democracy, economic interdependence, and nuclear weapons" (all are largely unrelated to polarity or the distribution of power), will help lessen the security dilemma and reduce the risk of armed conflict within the core. But the situation in the periphery, roughly comprising what has been called the "Third World", will be radically different. Lacking the attributes that will bring stability to the core, the periphery will feature fragile regional security systems experiencing heightened conflict and disorder.⁵ Stability in the periphery will be undermined by inter-state strife, arms races, and balancing behaviour. In telling the "tale of two worlds of international politics in the post-cold war era", Goldgeiger and McFaul conclude that while "structural realism is inadequate to explain the behaviour of states in the core...[it] is relevant for understanding regional security systems in the periphery".⁶

In this paper, I offer a different view of the stability-instability equation in the Third World. First, I argue that the structural realist claim that bipolar international systems are more stable than multipolar ones might have been true of Europe and the central strategic balance during the Cold War, but it is misleading as a theoretical tool for analysing regional stability in the Third World. During the Cold War, the supposedly "stable" system structure permitted a great deal of regional instability in the Third World. On the other hand, a multipolar system structure, in which the balance of power may be more uncertain and the behaviour of states less predictable, may allow stability in regional security systems, at least in some parts of the Third World.

My second argument is that the post-Cold War security outlook for the Third World too
complex to be understood within a structural realist framework alone, as suggested by Goldgeiger and McFaul. While one cannot overlook the high incidence of conflict in the Third World today, the perils of strategic uncertainty can be exaggerated. And the blessings of multipolarity can be understated. The end of bipolarity will not have a single or uniform impact on the Third World. Some of its consequences will be destabilising, while other may bring about increased stability. Moreover, the Liberal arguments concerning international stability, such as democracy and interdependence, could also apply to the Third World. As a result, the Third World in the post-Cold War era will not be a single vast theater of conflict and disorder. The overall picture will vary from region to region, and the determinants of stability-instability will be increasing localised. The security predicament of the Third World regions will range from localised anarchies to pluralistic security communities of the kind found in the core.

Structural Stability and Regional Anarchy: The Third World in the Cold War Order

The view that the Cold War was a period of "stability" in the international system as a whole derives from a popular tenet of realist theory: that bipolar international systems generate more stability than multipolar ones. Kenneth Waltz, for example, argued that bipolarity reduced the possibility of international conflict by extending "the geographic scope of both [super]powers' concern". Moreover, "the pressures of a bipolar world strongly encourage[d] them [the superpowers] to act internationally in ways better than their characters may lead one to expect."

In this view, bipolarity promoted a restrained and regulatory role of the superpowers in dealing with regional conflicts. Thus, Robert Jervis argued that "The superpowers offered security to their clients as well as enforcing a degree of restraint on them". John Lewis Gaddis provided a further elaboration of this view by pointing to the tendency of "self-regulation" in a bipolar relationship. Referring to the willingness and ability of the two superpowers to manage major international crises during the Cold War period, Gaddis concludes that this functioned like "the automatic pilot on an airplane or the governor on a steam engine" in counteracting threats to international stability. The critical elements of these "self-regulating mechanisms" include, among other things, a "fundamental agreement among major states within the system on the objectives they are seeking to uphold by participating in it" as well as "agreed-upon procedures exist for resolving differences among them."

Structural realists have pointed to historical evidence to support their claim regarding the positive correlation between bipolarity and international stability. Waltz points to the experience of the US-Soviet rivalry as evidence of the ability of a bipolar system to manage crises and maintain alliances without resort to war. These attributes of bipolarity compare favourably to the relationship among the pre-1945 Great Powers interacting in a multipolar international environment.

But the realist position is misleading for an important reason. It takes an excessively narrow view of stability. Realist theory equates stability with the absence of system-threatening war among the Great Powers. For Gaddis, "the most convincing argument for 'stability' [of the bipolar world] is that so far at least, World War III has not occurred." In the realist model, the distribution of power is key to stability and only those units who occupy the upper rungs of the
power matrix could affect system structure by virtue of their conflictual or cooperative behaviour. The weaker members of the system, such as the Third World countries, simply do not possess the capabilities needed to affect the system structure. A "stable" system may permit any number of limited or small-scale and internal wars, including conflicts in its peripheral areas, so long as such conflicts did not threaten the existence of the system structure. Thus, for realists, the high incidence of Cold War conflicts in the Third World does not challenge the essential stability of bipolar international systems, as long as the central balance and its European strategic core remained war-free.\textsuperscript{11}

Thus, arguments concerning the "essential stability" of bipolar systems appear credible only if one ignores the evidence of large-scale regional disorder in the Third World during the Cold War period. Not only did superpower rivalry permit vast numbers of conflicts in the Third World, far more so than those in the developed world\textsuperscript{12}, more importantly, far from being seen as a threat to structural stability, conflict and violence in the Third World were seen as more "permissible". Gupta and Ayoob have argued that superpower intervention in regional conflicts in the Third World might have served as a necessary safety valve - "as a way of letting off steam which helps to cool the temperature around the core issues which are directly relevant and considered vital to the central balance and, therefore, to the international system."\textsuperscript{13}

Moreover, superpower rivalry, instead of dampening conflicts in the Third World through, actually contributed to their escalation. Although rarely a direct cause of Third World conflicts,\textsuperscript{14} opportunism and influence-seeking by the superpowers contributed significantly to the ultimate severity of many cases of incipient and latent strife in the Third World. It led to the internationalization of civil war and internalization of superpower competition.\textsuperscript{15} It also contributed to the prolongation of regional wars by preventing decisive results in at least some theatres, including the major regional conflicts of the 1970s and 80s: in Central America, Angola, Horn of Africa, Cambodia and Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq War.\textsuperscript{16}

Perhaps more important, the Cold War relationship between the superpowers did not include any long-term and substantive understanding covering the regulation of Third World conflicts. To be sure, many analyses have spoken of explicit and implicit norms or "ground rules of conduct" supposedly developed by the superpowers to moderate and regulate their competition.\textsuperscript{17} For example, Jerry Hough has argued that two of the major regional conflicts during the Cold War period, the Korean and Vietnam wars, were "fought by implicit rules that minimized the danger of Soviet-American confrontation".\textsuperscript{18} Others have drawn attention to the Arab-Israeli wars, in which superpower action to diffuse escalation possibilities included steps to ensure avoidance of direct engagement of their armed forces, as well as to impose some degree of restraint on their own clients while urging the other side do the same.\textsuperscript{19} Similarly, the superpowers were supposed to have shown a degree of restraint in conflicts "where truly important interests of the other was involved", as in the cases of Iran and Afghanistan conflicts.\textsuperscript{20}

Upon closer reflection, however, it emerges that much of the superpowers' attempts to devise a code of conduct for Third World conflicts were ad hoc, prescriptive and limited.\textsuperscript{21} For example, the principles embodied in the June 1973 agreement on the prevention of nuclear war signed by Nixon and Brezhnev "were framed so generally that they never came close to a definition of where their interests actually clashed."\textsuperscript{22} Those developed in relation to the Middle East conflict were so informal or tacit that they could not be applied effectively to other theatres.\textsuperscript{23} Indeed, the record of superpower regional security cooperation in the Third World
during the Cold War bears out Robert Jervis argument that the so-called "rules of conduct" evident in the superpowers' behaviour towards regional conflicts were "too directly linked to immediate self-interest", were "neither unambiguous nor binding", and tended to change with changes in the "power and interests" of the superpowers in relation to a particular conflict.  

Well-known differences between the superpowers over the meaning of detente were itself a key factor which accounted for their failure to build a durable code of conduct to manage Third World conflicts. The US view of detente emphasised the principle of linkage, which posited a feedback relationship between US interest in nuclear arms control and Soviet restraint on Third World regional security issues. But the Soviet Union vehemently resisted the inclusion of regional conflicts in the superpower arms control agenda; linkage to Moscow meant giving a "guarantee' of the sociopolitical status quo in developing regions" - an obligation which "it could undertake neither on principle nor physically." Moscow adamantly distinguished issues of regional conflict from those of the central strategic balance (until the Reagan administration succeeded in linking the two), thereby preventing any long-term understanding to promote mutual restraint in, and cooperative approaches to, management of Third World conflicts.  

An additional barrier to a superpower code of conduct governing Third World conflicts was opposition from their Third World clients, including states and revolutionary movements averse to "solutions imposed from outside". To the extent that many Third World regimes sought superpower patronage to gain leverage against their domestic opponents, they had a minimal interest in a general code of conduct that would facilitate a superpower-imposed solution. In this respect, while the superpower might have had some degree of success in devising broad diplomatic formulas to govern their own "external" involvement, they were much less able to settle internal matters involving power-sharing. The recent experience of regional conflicts in Afghanistan, Cambodia and El Salvador attests to this problem.  

Two other closely-related factors explain why efforts by the superpowers to regulate their competition in the Third World bore limited results, especially when compared with Europe. The first is the futile attempt by the superpowers to duplicate their Europe-style alliances in the Third World, which might have facilitated collaborative management of regional conflicts. The reference here is to regional security alliances, such as SEATO and CENTO. Alliance stability has been identified by realist theory as a major reason for the stability of bipolar systems. Yet alliance-making in the Third World was difficult and short-lived for both the superpowers  

The absence of an European-style security order in the Third World could also be ascribed to another factor. In Europe, the essential bipolarity of the post-World War II security structure in Europe remained relatively undiminished, despite the assertive role of France. The Third World, on the other hand, was a much more complex arena where several states were able to pursue their own independent geopolitical ambitions, sometimes with the explicit backing of the superpowers suffering geopolitical fatigue (as in the case of the Shah of Iran under the Nixon Doctrine), or by a clever manoeuvring between superpower blocs (as in the case of India or China). This undermined the degree of superpower control over Third World regimes and their behaviour in regional conflicts.  

Thus, if bipolarity and superpower rivalry created a framework of international order and stability, it was very specific in its scope and objective. The primary goal of the superpowers was to avoid direct confrontation and prevent local conflicts among their clients from developing into global nuclear war thorough their competitive intervention. Such an order left considerable room
for the escalation of local conflicts to regional wars, actively aided and fuelled by superpowers. The bipolar structure might have contained certain Third World conflicts, especially the Arab-Israeli ones, but overall it did not provide an effective framework for conflict-resolution. It is therefore not surprising that the political settlement of the major regional conflicts of the Cold War period (such as Cambodia, Afghanistan, Namibia etc.) had to await, rather than precede, the end of the Cold War brought about by, among other things, domestic changes in the Soviet Union. The superpowers’ capacity for self-regulation was in limited display and did not prevent high incidence of conflict and violence in the Third World.

**Structural Uncertainty and Regional Order/Disorder:**

*The Third World in the Post-Cold War Era*

If the structural stability of the Cold War period did not preclude large-scale regional disorder in the Third World, what are the likely implications of structural uncertainty? Structural realist theory argues that the collapse of bipolarity creates acute uncertainty about the balance of power. If, as Waltz put it, “In a bipolar world uncertainty lessens and calculations are easier to make,” then multipolarity increases the scope for misunderstanding, misperception and confusion. In heightened anarchy, the principle of self-help assumes greater importance. States are increasingly likely to resort to balancing behaviour, either by increasing their domestic power through military acquisitions or by forging alliances with other, more powerful states. This, in turn, may aggravate the security dilemma in the Third World, producing destabilising arms races and increasing the risk of armed conflict. Thus, from a structural realist perspective, strategic uncertainty caused by the end of bipolarity is likely to make the Third World a much more dangerous place.

On surface, developments in the post-Cold War seem to bear out the structural realist prognosis. The Third World today remains a dangerous place, plagued by a large number of ethnic, territorial and political conflicts. But one is not quite sure whether these conflicts can be viewed as a direct consequence of the end of bipolarity. For example, the rise of ethnic and territorial conflicts in the Third World has been blamed on the end of the Cold War. The disintegration of the Soviet Union is said to have exacerbated ethnic tensions by removing "ideological models that ha[d] offered uniting symbols of nation-building in countries that would otherwise be torn apart by ethnic, cultural, religious, or linguistic differences."

In a similar vein, Barry Buzan argues that "If the territorial jigsaw can be extensively reshaped in the First and Second Worlds, it will become harder to resist the pressures to try to find more sensible and congenial territorial arrangements in the ex-Third World".

But the fundamental causative factor in both cases seems to be the *collapse of the Soviet Union* and not *the end of bipolarity* per se. It is quite possible that had the end of bipolarity come about in some other way, one that left the Soviet Union intact ideologically and territorially, then it would not have produced any negative demonstration effect on Third World ethnic or territorial relations.

Another reason why structural realist theory cannot use the example of recent Third World ethnic and territorial conflicts to make its point about the destabilising consequences of multipolarity is that these threats are hardly new. Roberto Garcia Moritan observes:
Many of the regional problems and conflicts that were essentially local expressions of the rivalry are now proving soluble. But there are many other conflicts rooted in other sources, among them historical, political, colonial, ethnic, religious, or socio-economic legacies, that continue to produce international tensions. Cutting across these local issues are the major disparities of wealth and opportunity that separate the industrialized nations and the developing world. These have existed for decades. The failure to deal effectively with this gap is a source of additional tension, which itself frustrates long-term efforts to provide wider prosperity. The end of the Cold War has been irrelevant for many such conflicts.\textsuperscript{33}

For example, the danger of ethnic conflict predates the end of the Cold War and was an even more serious problem then. Data compiled by the Minorities at Risk Project suggests that "ethnopolitical conflicts were relatively common, and increased steadily, throughout the Cold War", with the greatest absolute and proportional increase in number of groups involved in ethnopolitical conflicts occurring between the 1960s and 1970s (from 36 groups to 55). This contrasts with a rate of increase of only 8 (from 62 to 70) from the 1980s to the early 1990s. Thus, as the Project's Director, Ted Robert Gurr, concludes, "the explosion of ethnopolitical conflicts since the end of the Cold War is, in fact, a continuation of a trend that began as early as the 1960s". His Project's findings also suggest that "ongoing ethnopolitical conflicts that began after 1987 are not appreciably more intense than those that began earlier", although they might "have caused greater dislocation of populations."\textsuperscript{34}

Structural realist thinking also exaggerates the dangers of strategic multipolarity. For example, fears that post-colonial boundaries in the Third World are being undermined by the end of the Cold War are, to say the least, premature. The separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia after three decades of struggle makes it the first African state to be created through secession since decolonisation. But in many respects, Eritrea is a special case.\textsuperscript{35} As the Economist put it, while Eritrean independence breaks Africa's secession taboo, its claim for independence is "unusually strong" due to special historical circumstances in the sense that it never formed part of Ethiopia during the colonial era. Even if it encourages other movements, it "need not spell disaster for the continent".\textsuperscript{36} Similarly, the likelihood of serious territorial conflicts elsewhere in the Third World could be overstated. Even at the height of the decolonisation process during the Cold War, territorial conflicts were not a significant feature of the Third World's security dilemma. As research by Kal Holsti suggests, "The traditional national security problematic of most states in Europe was defined as protecting specific pieces of real estate. This is not the premier security problem for most states in the Third World".\textsuperscript{37} There is as yet no concrete proof that we are about to see a major outbreak or escalation of territorial conflicts in the Third World; in fact the trends point in the opposite direction.\textsuperscript{38}

Another example of overplaying the dangers of strategic multipolarity is the issue of Third World militarisation. Using realist logic, Goldgeiger and McFaul hold that the end of superpower rivalry means that "states in the developing world will have to seek means for enhancing security within their own states or regions." In other words, cuts in superpower military assistance programs in the Third World means their former clients may seek greater military self-reliance, thereby fuelling new regional arms races.\textsuperscript{39} Reinforcing the possibility of greater militarism in the Third World is the availability of large quantities of surplus military
hardware from the vast arsenals of the major powers at bargain prices. But available evidence points to the fact that multipolarity need not aggravate the security dilemma and produce arms races. Recent data shows that the military build-up in the Third World has substantially declined with the end of the Cold War. (for an overview of trends in Third World defence expenditures and weapons acquisitions, see Tables 2 and 3) The reasons for this trend may be found in the fact that "The end of the East-West divide has...heralded the demise of `patron support', `militarization by invitation', and soft financing terms. Only the richest countries are now able to buy weapons on a large scale." Analysing the decline of arms transfers to Africa, Thomas and Mazrui argue that this owes primarily to the end of superpower competition and several of its related effects such as recent successes in settling African civil wars (which were escalated by the Cold War) and the rise of pro-democracy movements (other factors include the end of anti-colonial armed struggles, economic crisis and concerns expressed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank regarding high levels of military spending in countries undergoing structural adjustment). In the rich nations of East Asia, defence expenditures and arms imports have risen since the end of the Cold War. But this region is hardly a microcosm of the Third World. Arms acquisitions by states in this region do not necessarily constitute an arms race, but are more plausibly a by-product of post-Cold War bargain-hunting and economic affluence. Available evidence seem to bear out Rosecrance's argument that multipolarity has a "dampening effect upon arms races." What about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Third World? Do the uncertainties of a multipolar system create greater incentive for states to seek such weapons? While one does not have to be a realist to appreciate the danger posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the fact remains that it cannot be attributed to the end of the Cold War. If anything, the Cold War itself had aggravated the problem, especially because both the US and the Soviet Union overlooked and tolerated proliferation efforts by their clients and allies in the Third World. For example, massive US military and economic aid to Pakistan in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was meant to discourage the latter's nuclear program by providing it with a conventional alternative. But its net effect was to ease the pressure on Pakistan's nuclear program which reached a weapon capability during this very period. A number of Soviet allies acquired chemical and nuclear material, ostensibly with Moscow's knowledge and backing. On the other hand, strategic uncertainty associated with multipolarity may actually help multilateral non-proliferation efforts. For example, the fear of "loose-nukes" created by the break-up of the Soviet Union has contributed to a strengthening of global non-proliferation efforts. International consensus against nuclear weapons has never been stronger. While strategic bipolarity legitimised the use of nuclear weapons, now the international community has begun seriously into looking at ways of ensuring their reduction and perhaps eventual elimination. The indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the proliferation of nuclear weapon free zones in the Third World, both occurring in the post-Cold War era, attest to this.

Brad Roberts has argued that "States acquiring massively destructive military capabilities will be forced by the power inherent in those weapons to learn to possess them wisely...this requires of leaders in the developing world that they act like the rational actors assumed in all deterrence models." This is true of any kind of international system, whether bipolar or multipolar. But the uncertainties of the latter may make states with dangerous weapons even
more cautious in choosing their strategic options. If the end of bipolarity "entails merely that the Third World will do more of its own fighting," then Third World states with weapons of mass destruction are likely to be more careful in weighing the costs and consequences of their possession and use of weapons of mass destruction. Given the demonstrated effect of nuclear weapons in inducing caution in the European theatre (as well as the central strategic balance in general) during the Cold War, there is no reason to believe, short of blind ethnocentrism, that the Third World leaders will behave like "madmen" once in possession of such weapons.

Yet another fear of a multipolar order as seen from a structural realist perspective is the localised hegemony of stronger Third World states. In anarchy what counts most is power. Power in the international system (including its Third World segment) is rather unevenly distributed, hence the ever-present danger of powerful states seeking to dominate weaker ones. The Cold War was marked by a rough global parity of power between the two superpowers. Regional imbalances did not matter much during the Cold War period, when the global superpower balance overwhelmed the aspirations of any would-be Third World regional hegemons.

Will the post-Cold War era may see the rise of regional hegemons, as Realist theory predicts? There has been widespread concern that superpower retrenchment might encourage countries such as India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Iran and Iraq to step into the resulting geopolitical "vacuum". As US president, George Bush drew attention to "a dangerous combination... [of] regimes armed with old and unappeasable animosities and modern weapons of mass destruction". On closer reflection, however, the threat to international order posed regional hegemons appears to be much more modest. Under bipolarity, regional powers derived a measure of autonomy from the superpower standoff while securing material assistance from them to further their regional ambitions. The end of the Cold War marks the end to the need for the superpowers to cultivate "regional policemen" (such as Iran under the Nixon Doctrine), or regional proxies (such as Vietnam and Cuba for the Soviet Union) as part of their competitive search for influence. In a multipolar system, potential regional hegemons cannot "count on foreign patrons to support them reflexively, supply them with arms, or salvage for them an honourable peace". Without superpower backing, even the most powerful among Third World states may find it more difficult to sustain military adventures, and may be deterred from seeking to fulfil their external ambitions through military means. The Iraqi experience during the Gulf War is illustrative of the predicament of regional powers deprived of an opportunity to exploit the superpower rivalry.

Are structural realists correct in assuming that multipolarity will drive states towards more competitive balancing behaviour? On the contrary, it is bipolarity which is more conducive to such behaviour. In an overarching global bipolar order, regional security relations reflect, and are shaped by, the competition between the two major powers. Such an order subsumes and dominates cooperative security systems established at the regional level. Bipolar superpower dominance undermines the autonomy of regional security arrangements in ensuring the pacific settlement of regional conflicts. Thus, during the Cold War, the superpowers ignored, bypassed, and manipulated indigenous security arrangements in the Third World geared to pacific settlement of disputes, and encouraged balance-of-power arrangements that often aggravated ideological polarisations within regions. With the end of the Cold War, security relations in the Third World have become more inclusive. The diminished global engagement of the Great
Powers provides Third World regional security organisations with an opportunity to assume a greater role in the management of peace and stability issues in their neighbourhood. Furthermore, as the security relationship among the core states develops the attributes of a security community (as suggested by Goldgeiger and McFaul), Third World regional security relations will no longer be influenced by an intensely competitive external dynamic. As a result, the prospects for more cooperative relations within Third World regions will improve.

Structural realist predictions also ignore those consequences of multipolarity that promote greater stability in the Third World stability. Under Cold War bipolarity, minor crises in obscure countries could escalate into serious international confrontation as a result of superpower involvement. As Gilpin noted, bipolarity creates the "conditions for relatively small causes to lead to disproportionately large effects." Transition to multipolarity, on the other hand, reduces the scope for the internationalisation, prolongation and escalation of Third World regional conflicts.

While critics of structural realism point to the increasing importance of interdependence and democracy as undercutting the potentially destabilising effects of the end of the Cold War in Europe, they agree with realist thinking in believing that these factors do not matter much in the Third World. This view is questionable. The Third World has seen a dramatic spread of democracy and increase in economic interdependence, the effects of which should matter in shaping future stability. Throughout the Third World, including Africa itself, many cases of democratisation have been remarkably peaceful. Multi-party democratic elections led to the replacement of existing regimes in Zambia, Madagascar and Cape Verde. Internationally-monitored elections saw the peaceful return of the governments of Seychelles, Guinea Bissau and Kenya. In the Horn of Africa, the independent state of Eritrea embraced democracy and led to the ending of the revolutionary war in Ethiopia, and the latter itself has seen "a remarkable effort to negotiate the framework of a democratic federation." These developments provide further confirmation that the appeal of violent methods of political change in the Third World may be diminishing. As Richard Falk points out: "The great struggles in the South during the 1980s, ranging from the overthrow of the Marcos regimes [sic] to the heroic challenges directed at oppressive rule in China and Burma, and on behalf of expanded democracy in South Korea, relied on non-violent mass mobilization, explicitly renouncing armed struggle." Even the "intifada", Falk adds, conformed to this trend; resting "upon an inner logic of confronting the military violence of the occupiers with an essential vulnerability of unarmed civilians."

While the downfall of repressive regimes leading to democratic transitions may contribute to increased Third World instability in the short-term, democratisation should also create more favourable conditions of stability and order in the long-term. As Brad Roberts contends, democratisation will "constrain" Third World anarchy by "compelling a search for common interests with erstwhile competitors." Democratisation addresses many causes of internal instability in the Third World. This is not just the view of Western Liberals. A recent report by a panel sponsored by the OAU notes, "despite their apparently diverse causes, complex nature and manifold forms, internal conflicts in Africa were basically the result of denial of basic democratic rights and freedoms, broadly conceived; and that they tended to be triggered-off by acts of injustice, real or imagined, precisely in situations where recourse to democratic redress seemed hopeless." At a time when "the romance seems to have gone out of Third World revolutions", democratisation provides an alternative, and peaceful approach to desired
political change. Whether democracies tend to live in peace with each other may be a debatable proposition in the West. But in the Third World, the correlation (spill-over effect) between internal strife and regional instability has always been strong, largely due to the tendency of weak states ruled by insecure regimes to "succumb to the temptation to consolidate their domestic position at the expense of their neighbours by cultivating external frictions or conflicts." Thus, greater internal stability and regime legitimacy in Third World states enhances the prospects for regional security and lessen the scope for unwelcome external meddling in these countries.

Regional interdependence and integration has been slower to develop in Third World than in Europe and the West. In the past, economic regionalism in the Third World was undermined by the difficulty of ensuring an equitable distribution of benefits. Regional economic integration among developing countries remained hostage to political and security concerns of the participating countries and their prior interest in fuller integration with the global economy through inter-regional trade and investment linkages. But the trends are now firmly towards greater intra-regional and inter-regional interdependence. Witness, for example, ASEAN's decision in 1992 to create a regional free trade area, the OAU's signing of an African Economic Community Treaty in 1991, and the emergence of two new trade groupings in South America (the Mercosur group including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, created in 1991, and the Group of Three including Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia, established in 1994). The renewed interest in economic regionalism stemmed partly from doubts about the future of GATT (since dispelled) as well as fears about the emergence of protectionist regional trading blocs in Europe and North America.

Moreover, interdependence between the North and the South has been on the rise. Faster growth rates in Third World are already providing Northern countries with greater market opportunities. Moreover, greater productivity in the Third World is having beneficial effects for the North's standard of living, as for the latter, "cheaper imports mean lower prices and, hence, higher real incomes." At the same time, with the market-oriented economic reforms (including IMF-induced structural adjustment) lessening the earlier distrust among Third World elites of Western multinationals and investments flows. There has also been a trend toward economic cooperation between the North and the South. New regional economic groupings with a North-South membership include the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The intended southward extension of NAFTA and Malaysia's proposal for an East Asian grouping under Japanese leadership are additional indicators of greater North-South cooperation. Such regional trading groups will expand market opportunities for the participating developing countries and alleviate their fear of protectionism in global markets. The end of the Cold War has already ended the economic isolation of many former socialist economies, such as Vietnam and India. Their progressive integration into the global economy will have a moderating effect on the prospects for North-South economic cooperation in the post-Cold War era and help prevent their escalation of political, cultural and civilizational differences which might otherwise promote new forms of conflict and constrain conflict management.

The Regionalization of Conflict and Order: A Tale of Many Worlds
Structural realist thinking holds that any significant change in the global distribution of power has uniform effects on the entire international system. Thus, the shift from bipolarity to multipolarity will be destabilising for the entire international system. The preoccupation with "structure" allows little room for considering regional variations in the pattern of conflict in the international system. In this view, domestic and regional sources of disorder do not matter very much. In accepting realism as a valid theoretical lens for analysing Third World security and viewing the post-Cold War international order in terms of two very broad categories - a stable core and an unstable periphery - Goldgeiger and McFaul also acknowledge no variations in regional security relations within the Third World.

But there are good reasons to be skeptical of such a homogenous view of the periphery. Two are especially important. First, the major sources of conflict in the Third World are often unrelated to the global distribution of power and are therefore unaffected by changes in the latter. Several studies have established that the primary threats to stability of Third World states are internal and regional in nature, including problems of weak national integration, economic underdevelopment, and regime insecurity. During the Cold War, domestic and regional disorder in the Third World enjoyed a great deal of autonomy from external factors, including the bipolar system structure and the attendant superpower rivalry. There is little reason to believe that things will be much different in the post-Cold War era. As Fred Halliday argues: "since the causes of third world upheaval [were] to a considerable extent independent of Soviet-US rivalry they will continue irrespective of relations between Washington and Moscow."

Secondly, the period since the 1970s has seen the emergence of significant regional differentiation in the economic conditions of states within the Third World. The affluence of OPEC members and the rise of newly industrialising countries contrasts sharply with the worsening poverty and underdevelopment of Africa and South Asia. John Ravenhill has proposed a new classification of Third World economies: (Ravenhill, North-South Balance of Power, International Affairs). Differing levels of economic development within the Third World call for a more differentiated view of its security predicament. Although rapid economic growth (especially if it is not accompanied by an equitable distribution of wealth) may pose threats to the stability of Third World regimes (including demands for greater power-sharing), it also addresses the root causes of conflict in the Third World in the postcolonial era. According to Rosenbaum and Tyler, "It is...generally understood within the Third World that economic development can contribute to national security; an economically weak nation can be exploited or defeated more easily by foreign powers and may be exposed periodically to the violent wrath of dissatisfied citizens." Accordingly, the security outlook for the Third World's economic achievers will be more positive than that of those left behind. Growing disparities between Third World regions in the economic sphere introduces a new variable that challenges the conception of Third World as a homogenous entity in the security sphere.

An analysis of emerging regional security systems in the Third World points to a range of possibilities. At least three deserve notice.

**Pluralistic Security Communities:**

Karl Deutsch defined a security community as a group of states which have attained "a sense of
community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with 'reasonable' certainty over a 'long' period of time. Security communities may be amalgamated where its constituent units - states - lose their sovereignty or pluralistic, in which states remain formally sovereign, but develop a common "we feeling". Security communities are characterised by a high degree of mutual responsiveness. In such communities states will exhibit a preference for common security doctrines over balance of power approaches. Arms races either disappear or are muted to the point of irrelevance. Inter-state relations are governed by well-defined norms. Institutional mechanisms for conflict resolution are both available and accepted. States within such communities develop substantial functional cooperation, including regional economic interdependence and integration. This, in turn, further reduces the likelihood of war within the community. The dynamics of such communities are best understood by using a liberal theoretical perspective.

Until now, all cases of pluralistic security communities identified by international relations theorists have been in the developed world. But in the Third World, at least two regions have developed attributes which closely parallel those of a security community. In Southeast Asia, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have not fought a war since the grouping's formation in 1967. ASEAN members have developed an elaborate set of norms, institutions and practices for pacific settlement of disputes. The feeling of "community" is also particularly strong in ASEAN, as revealed in frequent references to the "ASEAN spirit" or "ASEAN way" of inter-state behaviour. While ASEAN members do not share a common commitment to liberal-democracy (but a common opposition to communism and acceptance of the "soft authoritarianism" was an early catalyst of ASEAN solidarity), growing economic interdependence has served to cement the desire for war-avoidance. ASEAN's record in ensuring regional peace has been so successful that it has attracted considerable support from the world's major powers in developing a larger regional security system for the entire Asia Pacific region based on the ASEAN model.

The picture is somewhat less rosy in Latin America, but here too the only serious case of inter-state conflict since the Falklands War between Britain and Argentina was the brief war between Peru and Ecuador. Moreover, unlike ASEAN, the emergence of a Latin American security community is strengthened by a shared commitment to democracy and economic interdependence among the vast majority of states. Latin America is today the most democratic continent outside of Europe, and it has seen the emergence of two new trade groupings - the Mercosur group including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, created in 1991, and the Group of Three including Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia, established in 1994. Moreover, the success of the Central American initiated Contadora and Esquipulas processes in ending the bloody civil and inter-state conflicts involving Nicaragua and El Salvador, challenges the view that Third World regional groupings are incapable of effective conflict resolution. The efforts by the Latin American regional grouping, OAS, to strengthen its peacekeeping, conflict resolution and human rights mechanisms are hopeful steps in the further consolidation of the emerging democratic security community in Latin America.
Internationalized Rivalries:

Internationalized rivalries display characteristics that are exactly the opposite of pluralistic security communities. Some analysts have called them "enduring rivalries." [see the literature on enduring rivalries]. Here, regional security relations are highly unstable. The probability of inter-state war remains very strong. States seek security through balancing behaviour, rather than through common and cooperative security mechanism. Such strategies heighten the security dilemma, producing destabilising arms races, and, in many cases, a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Since most Third World states are not self-reliant in military power, those facing serious external threats are driven to seek security by forging alliances with outside Great Powers. In such a situation, regional mechanisms for conflict management are either non-existent or tend to be extremely weak and ineffective. This sort of regional security systems are best understood from a realist theoretical perspective.

There are several examples of such rivalries in the Third World today, with the three most important being the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia. All these regions share at least four common features: (1) a high intensity conflict situation, derived from historical, social-political, religious and ideological factors, (2) an arms race, featuring both conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction; (3) weak regional mechanisms for conflict resolution, and (4) a high degree of dependence on external security guarantees. Although regional in scope, these conflicts attract the world's attention because of the high probability of armed conflict, the likely use of weapons of mass destruction, and the external military alliances of the regional actors. Despite the geopolitical retrenchment of the major powers from the Third World in the post-Cold War era, these areas remain within their sphere of "vital interest". Security alliances involving the regional actors and external great powers ensure that any outbreak of military conflict will invite great power involvement and intervention.

Localized Anarchies:

Somewhere in between pluralistic security communities and internationalised rivalries are states and societies plagued by a great deal of internal instability and chaos. These regions are largely inhabited by "weak" states, with very low levels of socio-political cohesion. The writ of the central government does not extend to all parts of what it claims to be its national territory. Governments lack legitimacy and the contest for political power is not regulated through durable and commonly accepted institutional mechanisms. The capacity of the states to address socio-economic grievances is extremely limited. The nation-state is in a state of steady decline, overwhelmed by a crisis of governability. Conflicts tend to derive not so much from inter-state animosity or external intervention, but from such essentially local factors such as poverty, overpopulation, refugee migrations, crime, resource scarcity and environmental degradation. Moreover, these conflicts do not attract a great deal of external geopolitical (as opposed to humanitarian) attention and involvement, as they usually fall outside the sphere of "vital interest" of the world's great powers. Great powers are likely to be quite selective in choosing their areas of engagement. Goldgeiger and McFaul are right in pointing out that "Regardless of military matters..." (check quote). In these marginal areas of the Third World, bloody conflicts are likely to go unnoticed by the international community (as happened in Liberia in 1990-92

Africa is a microcosm of such localised anarchies in the post-Cold War era. Robert D. Kaplan has called West Africa as a symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real 'strategic' danger. While his predictions about the "coming anarchy" are supposed to apply to other parts of the world, it is certainly more true of Africa (and to a lesser extent, of Southern Asia) than Latin America or Eastern Asia. Localised anarchy has been a hallmark of the recent history of much of the African continent. Between 1990 and mid-1992, as many as 11 African leaders, including the governments in Ethiopia, Liberia, Chad and Somalia, were overthrown. Beyond regime insecurity, localised anarchies in Africa approximate what Homer-Dixon identifies as "simple scarcity conflicts" (conflict over natural resources such as river, water, fish, and agriculturally-productive land), "relative deprivation conflicts" (the impact of environmental degradation in limiting growth and thereby causing popular discontent and conflict), and "group-identity conflicts" (the problems of social assimilation of the migrant population) in the host countries.

The categories outlined above are not exhaustive, nor are they clearly demarcable. It is entirely possible that some regions will combine the attributes of more than one of the suggested categories. Moreover, these categories are not necessarily permanent. Regional situations could change over a period of time in response to new local and international developments. But they capture the major types of regional security systems most likely to obtain in the Third World in the emerging post Cold War order. In addition, they challenge the simplistic division of the post-Cold War order into the two broad arenas of the core and the periphery.

**Conclusion**

The foregoing analysis leads to a number of concluding observations. The correlation between structural stability and regional order is much weaker than what structural realist theory expects us to believe. During the Cold War, a stable structure permitted a great deal of regional disorder; in the post-Cold War era, a supposedly unpredictable and uncertain structure, while contributing to greater anarchy in some areas, should not preclude the possibility of pluralistic security communities in others.

Structural realism may not be the only, or even most useful, theoretical lens to analyse and predict the prospects for Third World instability in the post-bipolar era. Liberal concepts such as security communities, democratic peace and interdependence may have considerable relevance in explaining the security predicament in the Third World.

Furthermore, there is a need to rethink the broad categories of "Third World" or "periphery" as homogenous entities. For some time, political economists have called for the disaggregation of the Third world to account for the oil-producing nations and the NICs. Now, security studies scholars should follow suit. The post-Cold War order will not be a "A Tale of Two Worlds". A more differentiated view of the periphery is called for.

This view is not only more optimistic than the structural realist thesis, it also has implications for the research agenda of international security studies. During the Cold War, the Third World security issues were largely excluded from "mainstream" theory-building (although empirical studies abounded) in security studies. Instead, security studies scholarship concentrated on the central strategic balance. Regional conflicts, with the exception of European
security issues, were viewed as a relatively unimportant sideshow to the main drama of superpower rivalry. Theories and concepts of international security studies were abstracted from the Western experience with little regard for conditions obtaining in the Third World. Now, the Third World, appropriately disaggregated, should receive greater attention in the theoretical literature on security studies.

The time has come for security studies scholars to move away from an excessive focus on great power relationships as the chief determinant of international conflict and order. Realists like Waltz, who started the whole debate on the relationship between polarity and stability, pay too much attention to the structural or system-level determinants of peace and stability, and too little to regional patterns and variables. While structural realism is useful in explaining some aspects of Third World anarchy, especially the security dynamics of internationalised rivalries, it is mistaken in ignoring the possibility of security communities. It does not offer a system-wide and comprehensive explanation of conflict and cooperation in the Third World. As the Third World becomes ever more differentiated, security studies that are more sensitive to regional variations and particularities within Third World security environment.

(notes: enduring rivalries; Third World differentiation; ASEAN; Security communities)
NOTES
6. ibid., p.470
8. Jervis, "The Future of World Politics", p. 31
11. Rosecrance points out, "substantial territorial and/or political changes can take place in international relations without impinging on the overarching stability." Rosecrance,"Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future", p.327
12. One study by Evan Luard estimates that between 1945 and 1986, there were some 127 "significant wars". Out of these, only 2 took occurred in Europe, while Latin America accounted for 26, Africa 31, the Middle East, 24, and Asia 44. According to this estimate, the Third World was the scene of more than 98% of all international conflicts. Evan Luard, War in International Society, Appendix 5.
13. Ayoob, "Regional Security and the Third World", p. 14 A similar view had been offered by another Third World scholar, Sisir Gupta, who argued that for the superpowers "To fight out their battles in the Third World is one way of ensuring that their own worlds are not touched by their conflicts and that they retain a greater measure of option to escalate and de-escalate their conflicts according to the needs of their relationships." Cited in Mohammed Ayoob, ed., Conflict and Intervention in the Third World (Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1980), p. 242. According to another Indian scholar, K. Subrahmanyam, the tendency of the superpowers to play out their rivalry in the Third World was accentuated by Detente: "Once detente came about, nuclear weapons could not be used as the stock currency of international transactions in Europe. The only way they could still be used was to test the efficiency of the deterrent effect of the nuclear arsenal in confrontations in the Third World..." "Regional Conflicts and their Linkage to Strategic Confrontation", in Joseph Rotblat and Sven Hellman, eds., Nuclear Strategy and World Security (London: Macmillan, 1985), p. 325
Strategic Studies, 1989), p. 78
16. In a comprehensive survey of 107 wars in the Third World between 1945 and 1990, Guy Arnold found that "...many would almost certainly have been far shorter in duration and less devastating in their effects had the big powers not intervened." See: Arnold, Wars in the Third World since 1945 (London: Cassell Publishers, 1991), p. xvi
17. Chubin has identified several rules relating to conflict-avoidance: (1) refraining from intervening unilaterally in the other's sphere; (2) seeking to avoid the confrontation of armed forces; (3) seeking to restrain allies and associates; (4) urging each other to restrain respective allies; (5) refraining from direct intervention in a number of conflicts outside the established sphere of influence of either, where clear intervention by one would only spark intervention by the other (e.g. Congo 1960; Nigeria 1967-70; India-Pakistan 1971). Chubin "The Super-powers, Regional Conflicts and World Order", p. 79. See also Joanne Gowa and Nils Wessell, Ground Rules: Soviet and American Involvement in Regional Conflicts (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1982); Neil Matheson, The 'Rules of the Game' of the Superpower Military Intervention in the Third World (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), Alexander George, "Factors Influencing Security Co-operation", in Alexander George, Philip J. Farley and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures and Lessons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 655-678
21. In analyzing US-Soviet security understanding, Alex George distinguishes between "norms of restraint" and "rules of engagement". Norms of restraint are tacit and general understandings "regarding competitive behaviours that are and are not permissible in particular areas and under various conditions". Rules of engagement, on the other hand are much more specific and explicit guidelines indicating "the various types of involvement and intervention that would be "permissible" to each superpower", and provide a common understanding of the conditions under which each type of intervention could be legitimately and safely resorted to." According to George, the latter provided a stronger basis for superpower cooperation. But both are prescriptive, rather than reflective of the actual situation. Alex George acknowledges that neither the Basic Principles Agreement nor the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War fell into the category of rules of engagement. Alexander George et al, Managing the U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 367-79
22. Richard Ullman, "Ending the Cold War", Foreign Policy, no. 72 (Fall 1988), p. 143
23. According to Shullman, "any across-the-board agreements in principle do not take into
account the many kinds of problems that arise in particular cases - the differences in intensity of interest in one or another area, the kind of opportunities that may arise in unexpected ways, the particularities of local politics." Marshall D. Shullman, "Overview", in Marshall D. Shullman, ed., East-West Tensions in the Third World (New York: W.W. Norton, 1986), p. 16


25. In the particular case of the 1972 US-Soviet Basic Principles agreement, Jervis notes that the reason why it failed to regulate US-Soviet competition in the Third World could be due to the fact that "the two sides brought very different expectations to the agreement. While the United States considered it relatively unimportant, the Soviets apparently saw it as ratifying their right as an equal superpower to engage in what the United States considered illegitimate adventures in the Third World". Thus, while "Stylized and artificial restraints [were] deployed ...there [was] a disproportion between the strength of the animal to be secured and the strength of the cage". Robert Jervis, "Conclusion", in Robert Jervis and Seweryn Bialer, eds., Soviet-American Relations after the Cold War (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), p. 304-305. For an analysis of the various theories as to U.S. and Soviet views of detente as it affected their policies towards regional conflicts, see: George W. Brslauer, "Why Detente Failed: An Interpretation", in Alexander George et al, Managing the U.S.-Soviet Rivalry, pp. 319-340


27. Although Soviet policy has been blamed for the failure of the "linkage" principle, it should be noted that the US's own commitment to linkage was also doubtful, given the uncertainly whether the Nixon-Kissinger duo would have risked confrontation with the Soviets over regional disputes.


29. Steven R. David brings out this aspect clearly in his study: Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991)


35. "Next Test for Eritrea", International Herald Tribune, 29 April 1993, p.8


37. Holsti significantly adds that "there have been remarkably few militarized boundary
disputes between states in the Third World. And where they have arisen, (e.g. India and China, Libya and Chad) values other than territory drove the conflicts...Control of territory (excluding certain strategic areas such as the Bekka Valley)...is declining in importance as a major object of competitive claims and military actions...Protection of territory is less the main task of national security policy than is protection of the state apparatus from various domestic challenges." K.J. Holsti, "International Theory and War in the Third World", in Brian L. Job, ed., The InSecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), pp.55-57. As Buzan himself concedes, no direct and clear link can be established between the Cold War and adherence to norms regarding territorial status quo, such as those adopted by the Organization of African Unity relating to the inviolability of colonial boundaries. In this respect, the situation in Europe is rather different. In Europe, the Cold War did play a part in freezing the territorial status quo once they were formally or tacitly agreed upon by the superpowers prior to the unravelling of their wartime alliance. But in the Third World, the only credible attempt to devise norms regarding territorial status quo - the OAU - was an indigenous attempt, rather than superpower-influenced. Finally, the major sources of territorial disputes today are not necessarily the legacies of colonial rule, but the relatively recent Law of the Sea which has contributed to a host of maritime boundary disputes. These disputes were not caused by end of superpower rivalry, but by disagreements regarding the Law of the Sea. Thus, fears that end of bipolarity could lead to the unravelling of territorial consensus could be overstated.

38. On the contrary, SIPRI data shows that the total number of major conflicts over territorial issues in the world remain constant at 16 from 1989 to 1992. In the Third World, territorial conflicts have actually declined from 15 in 1989 to 12 in 1992, while for Europe they increased from 1 to 4. In Africa, where the vast majority of conflicts continue to be intra-state, rather than inter-state, the number of territorial conflicts have actually declined, from 3 in 1989 to 1. Ramses Amer, et al. "Major Armed Conflicts", in SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.87


42. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future", p.328

43. On nuclear-weapon-free zones, see


48. Yezid Sayigh, Confronting the 1990s, Security in the Developing Countries, Adelphi Papers no. 251 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990), p. 64
50. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 91
52. I am grateful to Sean M. Lynn Jones for raising and discussing this point
56. For an interesting debate on the link between war and democracy in the context of the post-Cold War era, see the response published in three subsequent issues of International Security to John Mearsheimer's article on "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", International Security, vol. 15, no.1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-55
57. Buzan, "People, States and Fear", p. 32. See also, Mohammed Ayoob, Conflict and Intervention in the Third World; Ayoob, "Regional Security and the Third World"
58. "NAFTA is Not Alone", The Economist, 18th July 1994, p. 47
59. A recent survey by The Economist reveals the extent of North-South economic interdependence. The Third World and the countries of the former Soviet bloc is the destination of 42% of America's 20% Western Europe's (47% if intra-European Union trade is excluded) and 48% of Japan's exports. On the import side, the magazine reports that America's imports of manufactured goods from the Third World rose from 5% of the value of its manufacturing output in 1978 to 11% in 1990. "A Survey of the Global Economy", The Economist 1st September 1994, p. 13 and 16
60. "Rich North, Hungry South", The Economist, 1 October 1994, p. 18
61. Huntington, "A Clash of Civilizations?"
63. This point is made forcefully by Mohammed Ayoob who argued that "...most of the salient regional security issues in the Third World have a life of their own independent of superpower rivalry, although...the latter...more often than not, exacerbates regional problems". This is as true of inter-state as of intra-state disputes and conflicts." Mohammed Ayoob, "Regional Security and the Third World", in Ayoob, ed., Regional Security in the Third World (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 15
64. Fred Halliday, Cold War, Third World, op.cit., p. 162
67. ibid., p.276
68. "NAFTA is Not Alone", The Economist, 18th July 1994, p.47
70. Keith Somerville, "Africa After the Cold War: Frozen Out or Frozen in Time?", Paper Prepared for the Workshop on Developing States and the End of the Cold War, Oxford University, 30 September - 1 October 1994, p.6