CONTENTS

Classing Ethnicity: Class, Ethnicity, and the Mass Politics of Taiwan’s Democratic Transition

David D. Yang 503

Civil Society and the Legacies of Dictatorship

Michael Bernhard and Ekrem Karakoç 539

Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and State Policies toward Religion

Ahmet T. Kuru 568

Heredity Succession in Modern Autocracies

Jason Brownlee 595

REVIEW ARTICLE
The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics

Amitav Acharya 629

Index to Volume 59 653

The Contributors ii

Abstracts iii

Referees 2006 v
Review Article

THE EMERGING REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF WORLD POLITICS

By AMITAV ACHARYA*


INTRODUCTION

For a long period the study of regions and regional orders occupied a small, if not insignificant, place in international relations theory and scholarship. Now we have two books which argue that regions are central to our understanding of world politics. Not only have regions become “substantially more important” sites of conflict and cooperation than in the past (Buzan and Wæver, 10; Katzenstein, 24) but they have also acquired “substantial” autonomy from the system-level interactions of the global powers (Buzan and Wæver, 4). While globalization has been the buzzword of international relations scholars in describing the emerging world order, at most it coexists with “regionalization” (Katzenstein, 21, 41–42)—so much so that “it is now possible to begin more systematically to conceptualize a global world order of strong regions” (Buzan and Wæver, 20, emphasis added). Or “a world of regions.”

* For comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article, the author is grateful to Rajesh Basrur, Rosemary Foot, S. P. Harish, Andrew Hurrell, Hiro Katsumata, John Ravenhill, Garry Rodan, Richard Stubbs, and three anonymous reviewers of World Politics.


2 Despite agreement on these basic points, the two books differ in significant ways. R&P covers all the major regions of the world, while AWR focuses on Europe and Asia, with a concluding chapter that discusses how its framework applies to other regions—South Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. But AWR’s thematic scope is wider, incorporating the economics-security nexus and the role of culture and identity in shaping regional interactions. R&P concentrates on security dynamics.

World Politics 59 (July 2007), 629–52
Not all international relations scholars are going to be persuaded by such claims. This reviewer agrees that the study of regional orders—including the construction and organization of regions, the cultural, political, economic, and strategic interactions that occur both within and between regions, and the relationship between these interactions and the international system at large—is vital to our understanding of how the world works. The two books under review offer conceptual tools and insights for understanding these dynamics and ought to be compulsory reading for all scholars of international relations. But the reviewer disagrees over a central question: what makes regions go around? Who determines their shape and role as building blocs of international order?

The title pages of the two volumes would seem to answer the question. Regions are defined by powers of various kinds: the sole superpower and its imperium, great powers including “core states” that serve the power and purpose of the imperium and, to a lesser extent, regional powers. This review essay advances an alternative view that has received considerably less attention in the literature on regions and regional orders. Power matters, but local responses to power may matter even more in the construction of regional orders. How regions resist and/or socialize powers is at least as important a part of the story as how powers create and manage regions. Regions are constructed more from within than from without.

This is the central argument of this article. After examining the considerable empirical and theoretical contributions of the two volumes, the essay concludes with a discussion of various ways in which regions respond to powers, both at state and societal levels. Overall, the essay calls for balancing the top-down and powercentric analytical prism found in the two books with an agency-oriented perspective that acknowledges local resistance to, and socialization of, powerful actors and attests to the endogenous construction of regions.

**Empirical and Theoretical Contributions: How Power Shapes Regions**

**Structuring Regions**

In *R&P* (Buzan and Wæver’s *Regions and Powers*), the regional structure of international security is shaped by $1+4+x$ distribution of power. At the top is the United States, followed by the EU-Europe, Japan, and...
China, and Russia, with the the rest at the bottom. This structure is divided into three types of regional spaces. The first is “overlay,” where a region is shaped by outside forces (such as the colonialism and superpower rivalry during the cold war). Such regional spaces have more or less disappeared since the end of the cold war. The second type is called “unstructured regions.” Here regional interactions are not sufficient to generate a discernible structure of interdependence. It may be the residual space left by all the other security complexes (for example, the South Pacific). The third and most important (as well as the most common) are called “regional security complexes” (RSCs), which “refers to the level where states or other units link together sufficiently closely that their securities cannot be considered separate from each other” (Buzan and Waever, 43).

There are eleven RSCs in the world, divided into three main categories on the basis of the number of great powers located in them. Three of them are called centered (North America, the CIS, and the EU-Europe). These are created either by a global-level power or by some collective institution that allows the RSC to act collectively at the global level. One is a great power complex (East Asia), so called because of the presence of more than one global-level power. The remaining seven are standard (South America, South Asia, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, and Southern Africa). These latter are characterized by the absence of any global-level power in the complex, thereby allowing local polarity to be defined exclusively by regional powers. In sum, power is a central variable in differentiating regions conceptualized as security complexes. One great power makes a centered RSC, more than one make for a great power RSC, and having

---

*I disagree with the characterization of the South Pacific as an “unstructured region.” It has a fairly active regional institution, the South Pacific Forum, and the relatively small size of most of its member states creates a shared vulnerability and engenders a sense of security interdependence.

The notion of regional security complex has evolved since Buzan first proposed it in 1983. Then, RSCs designated only areas of intense rivalry (for example, India-Pakistan; Arab states–Israel, North and South Korea), while ignoring regions where the main pattern of relationship is cooperative; Barry Buzan, “A Framework for Regional Security Analysis,” in Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, eds., *South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 8. In the new formulation they may vary from anarchy (“conflict formations”) to “security communities,” where war has been rendered unthinkable.

There are other types of complexes. Supercomplexes are a number of RSCs bound together by one or more great powers that generate “relatively high and consistent levels of interregional security dynamics.” Subcomplexes are similar to an RSC but are firmly embedded within a larger RSC. Precomplexes are potential RSCs or RSCs in the making, but the bilateral relationships have not yet reached the level of interdependence to qualify as a full-fledged RSC. Protocomplexes occur when the degree of security interdependence within a region is sufficient to differentiate it from its neighbours, but the overall regional security dynamics remains thinner and weaker than a fully fledged RSC (Buzan and Waever, 490–92). Finally, a “mini-complex” is an RSC on a small scale, composed at least partly of substate actors.
no great power leads to a standard RSC, although the last category may have regional-level powers.

In Katzenstein’s world of regions, only one power really matters. This is the U.S., which maintains a global presence and whose power and preferences are critical to the shape and functioning of all regions. But a crucial role in this hegemonic order is played by the “core states” of Germany and Japan. These states provide “steady support for American purpose and power while also playing an important role in the region’s affairs” (Katzenstein, 237). AWR (A World of Regions) is thus founded on a dual hierarchy, between the U.S. imperium and the core states (Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia) and between the latter and others in their respective regions.

If regions in R&P are internally interdependent but mutually exclusive security complexes, in AWR they are conceptualized as distinctively institutionalized but “porous” spaces hierarchically linked with the core states under an overarching U.S. imperium. Regions are made porous by globalization and internationalization. Globalization is driven by technology, nonterritorial actors, and processes, such as multilateral corporations and nongovernmental organizations, whereas internationalization is about territorially based exchanges, in which national sovereignty is “bargained away,” rather than transcended. Since no region is immune to these two processes, there can be no exclusionary and autarchic blocs in Katzenstein’s world of regions.

Unlike R&P’s global focus, AWR concentrates on comparing Europe and Asia. It regards them as the two most important sites of geopolitical and economic interactions today. As both regions are affected by globalization and internationalization, both are considerably porous. But their regional institutions differ in three ways. European regionalism is more “formal and political” and relies more on “state bargains and legal norms.” Asia’s is “informal and economic” and relies more heavily on “market transactions and ethnic or national capitalism” (Katzenstein, 27, 219). A second difference concerns the role of Germany and Japan, the two core states. Germany is more committed to multilateral action within Europe, so much so that its national identity has become Europeanized. By contrast, Japan retains a strong sense of national identity and remains wedded to bilateral over multilateral arrangements (Katzenstein, 36). Finally, European and Asian regionalisms differ in terms of their attitudes toward sovereignty. “Europe’s regionalism is more transparent and intrusive than Asia’s”; while “[a]bsent in Asia are the pooling of sovereignty and far-reaching multilateral arrangements that typify Europe’s security order” (Katzenstein, 219,125).
An important puzzle addressed by AWR concerns the question why Europe developed multilateralism well before Asia did (Katzenstein, 50–60). Here, too, the role of the United States assumes critical importance, although it was not America’s physical power but its sense of collective identity that is at play. In the immediate postwar period, American policymakers viewed their potential European allies as “relatively equal members of a shared community.” By contrast, the potential Asian allies of the U.S. were seen as “an alien and . . . inferior community.” The greater sense of a transatlantic community compared to a transpacific one explains why Europe rather than Asia was seen by the U.S. as a more desirable arena for its multilateral engagement.

But AWR’s ideational but Americanocentric explanation for why was there no “NATO in Asia”8 ignores a fundamental difference between Asian and European regionalisms. The emergence of European regionalism consummated the declining legitimacy of nationalism—blamed for two world wars; in Asia, however, regionalism was founded on nationalist crosscurrents. Thus in postwar Asia, unlike in Europe, nationalism and regionalism enjoyed a symbiotic relationship. Indeed, Japan’s approach to both security and economic regionalism—opting for a “network” style rather than an EC-style formal institutionalist approach—resulted in part from its fear of stoking Asian nationalist (anti-Japanese) sentiments that would have accompanied any effort to develop a formal regional group under Japan’s leadership. One consequence of AWR’s “core state” model is the limited attention it pays to ASEAN, which successfully exploited regionalism in the service of nationalism and sovereignty and which has been the central institutional building bloc of Asian regionalism. In this important sense, the trajectory of Asian regionalism and its core feature (that is, it would be led by ASEAN, rather than by the U.S. or Asia’s major powers) was neither Japan’s nor America’s choice.

(RE)CONCEPTUALIZING REGIONS

The two books under review reflect and advance recent shifts in the literature on how to conceptualize regions.9 As Mansfield and Milner

---

8 Beyond the U.S. role, AWR identifies state power, regime type, and state structures as the factors that make Asian regionalism different from Europe’s (Katzenstein, 220). European regionalism is a regionalism of relatively equal neighbors of similar regime types with well-functioning bureaucracies. Intra-Asian relations are more hierarchical, Asian political regimes differ widely, and Asian states are “non-Weberian” in the sense that “rule by law” rather than “rule of law” prevails.
9 On the various ways of defining regions, see Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, eds., The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970);
note, regions are increasingly viewed in nongeographic terms. Physical proximity or shared cultural, linguistic, political, or economic ties are no longer considered to be a sufficient condition for regionness. Behavioral approaches that employed inductive, quantitative methods to delineate regions have also lost their appeal. Newer approaches emphasize the social construction of regions. Adler and Crawford argue that regions are not to be conceptualized “in terms of geographic contiguity, but rather in terms of purposeful social, political, cultural, and economic interaction among states which often (but not always) inhabit the same geographical space.” Moreover, there has been an increasing tendency to view regions in ideational terms. Regions could express collective identities, self-generated and recognized as such by outsiders. Regionness could also be a function of regionalist ideas and discourses, and the prominence of regions may well depend as much on “representation” as on “reality.”

Both books profess a constructivist understanding of regions. R&P holds that regional security complexes “are socially constructed by their members, whether consciously or (more often) unconsciously” (Buzan and Wæver, 48). For AWR, “Regions are not simply physical constants” but “express changing human practices” (Katzenstein, 12).


But both reject the view that regions can be simply a product of the shared imagination of peoples or states. Neither book considers social construction to be adequate; rather, it has to be combined with materialist determinants. In *R&P* the materialist element includes the neorealist-favored notions of bounded territoriality and distribution of power. This is blended with securitization theory, which focuses on political “speech acts” with which a “security issue is posited (by a securitizing actor) as a threat to the survival of some referent object (nation, state, the liberal international economic order, the rain forests), which is claimed to have a right to survive” (Buzan and Wæver, 71). The book argues for combining neorealist, globalist, and regionalist perspectives in understanding post–cold war global or regional security orders (Buzan and Wæver, 13). *AWR* finds the boundaries between materialism/rationalism and constructivism to be thin and extols instead “the value of relying on multiple explanatory frameworks” that are “formulated on pragmatic assumptions.”¹⁵ It uses “analytic eclecticism,” a perspective that looks to a mix of geopolitical, behavioral, and constructivist understandings of regions. Instead of testing “the relative explanatory power” of realism (“the material capabilities of the US and the core states”), liberalism (“the relative efficiency of institutional forms built around the core states”), and constructivism (“collective identities in European and Asian affairs”), it draws “selectively from all three in the effort to establish the interconnections between the various processes” (Katzenstein, 39).

The syncretism of the two volumes extends to the relationship between disciplinary approaches and area studies. *R&P* laments the tendency among area specialists to focus on the cultural uniqueness of their respective regions and reject comparative studies. By contrast, IR theories aspire to a global reach and a systematizing capability that neglect the regional level. Regional security complex theory (RSCT) is supposed to provide a way out by sharply distinguishing between the regional and the global levels while at the same time focusing on “self-defining regional dynamics” (requiring area studies knowledge) in a worldwide setting of mutually exclusive regions (requiring the help of theory) (Buzan and Wæver, 468). *AWR* acknowledges that “exclusive specialization in a particular area . . . misses the connections between developments in different parts of the world.” But area studies is crucial for analyzing transnational relations. It offers “contingent gener-

izations that go beyond specific locales” and thus compensates for the “superficial and speculative” connections that strictly disciplinary perspectives make “to the variegated experiences of various parts of the world” (Katzenstein, x–xi).

The conceptualization of regional dynamics found in the two volumes is not without problems. The Wæverian constructivist facade of R&P sits uneasily atop its “Buzantine” neorealist foundation. Geography and geopolitics still rule. Although regions change, they cannot change too much. It would be extremely rare for an RSC to travel the distance from being anarchic (conflict formation) to becoming a security community (Buzan and Wæver, 480). What then are we to make of the transformations in EU-Europe and to a lesser extent in Southeast Asia and the Southern Cone? Norms have no place in RSC. The role of regional institutions as agents of transformation gets limited attention. As such, the line between regional security complex theory and neorealism becomes blurred. R&P even offers to make RSC the “fourth tier” of neorealism, provided the latter can “accept the importance of the regional level and its distinct shaping effects” (Buzan and Wæver, 481–82).

By giving more play to the role of identity, AWR raises possibilities for deeper regional transformation. National and regional identities, the product of historical memory, cultural flows, and political action by elites, are not constant but subject to reinterpretation and alteration (Katzenstein, 76, 81). Thus, an emerging regional identity need not replace national, subnational, and local identities. The two can coexist and may even complement one another. Hence, it is possible for former enemies to become friends and for security communities to replace historical patterns of anarchy and disorder.

But AWR’s analytic eclecticism, which allows it to discuss the role of U.S. power as well as its sense of collective identity, gives little space to ideational variables, which speak essentially to local agency. These include the anticolonial ideologies of regional groups in the developing world, regionalist ideas (for example, pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism, pan-Americanism), and personalities (for example, Monnet in Europe, Nehru and Sukarno in Asia, Bolivar in Latin America, Nasser in Egypt, and Nkrumah in Africa).

16 Security complexes may merge to become “supercomplexes” or may split. They may become conflict prone or peaceful through “securitization and desecuritization.” Securitization involves taking extraordinary measures to address challenges that have been labeled/constructed as existential threats to a state or other international actors (including regions) (Buzan and Wæver, 71). Desecuritization refers to the reverse process whereby issues already labeled as such are taken out of the emergency mode and put back into normal political sphere (Buzan and Wæver, 71).
Another gap in the conceptualization of the regional architecture of world politics common to both books may be noted. Both discuss at length the vertical relations of regions, that is, relations between regional and global powers, but neither devotes enough attention to the horizontal relationship between regions. To identify and compare regions is not necessarily to study their interrelationship. Neither volume tells us much about interregional flows (especially important, given AWR’s insistence that regions are not autarchic blocs) or about emulation and learning, including the demonstration effects of one type of regionalism on another. Yet the question of emulation becomes more important with the growing attention to the global diffusion of the norms and practices of the European Union.

ORDERING REGIONS

A central question for those theorizing about the regional architecture of world politics is how regions produce order. As Alagappa notes, while order is a “slippery” concept in international relations and can be used in “multiple ways,” policymakers and academics use the term as though its meaning were self-evident. Very few define the concept or even clarify how it is used. Neither book rises above this problem.

International relations scholars have used the concept of order (international and regional) in two main ways. The first is “as a description of a particular status quo.” Here, order means an existing distribution of power or institutional arrangement, irrespective of its consequences for peace or conflict. The second usage of order has more normative content, in referring to increased stability and predictability, if not to peace per se. Hedley Bull defined international order as “a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society.” He identified the goals toward which the pattern of activity is geared as including preservation of the state system, maintaining the sovereignty or independence of states and relative peace or absence of war.

17 RG&P discusses material security linkages between the neighboring RSCs, such as South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia; the Middle East and Africa; North and South America; and the links between Russia and Europe and Asia (Buzan and Wæver, chap. 6 and pp. 258–60, 333–37, 429–33).


as normal conditions among states, limiting violence, keeping promises, and protecting property rights. Bull’s conception of international order informs the concept of order at the regional level. Thus, Morgan defines regional order as “dominant patterns of security management within security complexes.” Alagappa stresses “rule governed interaction,” that is, “whether interstate interactions conform to accepted rules.”

Both books seem to use regional order in its descriptive sense as a particular type of arrangement. In Regions and Powers, we get not a generic definition of regional order but only identification of possible types of regional orders: collective security, alliance, concert, regime, and security community, as well as hierarchical orders built around great powers (Buzan and Wæver, 474–75). But how do different types of RSCs (standard, centered, great power, and so on) that the book spends so much time explicating correlate with these specific types of orders? R&P offers an elaborate schema for identifying security complexes, but as Lake and Morgan point out, “Regional security complexes . . . are distinct from regional orders. The existence of security externalities linking states together does not itself define the way in which those states seek to manage their security relations.” Regional order cannot be conflated with the structural and institutional forms of regions. Is there a causal relationship between a particular type of RSC and a particular type of regional order? There is a hint that institutionally centered RSCs are likely to produce security communities (Buzan and Wæver, 65). What sort of security order would a great power RSC or a standard RSC produce? South America is a standard RSC and a security community. Southeast Asia is a standard RSC, but it is only a security regime. East Asia is a centered (through a great power) RSC and a security regime. In other words, the structural schema proposed by R&P is not very helpful in telling us what type of security order will emerge from different types of RSCs. To understand how RSCs produce regional order, we therefore need to know how and why actors within an RSC opt for a certain approach to conflict management. It cannot simply be inferred from the descriptive features of the RSC.

22 Ibid., 16–19.
23 Morgan, “Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders,” in Lake and Morgan (fn. 1), 32.
24 Alagappa (fn. 19), 39.
25 Of these, the definitions of three types of regional security orders are noteworthy. Conflict formation: “a pattern of security interdependence shaped by fear of war and expectations of the use of violence in political relations”; security regime: “a pattern of security interdependence still shaped by fear of war and expectations of the use of violence in political relations, but where those fears are restrained by an agreed set of rules and expectations that those rules will be observed”; security community: “a pattern of security interdependence in which the units do not expect or prepare for the use of force in their political relations with each other” (Buzan and Wæver, 489, 491).
Here, Katzenstein’s institutionalist approach is more helpful. While regions should not be conflated with regional institutions, the existence, design, and performance of regional institutions can tell us much about the conditions and prospects of regional order, including protection of sovereignty and prospects for conflict management and rule-governed behavior among states. Institutions in this sense reflect as well as shape the state of regional peace and stability. But uncertainty exists in AWR about how different institutional forms relate to regional order. Since AWR establishes clearly that European regionalism is more institutionalized and less sovereignty bound than Asia’s, does it then mean that Europe has more regional order? The book could, but chooses not to, make such a claim, mindful of Katzenstein’s own earlier warning that in comparing the two regionalisms it would be “a great mistake to compare European ‘success’ with Asian ‘failure.’ Such a Eurocentric view invites the unwarranted assumption that the European experience sets the standard by which Asian regionalism should be measured.”

Nonetheless, more attention to variations among regional institutions and the implications of these variations for conflict management could offer a productive avenue for further research on regional orders. For example, a recently completed comparative study of regional institutions looks not only at why regional institutions differ in terms of their design but also at how these differences correlate with their effectiveness, including their role in ensuring regional order (peace and stability). One of the findings of the project is that if effectiveness is measured in terms of the ability of a regional institution to achieve its “set goals,” then regional institutions with less formal and binding rules have helped to preserve the state system and maintain the independence of states, the key “set goal” of all regional institutions in the Third World. This supports Katzenstein’s view that one should not think of EU-style supranationalism as the only model of success that other regional institutions ought to emulate. Another finding of the project, however,

---


28 Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston, eds., Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). This study is different from the Rational Design of International Institutions (RDII) project, which addressed why and how international institutions differ (in terms of their membership rules, scope of issues, centralization of tasks, rules for controlling the institution, and flexibility of arrangements) but bracketed considerations of their effectiveness. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); John S. Duffield, “The Limits of Rational Design,” International Organization 57 (Spring 2003). The RDII project did not study regional institutions. The Acharya-Johnston project looks at both material and ideational aspects of design variations among regional institutions and then studies the impact of these features on the effectiveness of institutions.
is that the distribution of power is not a key factor in the effectiveness of regional institutions in promoting peace and order. Regional institutions created by great powers or regional powers are not necessarily more effective at limiting violence and generating rule-governed interactions than are those created by small or weak states.29

This leads to the main issues raised in the introduction, the relationship between regions and power and the possibility of regions without hegemonic construction and of regional orders where local responses to powerful actors play a defining role.

THE MISSING PICTURE: HOW REGIONS SHAPE POWER

REGIONS AND HEGEMONY

Who makes regions? The idea of a regionalized world order suggests not only that regions are becoming more important sites of international interactions but also that they enjoy relative autonomy from system-level forces. But how can regions have autonomy if great powers and the sole superpower play such a dominant role in shaping them?

*R&P* argues that regional dynamics need not follow global power interactions. But is this disjuncture simply a product of great power design, indifference, overstretch, or domestic isolationism, or is it shaped by the normative preferences if not the physical resistance of the regional actors? *R&P* allows that the U.S. “can remove it self (or be removed)” from Europe, East Asia, and South America (Buzan and Wæver, 456). But this tantalizing question of who can remove the U.S. from the regional worlds and how is unfortunately not explored further.

In *AWR* it is the “U.S. policy [that has] made regionalism a central feature of world politics”(Katzenstein, 24). Even globalization and internationalization, central processes that make regions porous, often work “in accordance with the power and purpose of the American imperium” (Katzenstein, 13). Yet this overstates the role of the U.S. as a consistent promoter of regionalism and regional institutions around the world. The continental organizations of the postwar era, the League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity (now African Union), were not a product of U.S. policy but were expressions of local nationalisms (for example, pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism) with a general anti-Western, if not specifically anti-U.S., bias. And some parts of the world have developed regionalism in opposition to U.S. prefer-

29 Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston, “Conclusion: Institutional Features, Cooperation Effects, and the Agenda for Further Research on Comparative Regionalism,” in Acharya and Johnston (fn. 28)
ences. In Southeast Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was designed as an indigenous alternative to the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), a regional alliance sponsored by the U.S.30 Another recent example would be the idea of security multilateralism in Asia, represented by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an idea which the administration of Bush Sr. had opposed as a “solution in search of a problem.”31

What about the influence of regions on the U.S.? For AWR, “the American imperium shapes and is shaped by porous regions” (Katzenstein, 179). It puts forward a “two-way Americanization” thesis, which holds that while America changes others, “others change America, at home and abroad” (Katzenstein, 198). But does America really learn from others, as should be the case with any genuine two-way influence and feedback situation?

For AWR, changing U.S. public attitudes toward security, including the general public support for preemption (at least before and during the early stages of the war against Iraq) evident in America’s response to the 9/11 attacks, is an example of “two-way Americanization.” This shows that just as the U.S. can and does shape regional orders around the world, “that world has the capacity to react, often with a complex mixture of admiration and resentment and occasionally with violent fury—thus remaking America”(Katzenstein, 206). To this writer, however, anti-Americanism fueled by the resentment of U.S. dominance that might have contributed to the 9/11 attacks is “blowback” not “feedback.” The Bush administration’s reaction to that resentment through a nationalistic, unilateralist, and aggressive foreign policy and security approach can hardly be construed as a case of America learning from others or adapting to the ways of others. AWR does not deal with the variety of ways in which the role of the U.S. might be challenged from within regions, including Asia and Europe.

Emphasis on the role of great powers in the creation of regional orders is not unusual in the international relations literature. Indeed, the latter often privileges the influence of such powers.32 Mearsheimer sees a natural and inevitable tendency among great powers toward coercive regional domination.33 Cooper and Taylor hold that great pow-

31 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001), 182.
32 Singh (fn. 9).
ers shape regional institutions in a way that gives weaker states little choice but to join, even when not joining may be preferable.34 Grieco’s argument that great powers may actually undermine the regional integration efforts of weaker states, rather than use them as a means of legitimation, also suggests that power matters much in shaping regional order.35 Even liberal-constructivist perspectives acknowledge the hegemonic construction of regions. Ikenberry posits that hegemonic states may develop consensual and benign international orders with weaker states with a view to legitimize the power differential.36 His notion of “self-binding” suggests, however, that it is the hegemonic actor, rather than the weaker states, that shapes and tailors the terms of cooperation, although this could coincide with the interests of the weaker states.

Power matters in the construction of regional orders, but local responses to power may be more important. As Mittleman and Falk note: “Just as regionalism functions as a hegemonic strategy for the United States, it may also provide space for a variety of counter-hegemonic projects.”37 Acharya and Hettne discuss regionalisms by weaker states aimed at challenging the dominance of great powers and/or socializing them through norm setting.38 Further research into how regions respond to powerful actors, both within and without, is needed to establish their relative autonomy and hence any theoretical claim about the regional reordering of world politics.

The following sections highlight six types of regional responses to power (not mutually exclusive) that shape regional order by influencing the role of outside and regional powers. The various cells of Figure 1, illustrate these responses with examples from Asia.

REGIONS AND AUTONOMY

The first type of response (cell 1) may be led by a great power located within the region. One possibility here is normative dissent, if not out-

right physical challenge, by the core states—Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia—that currently serve the interests of the U.S. imperium.\textsuperscript{39} As American soft power dissipates, normative dissonance between the core states and the U.S. has grown. Left unchecked, this dissonance could lead to the former’s defection, or at least abandonment of some of its functions as a core state. Europe’s opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq was led not only by France but also by Germany. In the case of East


---

### Figure 1

\textbf{Regional Responses to Powers} \textsuperscript{a}

\begin{table}[h]
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Extraregional Power, Targeted} & \textbf{Regional Power, Targeted} & \textbf{Societal Responses} \\
\hline
1. Normative dissent (e.g., opposition to U.S. diplomacy) & 3. Resistance (e.g., opposition to SEATO) & 5. Antiglobalization/Anti-Americanism \\
New spheres of influence (e.g., Sino-centric Asian order) & Exclusion (e.g., ASEAN’s ZOPFAN) & \\
& Socialization/Binding (China and the U.S. in ARF) & \\
\hline
2. Regional rivalry between emerging regional power vs. U.S.-backed existing regional power (e.g., Sino-Japanese rivalry) & 4. Resistance (e.g., opposition to Chinese sphere of influence) & 6. Challenging legitimacy (e.g., anti-Japanese and anti-Chinese protests and riots) \\
& Exclusion (e.g., ASEAN’s ZOPFAN) & \\
& Socialization/Binding (e.g., China and Japan in ARF) & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{a}SEATO is South East Asia Treaty Organization; ZOPFAN is Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality; and ARF is ASEAN Regional Forum. Cells 3 and 4 may overlap, as minor states/powers may adopt exclusion and binding strategies directed simultaneously at both extra-regional and regional powers. Overlap between cells 1 and 2 is possible where a regional power develops a sphere of influence directed not just at extraregional powers but also at a regional power rival.
Asia, Japan remains within the U.S. security orbit but has also shown a willingness to organize its own economic region, especially during the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, when it proposed an Asian monetary system to counter the U.S.-dominated IMF.\(^{40}\)

Another type of challenge to the American imperium could be a sphere of influence organized by a great power located within the region (cell 1, second row). Such regional spheres of influence can be either benign/open or coercive/closed. Kupchan envisages the possibility of “benign regional unipolarity,” which would presumably remain open to rival great powers.\(^{41}\) In Asia, Kang foresees a stable Sino-centric regional order that revives the tradition of economic exchange and geopolitical practices of the old tributary system (although it is not clear whether such an order would be open to non-Asian powers such as the U.S., which did not exist during the period of the tributary system).\(^{42}\)

By contrast, some analysts have described China’s relationship with the region, especially with Southeast Asia, as a “centre-periphery” relationship or a Chinese Monroe Doctrine that might challenge and isolate U.S. power.\(^{43}\) Richard Armitage, deputy secretary of state (2001–5) in the administration of George W. Bush, has described East Asian regionalism as a “thinly-veiled way to make the point that the US is not totally welcomed in Asia. . . . It seems that China is quite willing to be involved in fora that does not include the US.”\(^{44}\)

The primacy of the American imperium may also be challenged indirectly by intraregional rivalries, in which an emerging regional power


\(^{41}\) Charles Kupchan, “After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity,” *International Security* 23 (Autumn 1998). By contrast, Wohlforth dismisses such regional unipolarities, because all potential challengers to the U.S. have great power neighbors that could turn into natural allies of the U.S. or balance each other; Wohlforth (fn. 39).


challenges the influence of the core state serving U.S. power and purpose (cell 2). Contemporary Sino-Japanese rivalry illustrates this possibility for Asia. This leads to a larger point: in contemporary Asia, a vital arena of the emerging regional architecture of world politics, the sudden slippage of U.S. power, the rise of China, Japan, and India, and the growing interdependence and interaction among Asian countries may redefine regional order in ways not anticipated by the two books under review.

For example, India’s rising power and growing interaction with East Asia may call into question not only AWR’s scant attention to India as a force in the East Asian regional order but also R&P’s designation of India as a regional, rather than a global-level power (hence the designation of South Asia as a standard, rather than great power security complex), and the separation of the South Asian security complex from the East Asian one. As regards the role of China, while it is far from imposing a Monroe Doctrine in Southeast Asia, Beijing is already challenging Japanese influence there through its growing economic and political clout and its diplomatic charm offensive.

Katzenstein discusses the role of overseas Chinese networks, but the emerging pattern of Asian regionalism could be based on China’s own economic linkages and influence as it reshapes the Asian division of labor. Already it is China, rather than Japan, that is the largest single trading partner of Asian states. Regional production networks in East Asia are increasingly China oriented as the result of foreign enterprises using China as an assembly platform for components of finished products. The emerging China-ASEAN free trade area (FTA) covers a total population of some 1.7 billion people with a combined GDP of about U.S.$2 trillion. For China, while ASEAN’s market of 500 million people and rich natural resources are important considerations behind its drive for an FTA with ASEAN, trade liberalization also offers potential political benefits. China can exploit it to replace Japan as the primary driving force for economic growth and integration. Indeed, China’s likely political gains from its proposed FTA with ASEAN may have prompted Japan to propose its own trade initiative in the region. China’s interest in an FTA with ASEAN is also challenging to the U.S. and puts paid to any remaining hopes Washington may harbor of promoting free trade through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

Against this backdrop, AWR goes a bit too far in affirming the relative importance of Japan over China in shaping Asian regional

order\(^{46}\) (Katzenstein, 91–92). The focus on Japan as the architect of Asian regionalism had more validity for the period of the 1970s–90s. But the rise of China and India is likely to spur new and different types of regionalisms in Asia, ones less closely wedded to U.S. power and purpose. Asian regional order will be shaped less by Japan acting as a core state within the American imperium and more by a fluid and complex pattern of regional interactions featuring the consolidation of China’s ties with selected states in its periphery, on the one hand, and an informal coalition of Japan, Australia, India, and the U.S., on the other.

The dilution of American hegemony and of Japan’s role as its main agent may be accentuated by changes occurring to the “San Francisco system” of U.S. bilateral alliances, the main basis of its strategic preeminence in Asia, which also cushioned Japan’s role in Asian regionalism. A variety of factors challenge the traditional integrity and importance of the San Francisco system with the U.S.-Japan security alliance as its cornerstone. These factors include the rise of complex transnational threats that cannot be handled through exclusionary alliances (not the least because they require the cooperation of China), the emergence of cooperative security (“security with,” as opposed to “security against”) norms through regional institutions like the ARF, the emergence of India and Singapore as de facto U.S. allies outside of the San Francisco system, and domestic popular discomfort in allied nations such as South Korea and Philippines with U.S. military presence.\(^{47}\)

Another type of regional state-based responses to power would feature attempts by a region’s “minor” states to resist, exclude, or socialize/bind stronger powers. Such strategies may be applied either to outside (cell 3) or to regional powers (cell 4) or to both simultaneously.

The minor states of the region may offer physical or normative resistance to outside or regional powers (or both) themselves. The resistance of Frontlines States of Africa to the apartheid regime, the Arab League’s disjointed but enduring resistance to America-backed Israel, the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) security measures against Iran and Iraq, and ASEAN’s support for the Cambodian factions fighting the Soviet-backed Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia in the 1980s are

---

\(^{46}\) Japan is vulnerable to China’s challenge not just materially but, as Katzenstein himself notes, ideationally. After all, it was China that had the central role in the historical identity of East Asia. And “Japan's inability to recognize its militarist past reinforces political suspicion throughout Asia, and its atypical national security policy has had remarkably little influence in reshaping Asia’s regional security order” (Katzenstein, 140).

\(^{47}\) Amitav Acharya and William T. Tow, “Obstinate or Obsolete: The U.S. Alliance Structure in the Asia Pacific” (Manuscript, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, August 2006).
examples of intraregional resistance. Regional resistance to power may also be normative. In Asia intrusive U.S. policies have been challenged by states that remain deeply wedded to Westphalian sovereignty. In the case of Europe, Fukuyama, who proclaimed “the end of history” after the cold war was over, now doubts “whether the West is really a coherent concept,” since “an enormous gulf has opened up in American and European perceptions about the world, and the sense of shared values is increasingly frayed.” The European Union challenges the American imperium in various ways: first, through normative dissent (at least over multilateralism, even if one does not accept Kagan’s more dramatic characterization of these differences), second, by increasingly self-organizing its own defense so as to lessen, if not eliminate, security dependence on the United States, and third, by providing an alternative source of peace operations (peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and nation-building) in out-of-area locations (Aceh, Bosnia, Kosovo, and so on). Similar resistance to the U.S. could emerge in Asia as the region begins to self-organize its political and economic space and develop mechanisms and capabilities for handling regional peace operations.

Exclusion refers to a response whereby regional coalitions of weaker states or minor powers may cooperate to reduce the scope for intrusion by stronger powers in their region’s affairs. This has been an important common feature of many regional organizations in the Third World that have attempted to regulate outside power intervention in their regions through norms of nonintervention and proposals for zones of peace and neutrality. Examples include the idea of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and ASEAN’s Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN, proposed in the 1970s with a view to keeping Southeast Asia “free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers”). Another category of examples would be several established or proposed regional nuclear-weapon-free zones in the South Pacific.

50 Kagan asserts that compared with Americans, Europeans are “more tolerant of failure, more patient when solutions don’t come quickly.” They eschew “finality” in international affairs, prefer “negotiation, diplomacy, and persuasion,” and emphasize “process over result.” Many of these observations are true of Asian regionalism as well. Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” *Policy Review*, no.113 (June–July 2002).
Southeast Asia (negotiated but not ratified by the nuclear powers), and the Persian Gulf (proposed but not negotiated, the targets being Iran and Israel).52 Although the success of such initiatives in excluding outside powers has been limited, they do create pressures for restraint on the part of the latter, sometimes with voluntary initiatives so as to reduce provocations to the regional states.

Relatively more successful are the attempts by the less powerful states of a region to pursue socialization/binding strategies directed at both outside and regional powers. Ayoob suggests that success in regional order building depends on “a consensus regarding the role of the pivotal power within the regional grouping, a consensus shared by the pivotal power itself.”53 This consensus characterizes Indonesia’s role in ASEAN and Saudi Arabia’s within the GCC, but not India’s in South Asia. The future of regional order of East Asia may well depend on such a consensus regarding the role of China. Regional institutions are an important means in the hands of weaker and smaller regional powers to socialize and constrain stronger powers. Latin American regionalism in the early twentieth century offers a good example of such binding, when the U.S. accepted the principle of nonintervention, thereby ending the Monroe Doctrine in exchange for the participation by Latin American states in the U.S.-led regional security order: the Inter-American System.54 More recently the power of the U.S. over its regional neighbors (in both North America and South America) has been reduced as the result of growing institutional enmeshment.55 In Asia the creation of the ARF was an initiative of the weaker states of the region aimed at engaging and socializing both the U.S. and China into a system of regional order and thereby dampening not only their mutual rivalry but also their dominance over the weaker states of the region.56


55 Hurrell (in, 9, 2007), 143.

Regional response to power can also be found at the societal level directed at both the global hegemon (cell 5) and the great/regional powers (cell 6). *AWR*'s discussion of Americanization and anti-Americanism in Europe and Asia generated by the invasion of Iraq and the war on terror is a welcome departure from *R&Ps* plainly statecentric perspective. For *AWR*, however, globalization and internationalization provide “both a common foil of anti-Americanism and a common experience of Americanization” (Katzenstein, 86). Yet society-level anti-Americanism is a much more enduring phenomenon, precisely because much of it is rooted in the perceived inequities and injustices of globalization that are structurally linked to the U.S. imperium. Anti-Americanism may bring together a broad range of social forces challenging internationalization and globalization (and hence the American imperium), with networking among them constituting an alternative form of regionalism. This is a hallmark of “new regionalism”; as Hettne notes, “Whereas the old [regionalism] was concerned with relations between nation-states, the new [regionalism] formed part of a global structural transformation in which also a variety of non-state actors were operating at several levels of the global system.”

As with the global hegemon, regional powers (or aspiring ones) can be targets of society-level resistance (cell 6), which may be even more influential in shaping the prospects for regional order. *AWR*, which discusses anti-Americanism extensively and fully accounts for the integrative role of Japanese capital (as well as the legitimizing influence of Japanese cultural products and cultural diplomacy) and the key place of overseas Chinese production networks in Asian regional order, offers surprisingly little discussion of anti-Japanese and anti-Chinese protests in the region. Societal resistance to regional powers could be inspired by local resentment against their economic and political dominance. It could also represent a reaction led by civil society actors, against globalization (and its regional variant, regionalization), especially if the regional powers, like the U.S. itself, are seen as fueling the inequities and injustices of globalization.

There are two main kinds of societal resistance to regional powers. Just as some forms of societal anti-Americanism are sanctioned by the regional powers (such as China sanctioning and/or tolerating

---


anti-American demonstrations), societal resistance to regional powers could be instigated (often quietly) by a rival regional state (some of the recent anti-Japanese demonstrations in China may fall into this category). Another type of resistance represents grassroots sentiments mobilized by nongovernmental organizations and nationalist pressure groups. Examples in East Asia would include past anti-Indian riots in Burma, anti-Japanese riots in Indonesia under Suharto, recent anti-Chinese riots in Malaysia and Indonesia, anti-Chinese demonstrations in South Korea over the Kogruyo controversy, and rising anti-Japanese sentiments and demonstrations in Korea and China. The role of ethnic minorities in regional relations and the problem of antiethnic riots did form part of the agenda of early Asian regionalist efforts, such as the Asian Relations Conference of 1947, and affects the prospects for regional community building in East Asia today.\(^59\)

The main rationale for studying regional responses to power is to compensate for the top-down view of power-constructed regions that is presented by the two volumes under review. Such a perspective also gives short shift to regionalist ideas and discourses. But these play a central role in the endogenous construction of regions. As Iver Neumann puts it, the conceptualization of regions must pay attention to its nature as a “cognitive construct shared by persons in the region themselves.”\(^60\) Despite mentioning discourses about national identity in India and Europe (Buzan and Wæver, 122–23, 361–64), R&\(^P\) dismisses “local discourses about regionalism” (Buzan and Wæver, 481) in the making of regional orders. This undercuts its claim that regions are socially constructed through processes of securitization and desecuritization. After all, local discourses about regionalism may contain “speech acts” central to securitization theory. AWR speaks of regional identity in terms of history, culture, and institutionalization but discounts their creation as “ideological constructs” (Katzenstein, 12). But regionalist


\(^60\) Neumann (fn. 9), 57.
ideas and discourses are an important part of region building. To quote Alexander Murphy, “As social constructions, regions are necessarily ideological and no explanation of their individuality or character can be complete without explicit consideration of the types of ideas that are developed and sustained in connection with the regionalization process.” While an “ideas all the down” approach to regional definition may not be called for, regionalist ideas and discourses do determine who is included and who is excluded from regions and explain why membership of regional institutions may not coincide with the recognized geographic boundaries of regions. In other words, regions, like nation-states, are to some extent imagined communities. They can be constructed through both discourses and socialization processes.

**Conclusion**

The two volumes reviewed in this article present a range of new and challenging ideas about how to conceptualize and study the emerging regional architecture of world politics. As such, they make a substantial contribution that no student of regional order can afford to miss. But further work is needed to develop a more complete understanding of regional orders. This article has focused on one key area for further research: the relationship between regions and powerful actors from outside and from within. This involves identifying conditions that lead regions to challenge external influence and theorizing about the different forms such resistance can take, at both the state and the societal level. One should also pay attention to how regions socialize powerful actors on their own terms, rather than simply playing the hegemon’s game. Study of these dynamics is ultimately crucial for understanding the endogenous construction of regions. Other areas of further research include the relationship between regional structures/institutions and regional order. Scholars of regional order should also pay more attention to interregional (region-to-region, as opposed to just global-to-regional) dynamics. Both of these are neglected in the two books under review, yet they play an important role in determining whether regions truly matter in world politics.

Finally, in contributing to a theory of regional orders, the two books have much to learn from each other. The statist and materialist orientation of regional security complex theory (R&P) can benefit from the

---

61 Murphy (fn. 9), 30.
62 Acharya (fn. 9). See also Adler’s notion of “cognitive” regions; Emanuel Adler, “Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 26, no. 2 (1997).
close attention to society, culture, and identity found in *AWR*. *R&P*’s emphasis on securitization can be usefully complemented by *AWR*’s attention to socialization and institutionalization. A theory of regional order should combine the former’s elaborate structural schema with the latter’s attention to process politics. *AWR*’s stress on the dynamic long-term variables of regional orders such as globalization, internationalization, and economic interdependence can enrich security complex theory, which needs to pay more attention to the economics-security nexus. In a similar vein, *AWR*’s framework can usefully borrow from the rich descriptions and conceptualization of different types of regional structures found in *R&P*, in order to look beyond a world of regions that is constituted mainly by core states serving U.S. power and purpose.